Peace Coalition Politics: The Liberal Experiment, 1954-1965 by Herrine, Steven K.
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1982 
Peace Coalition Politics: The Liberal Experiment, 1954-1965 
Steven K. Herrine 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Herrine, Steven K., "Peace Coalition Politics: The Liberal Experiment, 1954-1965" (1982). Honors Papers. 
652. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/652 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
,) 
PEACE COALITION POLITICS: 
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6 ~1ay 1982 
History Honors Thesi s 
Oberlin College 




Thi s study offers an overview of the peace movement in the Uni ted S ta tes 
during the decade prededing the Vietnam War. This movement, unlike its fore-
runners , was led by liberal s who attempted to reform the system from within. 
A coalition of established and new groups was forged, with the major consti-
tuencies drawn from world federalists and pacifists. This seemingly unlikely 
combination i s analyzed through historical investigation with some aid from 
the political science mathematically-based theory of coalition formation. The 
creation of this coalition was facilitated by their championing of a nuclear 
test-ban in a period when the health hazards of a tmospheric nuclear explosions 
were becoming known to the publi c . It was this issue that carried the movement 
until its final demi se upon the si gning of the limited test ban treaty in 
Augus t of 1963. 
Given the generally negative assessment of the achievement of thi s peace 
coalition, the study attempts to analyze what the true goals of the various 
factions of this movement were and the shortcomings buil t into these objectives. 
Furthermore, alternative strategies and tactics are suggested for current and 
future activi s ts looking to history for direction and precedent. Several pit-
falls of the liberal peace experiment should be noticed throughout the study. 
The gradual co-opting of the peace movement into the government camp was 
possible because of the coalition liberal' s desire to maintain legitimacy, 
especially through its anti-communist vigilance. Secondly, liberal s held a 
preponderance of power in the coalition, not the radicals, who were in the 
position of outsider so necessary to lead a reform movement to success. 
This project began as a paper for Clayton Koppes' Modern American Pol iti cs 
seminar in the fall of 1980. A Jerome Davi s research grant helped cover my 
Hi 
expenses during the research phase of the project. Thanks go to the admini s-
tra tors of tha t resource, the cha i rperson of whi ch i s t·Ji 11 iam Norri s. 
My thanks also go to the many who assisted in the production of this 
work. Clayton R. Koppes, my faculty advisor, wa s an excellent critical reader 
and helped me to sharpen my organization and clarity of ideas. The staff of 
the Swarthmore College Peace Collectfon, particularly its Curator, J. Richard 
Kyle, were gracious and helpful hosts during my two vi s its to that excellent 
archive . Thanks go to the t~eference staff at Oberlin College, led by Ray 
Engli s h. as well as to the Interlibrary Loan staff, who expedited my requests 
with alacrity. The Oral History Resea 'rch Office at Columbia University was 
a pleasant locale to spend one fall afternoon. Patt Clarkson was the abl e 
and friendly typist of the final draft. Finally, thanks to my ' friend. Gail 









Historical Introduction and Introduction to Coalition Theory 
The Birth of the Liberal Peace Witness 
Forming the Grand Coalition 
Premature Fall of the Grand Coalition 
Back to Chaos--A Full Circle? 
















Chapter I. Hi s torical Framework and Introduction to Coalition Theory 
A broad coalition of peace activists arose in the second half of the 
1950s. Lawrence ~Jittner ~ in 8ebe1 sAga i nst ~Jar. the major secondary source 
of the post-WW · II peace movement, speaks of a "rebirth" of the peace movement 
in the late 1950s as if it was the offspring of the very different activism 
of the 1930s, but this interpretation will be disputed here. The historical 
roots of this movement which can be unearthed relate to the assumptions, of mid-
century liberalism. Liberalism is a term fraught with many confused meanings, 
but will be used in the context of the mid-century peace movement to indicate 
the ideology and practi ce in America which encompas ses a belief in perpetual 
progress in the United States through its free enterpri se sys tem. maintained 
a vigilant anti-communism, and spoke much of the civil rights of all i ts 
citizens. Liberal peace activism was notably different than the radical 
practi ce, which advocated unilateral disarmament by the United States. Signifi -
cantly. liberals put great emphasis on their own legitimacy in society, choosing 
not to endanger their position in private or public life through the championing 
of unpopular causes. Instead, progressive social change was sought through 
manipulating the levers of power in the established pluralist system. 
The above description of liberal assumptions can not be used for the 
radical activism of the pre-World War II years or the years of protest during 
the Vietnam war. The peace coalition of the mid-twentieth century wa s an 
experiment in liberal activism. Surely. not all members of the coalition were 
liberal s , but the movement. as we shall see, was born of liberal ideology and 
broke up on the reefs of those assumptions. 
The underlying hi s torical currents which carried through thi s unprecedented 
liberal involvement in peace politics can be di.scovered by exploring the past 
1 
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07 US peace activism. A striving for legitimacy i s one of the key themes 
which will appear repeatedly, Especially keen on this strategy were the 
l iberals, who sought to change the system through their insider status . Implicit 
in thi s s tra tegy is a second trend, the danger of the acti vi s t program from 
becoming indistinguishable from that of the government. 
Peace activists seeking legitimacy often emphasized an lIeasy" issue on 
which a victory was achieveable or even imminent, hence insuring "success" and 
demonstrating their influence. However, once the battle was won, the issue 
which had enabled support to grow was lost and the numbers in the peace 
movement often dwindled. A third trend which i s noticable in the history of 
the US peace movement is the ebb and flow of activism corresponding to the 
presence of crisis and war. In the ·case of domestic or international crisis, 
the activists could often take advantage of fear and confusion to increase the 
numbers and power of their voice. However, when war did break out, the coalition 
would be stripped barely to sustenance level. with usually only the religious 
pacifist core remaining to reconstruct the shattered movement after the peace 
treaty had been signed. 
The history of religious involvement in the peace movement goes beyond 
lonely wartime witnesses. Ques tions concerni ng rel i gion and the state woul d 
often puzzle the clergy, with different analyses splitting religious opinion. 
This lack of unity was not, however, confined to the churches. The hi s tory of 
the peace movement is filled with examples of internal division, especially when 
external events demand the most unity. The search for a common ground. or 
IIlowest common denominator" among all members of the peace movement was often 
resolved with the championing of a single issue. For example, an international 
crisis could often draw increased membership to peace organizations. 
3 
The liberal coalition being discussed was especially vulnerable to this type 
of internal division since each participating liberal group had a reputation 
to uphold in order to maintain its legitimacy . 
The members of the peace movement in any given time frame were usually 
discernab1e as members of several key groups. Religious membership has been 
mentioned. Women formed a second group whose activity was vital to the 
continua tion and occasional rejuvenation of the peace movement in bad times. 
Furthermore, women's involvement was often quite radical in nature . A third 
group of potential activists was the student population. Hardly a factor until 
1900, the gradual po1iticization of collegiate youth was evident in the unrest 
of the 1930 ·s . Although the 1940s and 1950s are often associated with a period 
of "student apathy," the young members of the academic community would 100m 
large in the liberal coalition and in the transition to the radical con-
tinuation of the 1930s during the Vietnam War. Finally, there were those 
activists with a large stake in society. Normally, these elements were non-
existent, but when they did arise, only leadership in the coalition would be 
considered. In these phases, the radical components of the coalition--women, 
students , pacifists--would fall under the aegis of the liberal s . 
I 
No liberal contingent exi sted in the earliest years of American hi story . 
During the colonial period, the only IIpeace movement ll was the religious witness 
of outcast sects, several of which remain as the Historic Peace Churches--
Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren. Among these denominations, the Quakers were 
the most politically active, according to Peter Brock, historian of pacifism 
in the colonial period. because th.ey were English speaking, and therefore not 
i.solated from the society. as were many other sects of Germaic origin. In fact, 
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Quakers were greatly involved in the legi slature of colonial Pennsylvania . 
The Mennonites and Brethren were sects which cooperated with the government 
in very passive ways. Satisfied with the freedom of worship granted them, 
no political voice of influence arose from these sec ts, and it rarely does 
in the present. In this period, then, the strength of the religious imperative 
to resi st the state was already different among the various peace sects .l 
The American Revolution brought the issue of religiously based objection 
to a head. Many Quakers, because of their attachment to British culture, 
became loyalists and therefore gained unpopular notoriety after the war. The 
~1ennonites offered financial asststance to the revolutionary cause in the guise 
of commutation fees in 1 ieu of service. ranging. from £2.10s to £40. However, 
since the cummutation fee wa s seen as a passing along of one'·s duty to another 
by the Brethren and the Utopian Shakers, this option was not open to members 
of those sects. Furthermore, refusal to pay war taxes, to take payment for 
seized goods, to take loyalty oaths and a general uncooperativeness by these 
groups was an early glimpse of religiously based non-violent resistance. A 
schism in the Quaker church caused by the formation of revolution-supporting 
IIFree Quakersll in Philadelphia indicated that internal division was present 
even within a single denomination. A final point of interest of the religious 
peace movement of the R~volutionary period was the number of unattached individual s 
taking stands against the war. A theme which will recur, this individual witness 
is often an indication of a vacuum in the peace movement. In this case, the 
support of the war by most churches alienated these individual s , whose stances 
against war were all based on the New Testament. 
Following the Treaty of Paris which ended the Revolutionary War , many Quaker 
loyalists migrated to Canada. The glorification of the war of independence was 
J 
harmful to the peace witness of the church, leading to a "1 0ss of vitality" 
in pacifist circles for many years. Yet despite this sectarian silence, 
5 
a secular movement, initiated, led and poptlja~ed in a large part by women. 
arose in the early nineteenth century. This movement, manifested in a 
plethora of volunteer societies~ gave an organlzationa1 framework to peace 
work in a rapidly growing society. Many of the debates, strengths. and 
weaknesses that would be characteri stic of the peace movement in later years 
can be seen in these vo1un~eer organizations. 2 
The first peace societies emphasized local activism, American nationalism, 
gradual ism, and complete pacifism. The New York Peace Society and the Massa-· 
chusetts Peace Society were both founded in 1815, by David Dodge and the 
Reverend Noah Worcester, respectively. Both these societies were comprised 
maninly of res pectable men; primarily merchants, theologians, ministers and 
professors. In 1828, William Ladd founded the American. Peace Society (APS) 
based on the constitution of the Massachusetts Peace Society, which, with 
the New York organization, became a member of the APS. It was in this society 
that a large number of women first became involved. Throughout the 1830s a 
debate on absolute pacifism, as opposed to a pacifism which admonished only 
"offensive wars ,II raged in the APS. In 1836, a new constitution passed which 
both embraced absolute pacifism and welcomed non-pacifists to join APS. The 
factionalism which arose foreshadows some of the most profound problems to 
face the liberal coalition more than 120 years later. 3 
"I am not,1I wrote one disgruntled APS member, lIa believer in the Quaker 
principl e of the criminality of defensive war. I ought not, therefore , to 
lend even the poor support of my name to a principle which I think not founded 
upon the gospel, not true, and blasting to the prospects of usefulness of a 
society .. vJhich I hoped would tend to correct the public opinion concerning 
war." An attempt to rephrase the new constitution met with opposition 
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by society radicals, who formed an "arrangements committee" which would s lowly 
transform into the basis for the new "non-resistance" movement in New England. 4 
Founded in September of 1838, the New England Non-Resistance Society 
(NENRS) featured abolitionist William Lloyd Garri son as its leader. and was 
populated by a large percentage of women. Notable in the ranks were abolition-
ists Sarah and Angelina Grimke, novelist Lydia Maria Child, reformer Lucretia 
Matt, and feminist Abby Kelley. Also active in NENRS were students, indicated 
by a strong pacifist movement at Bowdoin College and a chartered branch of 
the society all the way west in Oberlin, Ohio. In addition to a strong pacifist 
sentiment, NENRS was marked by its allegiance to higher authority than the US 
government--a stance which would evolve into the "third camp" position of the 
peace movement in the middle of the twentieth century. As opposed to APS, 
which paid "dearest political affection " to the United States, the Declaration 
of Sentiments adopted by NENRS declared; "He cannot acknowledge allegiance 
to any human government,1I A foreshadowing of post ~~orld ~'Jar II world federalism 
appeared on the masthead of Garrison's renowned Liberator: "Our country is 
the world, our countrymen all mankind." Significantly, despite reports of 
"Knitting, se'.<Jing and embroidery,1I by women during NENRS meetings, women were 
5 
accorded equal standing in the organization. 
The Mexican War of 1845 was the first war which faced the new secular 
peace movement, the result setting precedents which have been followed closely. 
The NENRS. already faltering due to the extreme radicalism of some of its 
members. was harmed by the war and was dissolved as an organization in 1-850. 
The war ~caused a serious upheaval on the leadership level ... and a 
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reori enta ti on of its pol icy ina conserva ti ve di recti on. \I The wi thdrawa 1 
of the pacifist membership and leadership of NENRS led to "the gradual wither-
ing of its original vigor and inspiration. " Elihu Burritt founded a splinter 
group, the League of Universal Brotherhood, in December, 1845. Several trends 
which will become important are evident here. Radical groups became more 
radical and withdrew from legitimate coalition groups during times of war. 
More importantly, a proliferation of new groups occurred to embrace specific 
quirks in ideology. 
The extreme sectionali st conflicts of the 18505 and 1860s led to a 
re-examination of religion' s role with the state . William lloyd Garri son 
switched his views from absolute pacifism, along with many others, to the 
assessment that "war is better than slavery." Scripture was successfully 
lntegrated into the current political thinking, well demonstrated by the 
following example of antebellum prose by Lydia Child: 
I abhor war and have the greatest dread of military 
supremacy, yet I have become so desperate with hope--
deferred, that a hurra goes up from my heart, when the 
army rises to carry out God's laws ... I am convinced 
that this is the great battle of Armageddon between the 
Angel s of Freedom and the Demons of Despotism. 
During the Civil War itself, the Peace Churches were able to excuse their 
members from military service by the payment of a commutation fee, an option 
taken by many Quaker meetings, an early example of the Friends' willingness 
to cooperate with the rules of the government. Many Mennonites and Brethren 
strayed from the faith, taking up arms in the war. The most radical opposition 
to the Civil War came not from organized religion but from threatened young 
men, who rioted in major cities throughout the United States, most notably in 
New York City in the summer of 1863. 7 
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The lukewarm support of the Civil vJar by the American Peace Society 
was disillusioning to many members, including Albert Love, who in 1866 founded 
the Universal Peace Union (UPU), a secular radical group devoted to the 
"emancipation of labor" as a solution to the economic roots of war. A true 
radical coalition, the UPU enlisted the support of disgruntled members of 
APS, pacifist religious sects such as the Progressive Friends, Shakers, 
Rogerences and Bible Christians, members of non-pacifist denominatlons and 
lI unaffiliated religious liberal s ." Fully one third of the active membership 
of the soci ety were women .• incl uding impressive fi gures such as Susan B. 
Anthony, Lucretia Mott, Belva Lockwood (the first woman to stand for the 
US presidency), and Lucy Stone. Foreshadowing the work of the Committee 
for No-n-Violent Action which would emerge in the late 1950s, UPU advocated 
that the United States take a moral lead in the -world through unilateral 
disarmament. And, similar to the later work of the Women's International 
League for Peace and Freedom, UPU attempted to change the emphasis of the 
educational process to a more peaceful view. UPU never attracted an impressively 
large membership and the organization enlisted such bellicose honorary vice-
preSidents as Will iam H. Taft~ El ihu Root, and Mexican dictatorial president 
Porfirio Diaz. However, UPU wa s significant in its message and method. The 
radical call for a conversion of society through non-violent means was in 
direct opposition to the policies of the faltering legitimate APS. Further-
more, the transformation of Garrisonian non-resistance into a Tolstoyian 
non-violence is apparent as an undercurrent in the Union's peace literature , 
with UPU even issuing reprints of that Russian ' s work. Unfortunately for 
the future of UPU, the Spanish-American war broke out in 1898. Their immediate 
opposition was met by an effigy burning of Love in Philadelphia . The US' s entry 
into the imperialist club was met with limited and feebl e opposition from 
radical and pacifist circles, marking the genesi s of a brief legitimate 
coalition of anti-war activism. 9 
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The centrist coalition which arose can be classified into three groups; 
(1) the generalists, who espoused broad, vague plans of negotiated !Jeace. 
(2) the world federalists, who urged the end of national sovereignty in favor 
of a world government and l egal system and (3) the legalists, who favored 
more successful negotiation of international confl icts through a world court . 
None of these refo~ming trends can be .considered radical. All were causes 
acceptabl e to society taken up by upstanding citi zens, mostly men. The first 
noticeabl e manifestation of this brief centri s t coalition was the Pari s 
international peace conference of 1889, where the American delegation showed 
an obvious favoring of the English as allies. The 1899 Hague conference, 
one 
called by the Russian government according to author due to their "sagging 
artillery." was aimed at 'the legalist solution to world tension. No real 
provisions for disarmament were made at this conference. The popularity of 
the peace conference movement and legalist philosophy is evidenced by the 
establishment of forty-five new societi.es with these goal s in the first 
fifteen years of the 1900s. l0 
Certain problems which faced the legalists in the late nineteenth century 
are analogous to situations which would ari se in the mid-twentieth century 
coalition led by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). 
The elitism of the movement was striking. The establishment of the Andrew 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), based on $10 million of 
United States Steel bonds, along with Carnegie's presidency of the New York 
Peace Society must have severely limited the level of the coalition ' s social 
10 
criticism. Many other business leaders were involved in the upper echelons of 
the legalist program. No lip service was paid to true internationalism since 
United States nationalism wa s felt and spoken of s trongly by members of thi s 
early legitimate coal Hion. ll 
Despite the 1 egitima te route of the majority of peace workers in the 
period following the Spanish-American War and preceding the Great War, the 
seeds for the future were bel~ng planted especially by those Americans influenced 
by the writing of Count Leo Tolstoy. A Tolstoy Club was founded in Boston 
in 1899, while several well-known citizens in the US were influenced by and 
disseminated hi s ideas. Both William Jennings Bryan and Clarence Darrow were 
examples , although Bryan reluctantly supported the Spanish-American War. Other 
Tolstoyites, including the international lawyer Ernest H. Crosby, were critical 
of American imperialism , as was Jane Addams, a radical feminist who criticized 
lithe pathetic belief in the regenerative results of war.,,1 2 
II 
It was Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, and other dedicated women who broke 
peace activism out of the stagnation of legalism toward a more deep-reaching 
critique of society's ill s. Spurred on by the imminence of international war, 
many organizations which still exist today were founded in the 1910s. Thi s 
new breed of peace groups included the \~omen ' s Peace Party (1 a ter the Women' s 
International League for Peace and Freedom), the Fellowship of Reconciliation 
(FOR). and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Although Worl d l~ar I 
was a temporary block to these new groups, they emerged 'ill 'surprisingly good 
health from the experience. A continuation of conservative. legitimate peace 
activism, the government's use of peace issues to their own advantage, and a 
right-wing backlash aimed at the extinguishing of the radical peace witness 
are apparent trends in the period 1914-1933. 
Thi s was the true beginning of the Modern Ameri~an peace movement and 
a trial period for the radicalism of the later 1930s. Peace groups began 
to analyze war as a symptom of the greater ills of society. Attempts were 
made to organize many sectors of life in the US by educating the populace 
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in a new light. These groups explained that certain sectors of society could 
gain great advantage from the war system, while the laborers lost their 
possessions and their lives. In a sense, the new activism waS radical by 
definition, since it dealt with overthrowing the existing order of ideas. 
The liberal experimental coalition would undergo difficult times due to the 
radical nature of the new peace analysis. 
Religious peace activism underwent drastic changes in the WWI period. 
In contrast to the days when only the peace churches spoke against militarism, 
more denominations became involved with the founding of the Fellowship of 
Reconcilation (FOR) in November 1915 as an offshoot of a London organization 
of the same name. An indication of the political leanlngs of the original 
FOR was the executive secretaryship of Norman Thomas, later the Presidential 
candidate of the Socialist Party, USA. In 1929, FOR decided to put more emphasis 
on politics, followed by a 1934 reaffirmation of non-violence as its mean toward 
change. This radicalization and political awakening of religious groups was 
not the entire story of religious activity in this era. For example, Reinhold 
Niebuhr. an influential Protestant clergyman. discarded radicalism. switching 
his politics away from pacifism in 1934. The American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC) cooperated with the government' s Selective Service legislation of WWI. 
gaining conscientious objector status for Friends while participating in relief 
and ambulance work. 13 
One pacifist during thi s time commented that women "constitute the backbone 
of the peace movement in America. " Indeed, women emerged in this period as a 
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strong radical force with the founding of the ~lomen I s Peace Party, the Homen I s 
Peace Union, the American Union Against Militarism , and the Women' s Inter-
national League for Peace and Freedom. Henry Ford found enough merit in their 
work to finance a "peace ship,1I support he withdrew with the US declaration 
of war in 1917. These womens' campaigns were founded on the basis of radical 
social reform, not temporary al liances and treaties : Some women, rather 
than working from outside the power structure, attempted to gain entry. ~JILPF 
initiated a Vlashington lobby campaign and the consideration of the women ' s new 
vote was strong among professional po1iticians. 14 
A reaction to the initial successes of radical peace activism wa s evident 
as both radical and legitimate groups came under attack by a right-wing 
resurgence immediately preceding World \~ar I. New strength in groups such as 
the Ku Klux Klan and the American Legion in the domestic sphere and the 
isolationist America First Committee and the Committee to Defend America on 
the international scene were challenging opponen ts to peace activists. Executive 
branch actions, such as the censorship of FOR periodical, the World Tomorrow, 
indicated that radical opposition to US intervention in Europe would not be a 
popular or comfortable stand. The legislators issued similar sentiments by the 
passage of the Espionage Ac t in 1917 and the Sedition Act in 1918 which curtai l ed 
civil liberties. This type of attack on radical elements is certainly not 
uncommon during times of war, however, the significance to the peace movement 
is evidenced by its own fragmentation. Without a unified stand on the war and 
the social and economic pitfalls which faced the world, th e peace movement s tood 
vulnerable to the splitting effect of the right-~ing wedge .15 
Developments which harmed the pre-WW I peace movement as much as the 
right-wing resurgence were moves by the US government and conservative elements 
J 
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tov/ard a negotiated peace movement which took even more of the sting out 
of religious, pacifist and femini st efforts to reform a militarist society. 
The interwar period was filled with examples of idealistic treaties, conferences, 
and agreements. The Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-1922 was 
genera lly successful in its goals, yet the reasons behi nd the passage of its 
rOesulting treaty were nationalistic, with the US achieving naval parity with 
Great Britain and superiority over Japan. The acclaim the treaty received 
from peace workers served to attentuate more radical solutions being considered. 
The Locarno agreements of 1924, in which the League of Nations guaranteed 
certain frontiers in Europe, seemed a step toward rational international 
behavior, yet the breakdown of the League in the 1930s proved that such hopes 
were premature. After some initially approving debate , the Senate finallY 
rejected the World Court, indicating the lack of willingness of international 
powers to surrender any sovereignty whatsoever. Finally, in a massive lIinter-
national kiss,1I the Kellogg-Briand Pact formally outlawed war as an instrument 
of national pol icy in 1928. This treaty was approved by the US Senate in 
January of the following year by a vote of 85-1. The success of such an empty 
measure in diverting the power of peace activism i s evident.
16 
As conditions worsened in Europe, the US peace movement stepped up its 
ac:tivity. Despite alack of response to the 1933 Japanese aggressive invasion 
of r~anchuria, by 1935, the !y.'adical peace movement was at its height of pO\,/er . 
The theory of non-violence \'/as becoming popular to some Westeners through 
studies of Mohandas Gandhi's work in India. A coalition of pacifists, laborers, 
socialfsts, communists, students, women, and blacks arose in the 1930s to work 
against war. So influential was their mess~ge and so threatening were the war 
clouds ga thering over Europe that ina survey taken in February 1937 asking 
lI if another war like the World ~Jar develops in Europe. should America take part 
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again," ninety-five per cent answered "no ." In The Power oi.NQn.ViQlence. 
published in 1934, American Ri·chard Gregg, a western disci"ple of Gandhi .• 
provided a working primer for the aspiring non-violent activist. By employing 
"moral jiu-jitsu," Gregg explained, one could convert society rather than 
trying to stop war in a society which depended on that foul event for its 
economi c well-being. Gregg was indeed a radical, indicated by his assertion 
that sedition is morally acceptable if pursued through non-violent means. 
Using faith in this new weapon and the general fear of war throughout the 
United States, the pacifists were able to form a leftist coalition for several 
years in the second half of the 1930s. Although a centrist coalition formed 
around the Emergency Peace Campaign of 1935, the pacifist group was both 
numerically and mometarily stronger. l ? 
A key member of the leftist coalition was the National Council for the 
Prevention of War (NCPW), which foreshadowed the Turn Toward Peace effort of 
the early 1960s in its efforts to coordinate the work of pacifists, non-
pacifists and labor into a coherent peace movement. The Communist Party was 
loudly in favor of a "united front" against war. The Socialist Party, too, 
threatened a "general strike ll if war was ever declared in the United States. 
Pacifists such as Devere Allen, who wrote the 1934 platform, and Norman Thomas, 
who represented the SP for the presidency were influential in the party. 
Although many labor unions were opposed to the work of the leftist peace 
coalition, several unions did participate in anti-war demonstrations. l8 
Women were actively involved in the leftist coalition of peace work in 
the mid-1930s. Jeanette Rankin, the only member of the United States House of 
Representatives to vote against entry into World War II, was the Washington 
lobbyi st for NCPW. The WILPF wa s strong, with over thirteen thousand members 
in one hundred and twenty local branches in the United States alone. That 
organization's lobbyist, Dorothy Detzer . was largely responsible for the 
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Nye Committee investigation of the role of the munitions industry in the US' s 
entry into WWl--the so-called "Merchants of Death" controversy. In 1934, 
five hundred young women at Vassar College~ led by the president of that 
institution, marched in full academic regalia through the street of Pough-
keepsie, chanting anti-war slogans. 19 
Indeed, students made up a considerable part of the coalition' s constituency . 
The American Student Union , founded in 1935, was the first non-socialist campus 
group with a large following. The Oxford Pledge Movement of 1936-1938 was an 
effort to have all young persons swear not to serve in the armed forces . In 
1937, some 500,000 students nationwide participated in anti-war "strikes. " 
Although this opposition to miliarism would wane greatly with the onset of the 
Second World War~ the possibility of a strong and radical s tudent activist 
movement had been demonstrated. And it will be the student movement which 
forms the tenuou s link between the ' experimental liberal coalition of the 1950s 
and early 1960s and the radical anti-Vietnam movement of the later 1960s. 20 
A final member of the leftist coalition was the black community. In the 
1950s and 1960s the civil rights demonstrations would help radicali ze young 
activists , their new political choices carrying over to anti-war issues. The 
origin of the radical black movement is traceable to pacifist A.J. Huste' s 
establishment of hi ,s Harlem "ashram," and continued in the founding of the 
Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) in 1942. The first direct acti,on of CORE 
was in the White City Roller Rink in Chicago in March of 1942. where black 
denomstrators non-violently and successfully demanded the integration of the 
facility. During the second World l~ar, some black Americans emphasized that 
their condition in society would not be much worse with the victory of Hitler. 
"If we win, I lose," explained one enli sted man, while another offered 
his IIDraftee's Prayer ll ; 
Dear Lord. today 
r go to war; 
To fight to die, 
Tell me what for? 
dear Lord, I'll fight 
I do not fear, 
Germans or Japs; 
My fears are here. 
Americal 
16 
The black witness was, as in the more. contemporary period,. waged as a separate 
struggle, from other radical causes. However, the black movement encouraged 
radical activism by its striking successes, specifically inspiring youth. 21 
Another seedbed for future activism were the locations where conscientious 
objectors were incarcerated during the war years. The Quakers, in step with 
their history, cooperated wi th the warring state in order to protect its own 
members, helping to draft the section dealing with objection in the Selective 
Service and Training Act of 1940, the first peacetime draft legislation in 
the history of the United States. The Quakers continued their legislative 
efforts through the establishment of the Friend's Committee on National Legi s-
lation (FCNL) in 1943. Further cooperation came with the setting up of 
alternative service programs, namely the Civilian Public Service (CPS) camps. 
Although originally praised by pacifists as a constructive alternative to 
combat service, the program soon displayed its inadequacies. "Guinea p'ig " 
research and rural conservation work did not seem to the generally well-educated 
pacifists a real service to their country. Furthermore, the lack of remuneration 
for thei r work and the mi 1 ita ry disci P 1 i ne of the camps soon 1 ed to ou tri ght 
rebell ion. 22 
\'lalkouts began in 1942 and greatly accelerated thereafter, with many 
pacifists choosing jail as a more effective protest against the wartime state . 
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~lassive non-cooperation was reported in the. camps . Organized work strikes 
hit many of the CPS locations after the war. In the prisons, where every sixth 
inmate during the war was a CO. non-violent direct action was practiced. m9st 
successfully at Danbury State Penitentiary. where a hunger strike was initiated 
in demand of the integration of the dining hall s. After 135 days of non-
ooperation. the demands were met. Inspired by Corbett Bishop's remarkable 
426 days of non-cooperation, one pacifist look.ed to the future;IINon-vio1ent 
resistance . . . can be. the bright. strong me.ans of defeating--without war--
imperial oppression and aggression throughout the world." One warden attested 
to the effec tivenes s of the CO I S beha vi or: "You CO I S may be glad when the war 
is over, but not'half as much as I who yearn for the good old days of s impl e 
murderers and bank robbers for prisoners." These young pacifi sts would be 
the thoughtful radicals of the pacifist wing of the liberal coalition in the 
1950s and 1960s, armed with their ne\'/ strategy of action. 23 
The history of peace w'itness and activism in the United States through 
the second world war contains several key trends which will recur in the 
liberal peace coalition of 1954-1965. Religious activism . usually the only 
contingent active during times of war. was often divided against itself. even 
within single denominations. Secular movements arose to concentrate on s ingle. 
poignant issues. The involvement of women in these usually nationalisti c 
pressure groups was significant . Cooperation between these organi za tions was 
often lacking. as each championed peace through slightly or drastically different 
means. A brief legitimate coalition arose in the early twentieth century 
which placed emphasi s on strengthening the role of the United States in keeping 
the peace . 
Only after the Great War did signs of the modern peace movement ri se to 
the surface. In this period . as in the first several decades of the nineteenth 
century, the rol e of women as a moral force was vital . In the interwar 
yea rs, a radica 1 coa 1 iti on was able to ga i n support through its advocacy of 
basic social change. only to be quelled by the second world war. Finally, 
during the war, religious objectors discovered the Gandhian technique of 
satyagraha, a method whi"ch would guide the thinking of the pacifist wing of 
the peace movement in the mid-twentieth century . 
III 
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A recurrent problem which faced peace movements in the past and which 
would plague the liberal experiment was the establishment of alliances. 
Inevitably. several sectors of society are needed to advocate a difficult issue . 
although they might do so for different reasons. 14hen several organi za tions 
attempt to forge a unit, the needs and ideals of the organi za tions must often 
be put aside in order to achieve their common pur~ose For exampl e, if one 
organization has greater numbers and· financial support than another, should 
the stronger group have more input in policy decisions of the coalition? Or, 
should a group with mainstream political ideology join forces with a s trong 
organization with an extreme viewpoint? These types of coalition dynamics 
have not been emphasized enough in exi"sting studies of the US peace movement . 
In order to deal with these types of problems, the pol itical science theory 
of coalition formation will be employed as an aid. Based on the mathematical 
theory of games, coalition theory develops model s of behavior which can predict 
what types of coalitions are most likely to form. After a review of the major 
theories and counter-currents of coalition formation, an analysi s of the 
usefulness of this framework will be offered. Finally. some of the history 
discussed above will be related to the exi sting theori es as an illustration of 
their use. 
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Certain assumptions were made. in all the early game theori es, namely, 
the limitation of the game to two players, the "rati"onalitylt of the actors in 
the game, the "constant-sum" condition, in which the players had diametrically 
opposed goals , and the conditions of winning. which resulted in some numerical 
"payoff." As we will discover, these as sumptions can severely limit the. 
applicability of the theory to actual situations. "Rationality" refers to 
the assumption that the players, given that a certain action will maximi ze 
their II payoff ," will choose that move. Al though the theory was soon expanded 
from two players to the general case of "nll players, the constant sum condition 
was conti nued. For exampl e, in a three person game, suppose pl ayer A wi ns 2 
units in a game, then players Band C must lose those same two units between 
them. Payoffs were originally of two types: "equidivision," in which all 
players of a winning coalition take equal shares of the payoff, and the "parity 
norm," in which each member receives a s hare in keeping with its contribution 
to the coalition. 24 
The publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by john Von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 was the first formulation of n-person 
game theory. In their theory, that of IIsimple games." the most likely coalitions 
to form were proven to be those which will attain their objective (a majority 
of votes in this case) with the minimal possible number of members . The first 
major i nnova ti on on the theory came in 1962 wi th the writi ngs of Wi 11 iam H. 
Riker, who derived the "size principle." which dealt with the possibility of 
the actors being of different importance; or having different "weights. 1I To 
give an illustrating example, suppose group A has 25 votes, group B ha s 35 
h , 
votes and group C has 40 votes. Majori ty is defi ned by m= .~ .l. "'~ + d where 
c.=1 
the w. are the weights and d is larger than zero and smaller than the small est 
1 . 
weight . In thi s case, then. m=51. Therefore, al l two group combinations , when 
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pooling their votes, will be a winning coalition, but A and B is most likely 
to form because of their smaller size. Michael Leiserson further hypothesized 
in 1966 that as the number of actors in a game increases, the more. likely 
coalitions will be those with the fewest members, a result of the so-called 
II • •• 1 11 25 bargainlng prlnclp e. 
In the 19705, the formulators of theory came to grips with the problem 
of the goal s of real world players. In the past the goal had been assumed to 
be wi nni ng the payoff. Now, with the "mi nima 1 range theory, II the actors t 
goal became to be included in a winning coalition which had views as close as 
possible to the actor1s own policies. In order to achieve this outcome, a 
spectrum of views was constructed, interchangeable with the left-right political 
spectrum, in which coalitions and individual actors were placed. In Robert 
Axelrod1s formulation of "minimal connected winning coa1itions,1I no member of 
the spectrum was skipped in the formation of a coalition. However, in the 
theory of Leiserson, which has enjoyed wider acclaim, an actor whose weight 
was low could be excluded from the coalition. Turning again to an example, 
suppose player A has weight 25, player B is endowed with 19 units and player C 
is worth 27, with m-51. Then A and C form a likely coalition according to 
Leiserson but player B must be included in Axelrod1s formu1ation. 26 
"Von Neumann and Morgenstern had no intention of describing what people 
did do," wrote political scientist A. Mazur in 1968, "but rather what they 
s hou 1 d do if they wa nted to max i mi ze thei r game ou tcomes . II The theory has none-
theless been applied to many historical and current political events. Many 
reasons exist why this application is a very risky practice. ~1ost crucial 
is the assumption of rationality, where experience tells us that in crisis 
situations or even in everyday politics, that such an axiom can easily be false. 
Attempts to reconcile the theory with these considerations were undertaken 
in the late 1970s, with no definitive formulation emerging. The constant 
sum assumption breaks down when the coalition i s faced with the requirement 
of grea ter than a s impl e majority to "wi n, II the exi s tence of a veto, or 
even the "bandwagon effect," where a coal ition is imminent to the players , 
who all fl~ck to join. U.S. political conventions demonstrate this latter 
phenomenon well .27 
The consensus among political scientists seems to be that, an applicabl e 
coalition theory will never be found. One author's analogy of coalition 
theory to free market economic theory inspires little hope given the limited 
applicability of economic theory to real world situations . Another team of 
authors describe the confusing attempts to test theori es by computer. Many 
authors are quick to admit that the theory exists for itself alone, that 
political scientists "are not trying to replicate real world coalitions nor 
are we trying to gain 'empathetic understanding' of politics in groups. " 
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Why then, study or even mention this politico-mathematical theory of coalitions? 
Despite its apparent limitations, the general conclusions reached by the theory 
do lead one to suspect that certain kinds of coalitions will be more successful 
than others. Using these clues and historical insight concerning outside 
conditions, the theory can be of some analytical help. As a demonstration, let 
us apply some aspects of the theory to the history of the peace movement as 
discussed above. 28 
The goal, or II payoff II to a winning coalition will be defined to be the 
influence of agencies of power, specifically the United States government, to 
take policy initiatives which are considered by the coalition to be steps 
'.toward peace . The goal of the early peace churches was only the protection of 
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their own constituenci es from the warring state. In this objective the 
peace churches achieved some success. The first peace coalition to strive for 
the goal as defined above was the group of volunteer societies scattered in 
nineteenth century America, particularly in New England. Their homogeneity 
of economic position, Christian ideology, and northeastern reforming zeal 
fits well into the closed minimum range theory which predicts that coa~tion will 
form among groups close together on the political spectrum. That thi s coalition 
was never able to extend its membership to the midwest or the deep ~outh led 
to its demi se , which was spurred on by the crisis situations which most formu-
lations of coalition theory cannot account for. 29 
The legitimate non-pacifist coalition of the early twentieth century 
was abl e to obtain some victories because of its great "weight." The cooperation 
of industrial entrepr91eurs and influential citizens enabled many peace confer-
ences to be held, with the misleading results those meetings produced. The 
"parity norm" system of payoffs was clearly in force here, evidenced by the 
healthy continued existence of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
today. Conversely, the strength of the radical peace coalition of 1933-1938 
was due not to the weight of any of its individual members, but to the vast 
cas t of characters. Again, crisis seems to have been a primary catalyst to 
the crystalization of this coalition, and fortunately for historical accuracy, 
this paper will not rely heavily on the coalition theory because of its 
l imitations in this context . 
A final example of the applicability of coalition theory i s the case of 
the incarcerated CO's during the Second World War. Because of their number 
in the prisons, CO' s were able to achieve a victory in some federal peni-
tentiaries . Thus, although faced by armed power, the non-violent res i sters , 
acting as a whole, were effective. The same would be true in the Southern 
states in the early and middle 1950s. However, the limitations of the 
non-violent resistance strategy when used in society as a wh.ole as opposed 
to a 1 imited setting would become evident in la ter years. 
23 
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Chapter II. The Birth of the Liberal Peace Witness 
After the turbulent World War II years, peace activism would emerge . but 
in a remarkably different form than the radical coalition of the 1930s. 
Vocally anticommunist and basing its immediacy on the threat of atomic 
destruction, this liberal experimental peace coalition had proponents in 
many areas of society. The idea that the advent of the atomic bomb made limited 
war obsolete was widespread in the US, Even President Truman admitted to 
his r~issouri neighbors that "war in the future would be sensel ess ." Yet 
despite this agreed lowest common denominator, many different approaches 
to world peace arose in the post-war years. In the dark times of domestic 
repression and international tension that would follow, only the most nation-
alistic options would be considered by legitimate spokespersons and policy-
makers . Although it was easy to speak of the need for world peace in these 
years, specifics often went undiscussed. A striking exampl e of this political 
vagueness is available in the history of the world federalist movement. 
Norman Cousins, editor of the liberal Saturday Review, essayist E. B. 
White, former Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, labor leader Robert L. 
Lund, scientists Albert Einstein, Edward Teller and Harold Urey, industriali s t 
Owen D. Yeung, Senator Glen Taylor, Representative Jerry Voorhi s , and writer 
Upton Sinclair, to name just a few, were strongly and publ~cly in favor of 
the world federation. The diversity in the group of world federalist proponents 
is an indication of the lack of concrete policy behind that ideology. Some , 
like President Truman. never intended to give up any US sovereignty, yet he 
remarked to one audience that "it will be just as easy for nations to get 
along in a republic of the world as it is for you to get along in the republic 
of the United States. " Others, like Congress person Helen Gahagan Douglas, 
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who claimed that "Hiroshima made me a pacifist, " profoundly changed their 
politics in the nuclear age. Despite the vagueness of world federalist 
rhetoric, by 1949, seventeen state legislatures had passed resolutions calling 
for moves by the United States to bring about such an arrangement. A Senate 
resolution to the same effect was co-sponsored by seven members in 1947 .1 
United World Federalists (UWF) was the organizational result of the new 
ideology. The members of this organization would later be the first to become 
involved in the liberal peace coalition experiment and the National Committee 
for a Sane Nuclear Policy '(SANE). UWF was founded by ex-marine and summa 
cumme laude Yale man Cord Meyer, Jr. in 1947 as an outgro\,/th of the National 
Planning Committee of the American Veteran's Committee. This organization 
\'/as not leftist, evidenced by its rejection of a membership bid by Ronald 
Reagan due to that actor's "radical" po1itics. 2 
UWF, by 1948, had over 40,000 members located in 659 local chapters 
nationwide. Despite a Madison Square Garden rally which attracted over 8000 
participants, the organization was not successful in-. attracting radical elements 
into its ranks due to its extreme US nationalism. On a radio interview, for 
example, UWF president Meyer advocated world federalism, but also spoke of the 
rearming of the United States in the interim period. The UWF continued to 
play both sides of the issue, including an excited endor?ement of the Korean 
War as a "police action," until 1950 when they were cited as a "subversive" 
organization by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The growing tensions 
associated with the Cold War had made cooperation of any kind with the Eastern 
bloc unthinkable. By 1951, all the .states which had passed world federalist 
resolutions had repealed them. A 1952 Connecticut newspaper headline spoke 
the current wisdom: "World Government Means Communism. u3 
United World Federalists became an anti-communist hot bed for liberals 
looki,ng for a, road to peace. Led by editor Norman Cousins, who assumed the 
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presidency in 1952, UWF worked its way into anonymity during the darkest 
years of the Cold War. Cord Meyer, Jr . left the organization in 1953 at 
the urging of Allen Dul l es to become a CIA agent, thereafter experiencing 
one tragedy after another in both his professional and personal lives. The 
rise and fall of UWF and Cord Meyer. Jr . was an early example of how activists 
who work closely with established power in the US quickly become indistinguish-
able from government spokespersons. This co~opting would be the same fate 
suffered by SANE in the next decade. 4 
I 
Religious pacifism after the world war took on a decidedly liberal tone. 
Inspired by the Steps toward legitimacy al lowed by the awarding of the Nobel 
Peace Prize to Emily Green Balch of WILPF in 1946 and to the American Friends 
Service Committee in 1947, the religious groups increas,ed their activity in 
traditional methods. The Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) 
was bu sy lobbying against the 1948 Selective Service Act (to no avail), im-
planting that group as a permanent fixture in Washington as the first religious 
lobbying organization. FOR was able to turn toward liberalism and go on 
record against the tactics of civil disobedience due to the withdrawal of 
exhausted CO' s. FOR's part in the anti-Universal Military Training campaign 
of 1947-1948 was significant. Later, thi s effort was described by pacifist 
A. J. Muste as lithe only case where really effective coordination of pacifi s t 
forces and near-pacifists was achieved."5 
An early coalition of religious groups was the Consultative Peace Counci l 
(CPC). CPCwas an offshoot of the conservative Foreign Policy association in 
the post World War I years, a group which was broken up by "bloc tactics" 
among certain organizations . Further demise wa s inspired by the departure 
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of their dynamic leader, James ~1cDonald. The Peace strategy Committee con-
tinued on, meeting in Quaker hotels in the Poconos and Atlantic City, until, 
at the urging of AFSC, the more permanent Consultative Peace Council was formed. 
Enjoyi ng a very short heyday, CPC "boil ed down to the meeting of the executives 
of the most interested organizations. II The significance of CPC is mainly as 
a trial coalition of groups which espoused generally the same policy alterna~ 
tives. Unfortunately, thi s period of practice would not make the parti~ipa­
ting groups more adept at cooperation during the hard times of the liberal 
coa lition to come .6 
Although many religious bodi es were content to fall into the growing 
liberal ideology, there were notable waves of radicalism in the religious 
world , especially prior to 1948. Many graduates of the CPS camps and the 
federal prisons shunned the more traditional FOR and cast their lots with 
the War Resisters League (WRL) ~ This influx of young radicals led to the 
resi gnation of the executive secretary and ACLU member Abraham Kaufman. WRL 
soon published literature openly advocating non-registration for the draft 
and non-payment of war taxes. Socialistic pacifism was the intent of the 
Commi.ttee for a Non-Violent Revolution (CNVR) of which one member, David 
Dellinger, suggested, lIa mass invasion of A&P supermarkets by housewives with 
hungr y fami 1 i es, for the express purpose of emptyi ng the shelves [as] a good 
way of keeping down the profits of the masters,,,7 
An organization which was less Marxist in its outlook whil e maintaining 
its radicalism was the Peacemakers, founded in late 1947 and devoted to 
tactics of resistance and civil disobedience . Tax refusal and draft non-
"registration were the most common forms of action by this group. A. J. ~1uste , 
a Dutch reformed minister who was a founding member of the Trotskyis t Worker' s 
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Party, USA, in the mid 1930s, and who converted to Quakerism in 1936, was 
an influential Peacemaker. His essay Of Holy Disobedience, written in 1952, 
was an early call to non-violent direct action in order to achieve broad 
social change. Urging pacifists to lead the way by refusing cooperation with 
the state, Muste queried: "why should they {the state] think there is any 
reality, hope or salvation in peace advocates. who when the moment of decision 
comes also act on the assumption that they "have no choice" but to conform?1I 
Although ~1uste was writing in a time darkened by the draft legislation of 1948, 
the final defeat of Henry ~Jallace's politics, the advent of NATO, the Korean 
War, and a period of domestic suspicion and persecution, his call would be 
listened to and referred to often in the years to come. S 
If the pacifists had a powerful witness but no audience ~ then the scientists 
of the time had an anxious audience and a mixed opinion. Although many con-
cerned scientists, particularly the physicists who were involved in the Man-
hattan project, organized to advise the government to internationalize atomic 
energy, an equally vocal and inflential scientific contigent adopted the 
government's anti-communist line. If any group had the legitimacy, progressive 
political leanings and numbers to rallyan anti-war movement, it was the 
scientists. 
The first organized effort by scientists in opposition to the bomb was the 
issuance of the Franck report by three physicists, three chemists and a biolo-
gist at the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory urging the United States not to 
employ the weapon militarily against Japan. An lIinterim committee" appointed 
by President Truman to study the Franck report presented the White House with 
an opposed viewpoint. IIWe can see no acceptable alternative to direct military 
use,1I concluded the report. A survey taken at the Chicago faci l ity indicated 
that the majority of scientists there agreed with the views of the interim 
committee. The bomb fell, and those with strong anti-bomb opinion, struck 
with moral pangs, became more active. 9 
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Led by Eugene Rabinowitch, the periodical Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
made its first appearance in 1945 . In November of that year, the Federation 
of Atomic Scientists was formed lito promote the use of scientific discoveries 
in the interest of world peace and the general welfare of mankind." Its first 
fight was against the May-Johnson bill pending in Congress which would have 
given control of atomic energy to a military committee . Spearheaded by physicist 
Leo Szilard, the scientist's campaign gained a hearing against the bill, which 
was eventually defeated . Scientific politically oriented organizations grew 
widely once the ice of public speaking had been broken by Szilard, including 
the Federation of American Scientists, and the Association of Los Alamos 
Scientists. The government, in an effort to keep the "eggheads II in the fold, 
established various basic research funding agencies, most notably the National 
Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research. 10 
Despite this flurry of activity, pacifists were outraged at the scienti sts ' 
col l usion with the national security state . A. J . Muste urged the scientists 
to refuse to manufacture atomic weapons at all. He hoped that they would IItake 
upon themselves the awful responsibility of being prophets, conscientious 
objectors, persons, whole human beings, and not technicians or slaves of a 
war making state, albeit a heavy-hearted and unenthusiastic one. 1I Some scien-
tists attempted the non-cooperation which Muste suggested. Mathematician 
and missile expert Norbert Wiener of MIT publicly refused to give information 
to a major aircraft corporation. Albert Einstein stated that "non-cooperation 
in military matters should be an essential moral principle for all true scien-
tists. lfll 
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Overall t however t thi s opposition wa s the minority view. W. A. Higinbotham t 
chairperson of the FASt felt that uif sc ientists were to walk out on all 
military -projects they would be taking the law into their own hands just as 
surely as the Ku Klux Klan. II Hans Bethe, later a vigorous proponent of a 
nuclear weapons test ban, was afraid that a scientists IIstrike ll would put 
those citizens in the role of dictators of national policy. Physici s t 
Loui s Ridenour felt that although it was udeplorable that our nation is pre-
paring for war,lI he promised Unot to attempt to impede such preparations. 1I 
This passive agreement carried over to the deci sion to develop a IIsuper-bomb,1I 
or hydrogen nuclear explosive. Edward Teller, dubbed the IIfather of the 
H-bomb ll due to a technological breakthrough of his invention, felt that the 
scientists' job was to create the weaponrYt not to decide if and how it would 
be used. The fact that the government felt similarly was made evident by 
the security hearing of former head of the Los Alamos laboratory Robert 
Oppenheimer. Many felt that the reason for his prosecution was hi s out-
spoken opposition to the development of the H-bomb. 12 
Divison within the scientific community and increasingly politicized 
empirical observations attenuated that potential force, their downfall demon-
strated by the development of the H-bomb and the withdrawal of Robert Oppen-
heimer's security clearance by the Atomic Energy Commission . Although many 
members of the scientific community fell into line during the Cold War years 
of tight internal security, an opionated anti-military core remained, awaiting 
the opportunity to use their uprestige. 1I In 1954, thermonuclear tests were 
accelerating in both pace and megatonnage by both superpowers, al though 
quietly. Then came Bravo, a US bomb which was far more powerful than any 
exploded before, far exceeding the calculations made. And on the cloud of 
radioactive dust which encircled the globe floated the hopes of the liberal 





The peace movement prior to 1954 was comprised almost exclusively of 
re1 igious pacifists who carried their fl ickering 'torch thr'Qugh -cri-ld and dark 
times. The intensity of cold war fears and jingoistic investigations made 
imposs ible any broad-based support for programs of disarmament or even 
detente. Fortunately for these persistent pacifists, several events of the 
early 1950s made possible a renewed surge of peace thought and activism, 
both by the pacifists themselves and later, some liberal-based groups. 
Internationally, the death of Joseph Stalin and the ensuing conciliatory 
policies by his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, eased frayed U.S. nerves. The 
end of the Koreah war in the early months of Eisenhower's first term also 
helped make talk of peace acceptable once again. Domestically, the fall of 
Senator McCarthy in 1954 eased the tensions associated with blacklisting and 
enabled civil libertarians to release a sigh of relief. For the peace move-
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ment, however • . the most significant events. occurrences which would determine 
the direction of peace activism for the next decade, were the events leading 
to the fall-out scare of the mid-1950s. 
The realization of the frightening and possibly unnecessary risks of 
atmospheric thermonuclear weapons testing was facilitated by a slow awakening 
by po1icymakers and citizens to the realities of nuclear war. General 
MacArthur said of such a war: Jllf you lose you are annihilated, if you win, 
you only stand to lose." A top;,..secret report issued in 1955 by the Techno-
logical Capabilities Panel (TCP) of the President's Science Advisory Committee 
evaluated the nuclear-based defense of the United States and the threat from 
the Soviet Union. Urging the President to maintain "a sense of urgency 
without despair," the TCP indicated that bombs of almost unlimited size, up 
J 
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to liane-thousand megatons or SO, II could be developed by both powers. The 
real challenge was to develop weapons small enough to become easily 
deliverabl e. Testing was necessary to achieve this end, concluded the panel, 
yet these tests were potentially dangerous to US and world health. 13 
Unfortunately for the public, the President and the AEC did not choose 
to reveal these potential dangers. However, appalling facts, newly dis-
covered by the US public, led to calls fora ban on nuclear weapons tests. 
The importance of the discoveries was recalled by FOR executive secretary 
Alfred Hassler who reminded that lIuntil Vietnam the Bomb was central to all 
peace activities." The 1956 democratic presidential campaign by Ada1i E. 
Stevenson gave a needed legitimacy to these early demands. The astonishing 
facts about the nature of the radioactive debri s from the ever-increasing 
tests were withheld by the AEC until some mishaps in the Pacific associated 
with their Castle test seri es l ed to their discove,.14 
The first thermonuclear device being tested in the Castle series, code-
named Bravo, gave a much larger yield of energy than was originally calculated, 
a whopping 15 megatons, or the equivalent explosive power of 15 million 
tons of TNT. This was by far the largest hydrogen bomb yet tested, a blast 
which was later described by Representative Chet Holifield as 1I0ut of control.1I 
Due to unexpected wind patterns and the tremendous amounts of radioactive 
pulverized coral released to the atmosphere, 236 Marshall Islanders and 26 
Americans had to be evacuated from the islands of Rongerik, Ronge1ap, A1inginae 
and Utirik, all having received large doses of radiation, some close to the 
theoretically fatal limit of 200 roentgens. The AEC was able to dismiss the 
incident as relatively harml ess and did nothing to change i ts plans for the 
rest of the test series. 15 
On the morning of that same Bravo bl ast. r1arch 1, 1954, the Japanese 
fishing skiff, Fukuryu Maru, translated Lucky Dragon, had been prowling 
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the waters less than 100 miles east of ground zero, well outside of the 
announced AEC limit. The crew spotted the flash of light and a few minu tes 
later~ experienced the blast and shock waves. Although the thought of 
il pikadon," Japanese slang for an atomic explosion, entered their minds, they 
soon dismissed the idea and resumed their work. However, many of the crew 
fell s ick soon after, and upon anchoring at their home port of Yaizu, all the 
men had the classic symptoms of· radiation poisoning, Their catch, over 
16,000 pounds of radioactive tuna and shark, had already been di s tributed , 
causing a national fi sh market scare in Japan. accompanied by a shortag~ of 
geiger counters. The incident prompted a strong protest by the Japanese 
government and a public apology by the US ambassador. 16 
In the United States, the nation was presented with extensive medi a 
coverage of the incident. The AEC reported that radiation levels had risen 
in the US mainland as well as in Japan, but that the levels were well within 
safety standards. Although the AEC stated that the danger of being harmed 
by fallout was about as great as being hit by a meteorite while driving on 
the highway, the public heard President Eisenhower admit', that something 
had "happened that we have never experienced before," while Secretary of 
Defense Charles Wilson reported that Bravo was "unbelievable." Expecting 
reassurance from AEC Chairperson Lewis Strauss, the public became more 
shocked when it was revealed that a single H-bomb could "destroy a city." 
The situation was further worsened by the release in April of color photos 
and black-and-white film of a thermonuclear expl os ion.1 7 
The response of the public was immediate and intense. Respected individual s 
throughout the nation urged the government to reconsider its defense polici es . 
) 
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A Gallup poll taken in April showed that 33 per cent of respondents believed 
there was a 11 good chancel! pf their city being attacked by an atomic bomb, 
while 54 per cent of residents in cities with populations over a half million 
agreed. However, 54 percent felt that H-bombs made war less likely and 71 
per cent opposed the unilateral suspension of testing. Despite the furor 
in some circles concerning the tests, most Americans were content to leave the 
defense strategy to Ike. 18 
International response to the Bravo incidents and Strauss · statements 
were more emotional and demanding than that in the US. Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru spoke for Asia, so far the only major victim of the nuclear 
age, calling for an immediate end to the tests by both superpowers. The 
United Nations made Nehru 1 s claims even more valid by announcing that the 
Asian diet made that sector of the world's population more susceptible to 
health problems assocated with radioactive fall-out. Dr. Albert Schweitzer 
called on fellow intellectuals , to speak out against the tests. In April, 
Pope Pius XII spoke on the issue of atomic testing, although not making any 
specific proposals. In Great Britain, Parliament commenced a great debate 
on a possible summit meeting with the Soviets. Although a resolution to this 
effect was defeated by the Conservative majority, aging Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill agreed to seek such a conference. 19 
Perhaps the most intense area of debate over the advi$bility of continuing 
or banning hydrogen bomb tests was carried out in the scientific arena. Anti -
testing proponents such as Ralph E. Lapp pointed out that although all agreed 
that the effects of local fallout are very harmful. no one was really sure 
about the possible effects of global fallo~t, the particles that escape the 
atmosphere. only to rain down allover the earth in subsequent years. 
Professor A. H. Sturtevant of Cal Tech predicted that over 1800 birth 
defects would occur in the world as a result of the Bravo blast alone . 
The most frightening long-term effect from the tests was the increasing 
amounts of Strontium-90 in the atmosphere. This isotope, which structurally 
resembles calcium, is taken up by plants and eaten by animal s. When in the 
human system, the substance enters the bone tissue, especially in young 
children, causing bone cancer and leukemia. Many scientists felt that the 
amount of Sr-90 in the atmosphere was already dangerous, but the AEC felt 
otherwise. 20 
35 
As a result of the scientific evidence being made availabl e to the public, 
the AEC and its chief scientist, Dr. Willard Libby, released a report on the 
effects of radioactive fallout in 1955. Intended to calm fears, the report' s 
late rel ease and admissions of possible long term genetic effects led to a 
minor hysteria. As if to make things worse, the US soon announced a new test 
series for early 1955. Scientific advisor George Kistiakowsky recalls that 
these tests were needed to overcome the danger of "single-point initiation" 
in the thermonuclear bombs, which might have caused them to explode whil e 
enroute to their targets. The tests, staged in the Nevada desert, gave rise 
to a cloud of radioactivity stretching halfway across the continental US, 
with many citi es reporting levels of radiation many times higher than normal . 
The admi ni s tration and its scienti s ts then unl eashed a m3.ssive publ i c rel a ti ons 
campaign to calm the fears of the American public over weapons tests. 2l 
. n 
It was after this series that the first of many misleading statements aimed 
at a lay public were made. The Nevada tests were explained to be less dangerous 
than wearing a luminous dial wristwatch. United States News and World Report 
claimed that "an H-bomb explosion could be conducted every week for an indefinite 
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period without raising the level of thi s substance [Sr-90] ta dangerous 
level s . f1 Testimony at the JCAE hearings in April of 1955 minimized the dangers, 
prompting one magazine to state nYour Health? No Risk ... The Weather? 
Not Affected. II Lewis Strauss's articl e entitled liThe Truth About Radio-
active Fallout" advised persons in a fallout area to "dig a foxhole," remain 
there for several hours, followed by a complete bath making sure to "sweep 
away radioactive dust . " In general, many scientists were undecided about the 
potential dangers of radioactive debri s, s ince much of the evidence was 
classified or not yet discovered. Most preferred to err on the side of 
national security at this point, waiting for more evidence. 22 
The first surprising piece of new evidence to arrive was discovered by 
Japanese physicists who had noticed that the high level of radiation from 
the most recent tests indicated that these devices were of a new type: the 
so-called fission-fusion-fission bombs. In thi s device. an added ca sing of 
common grade U-238 was added to the more expensive and rare core of U-235 
making the size limitation on deliverable thermonuclear weapons obsolete . 
In a veiled reference in June, Willard Libby confirmed these suspicions, 
prompting the media to entitle yet another weapon, the "U-bomb. 1I Because of 
the increased radioactivity of these bombs, the issue of global fallout 
became in vogue once more among scientists, who insisted that more evidence 
on the maximum permissible amount of Sr-90 was essential. The Federation 
of American Scientists, a polticially-oriented group formed just after I~WII, 
called for a UN sponsored ~tudy of the fallout issue. In December of 1955, 
the UN Scientific Committee on Radiation was established, charged with filing 
a report by July 1,1958. The Indian delegation proposed that this committee 
be enpowered to issue new maximum limits on the key isotopes, while the 
) 
USSR proposed an outright ban with no inspection. What resulted, however, 
was the US proposal which gave no pol itica1 powers to the committee and 
whose report was due so far in the future that the US could virtually set 
23 its own course. 
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A more immediate study was initiated under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences in 1955 and was completed on June 12, 1956 . The results 
were a great relief to theAEC, since the report minimized the danger from 
the tests. However, the possible genetic effects and the still mysterious 
Sr-90 were stressed as dangerous. Willard Libby insisted in a speaking tour 
and articles that the dangers of this radioactive isotope were negligible, 
since by the time the substance returned from the stratosphere, its potency 
had greatly reduced. Ralph Lapp disagreed and stated that the level had 
already reached the 15 percent satuY'ation point. Unhappy evidence to his 
claims came upon the death of a Brookhaven National Laboratory scientist when 
hi s autopsy revealed 1000 times the maximum level of Sr-90. The swaying opinion 
of qualified scientists at this point was demonstrated by Hermann J. Muller, 
a Nobel laureate in radiology, who although starting in the AEC camp, . 
gradually came about to be concerned about possible long term genetic effects 
of radioactive fallout. The time for an authoritive government investigation 
had come. 24 
Thi s investigation came in the form of hearings before the newly formed 
Senate subcommittee on disarmament under the chairpersonage of Hubert Humphrey. 
The committee, comprised of six democrats and six republicans, convened in 
January of 1956, with special assistant for disarmament Harold Stassen open-
ing the testimony. Stassen, dubbed IISecre tary of Peace ll by the media upon 
his appointment. spoke of the need for continued testing due to the necessity 
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of deterrence as a strategy. the existence of a deliverable Russtan H-bomb, 
and the successful propagandizing of the issue thus far by the Soviets. 
Secretary of State Dulles enunciated the diplomatic line that a test ban 
without comprehensive and fool-proof inspections would never be accepted by 
the United States. The Soviet Union ' s response to this argument was that 
the US re'fused to link the test ban with long term goals of disarmament. 25 
A summary of the many bomb tests that were taking place during these 
years may help put the debate in the perspective of the time. Each year. 
both the superpowers set off at least one seri es of thermonuclear explosions 
in the atmosphere. The early ones were especially damaging with respect 
to fallout yield since they were generally detonated on towers not far 
from the surface of the earth. Later, when the devices were dropped from 
planes in high altitude air bursts, the amount of debris sucked up from 
the earth was reduced. In the spring of 1954, the fateful Castle series 
took place, initiated by the Bravo blast of 15 megatons. The Soviets had a 
series in the fall. From February to May of the following year, the US 
proceeded with the Teacup tests in Nevada, designed to test small "tactical 
nuclear weapons. The Russians detonated several bombs in the summer of '55, 
including a device estimated at 2-4 megatons which was delivered from an 
airplane. Thus the Soviets were the first to demonstrate an immediately 
deliverable thermonuclear device. 
Operation Redwing was announced by AEC Chairperson Strauss in the spring 
of 1956 as a Pac ifi c-1 oca ted tes t of "defens i ve wea pons. " The tes ts were 
highlighted by a 10 megaton bomb dropped from an airplane. Simultaneous 
Soviet tests demonstrated their possession of a 20 megaton explosive. They 
resumed testing in the summer, unannounced, and upon completion of their 
J 
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series called for a test ban. A possible US propaganda victory was reversed. 
The testing issue approached a boil in 1957. The Soviets commenced 
detonations in January that yielded very heavy fallout in Japan and through-
out the worl d. Khrushchev announced the Sovi ets now had a bomb that "coul d 
melt the polar ice cap and send oceans spilling all over the world . " Th~ 
US Plumbob seri es was only atomic in nature, with very low fallout. The 
highlight of this series was the first underground detonation ever, code-
named Ranier. The data from thi s test would be important to the upcoming 
Geneva test-ban negotiations .26 
In May, 1957 Great Britain joined the nuclear club with an H-bomb 
detonation on Christmas Island. The earth's atmosphere was filling with 
radioactive dust, the superpowers were increasing in number and showed 
no signs of decreasing their rates of tesing, and the scientists were just 
not sure about the possible effects of these events. Certain investigators 
went so far as to recommend that all citizens should carry a pocket-sized 
radiation meter at all times . If the time for a peace movement ever 
existed, it was in these years of testing. 27 
III 
Despite the favorabl e conditions for a renewed peace movement in the 
early 1950s, the activist groups that existed were not yet ready to come 
together as a coalition. The peace movement in 1953, the year of the first 
Soviet H-bomb detonation, was a splintered group of religious pacifists 
issuing occasional statements on the ethics of US foreign policy and involved 
in some educational programs. The most pressing problem for these groups 
was to escape from being labelled "communi st" or "subversive" in their 
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activities and to gain some legitimacy tn US society. The Fellowship of 
Reconciliation (FOR) was occupied in thi s period with their Food for China 
Program, which sent small bags of grain to the White House, urging that the 
USsurpl us, which threatened to rot in storage, be used to save the famine-
stricken mainland Chinese . . Al Hassler, Executive Secretary of FOR,later 
theorized that although the Eisenhower administration did not release the 
surplus to the starving, the appeal made Ike reconsider a preventive nuclear 
strike against the Red Chinese. Such activities led to the red-baiting of 
this group, and later threatened its tax-exempt status. Pacifist leaders 
such as A. J. Muste were outspokenly in favor of civil· liberties for 
communists, although against forming coalitions with them. Muste insisted 
on a hearing for communists "and all others who dissent from the prevailing 
views and increase our opposition to all the various instruments for securing 
conformity which are being used so generally today.1I28 
Other groups faced similar problems an~ were devoted to fighting the 
same set of injustices, yet Muste and other influential pacifi sts felt that 
the time was not ripe for cooperative action. 'IiUnited action' and 'united 
fronts' should not be proposed at this juncture,11 wrote Muste in 1956. "There 
is no mutual confidence on which to build such action •.. This means that 
essentially discussions should involve individuals rather than organizations 
as such." Muste went on to express the concern that a coalition of frag-
mented and ridiculed extremists "would not impress or engender attractive 
power. II What the pacifist groups had was faith and perseverance, what they 
needed were allies with respectibility and legitimacy.29 
The United World Federalists, a group in great vogue immediately follow-
ing the Second World War, came under vicious attack by Senator McCarthy and 
J 
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others after him . World government was often equated with communist domi -
nation. In 1952, a congressional rider denied groups advocating lIone-world 
government ll all federal funding. Norman Cousins, a long-standing member and 
president of the organization, sadly stated in that year, IISeven years ago, 
when world law was mentioned, people said it was too soon, now when it i s 
mentioned, they say it is too late. 1I Slowly, the group drifted towards 
the right where the haven,of consensus and legitimacy awaited them. Thi s 
tactical turn would later be advantageous to the pacifists, who would 
successfully form a coal ition with members of · this group to form SANE. At 
this time, however, the UWF was not a viable candidate for a peace movement 
coal ition. 30 
The scientific community was also not yet available for a role in a 
potential coalition, despite their findings concerning the effects of low-
level radiation on human health. The security hearings of former head of 
Los Alamos Robert Oppenheimer in 1954 sent shock waves through the scientific 
\'Iorld which not only outraged its members, but essentially informed them to 
stay in line with the government. An appeal by Bertrand Russel and Albert 
Einstein in 1955 included signatures by eminent scientists in both the US 
and Great Britain . Thi s petition warned that the species' "continued 
existence is in doubt." A concurrent meeting of Nobel laureates in Switzer-
land brought forth a similar document. Yet the scientists, despite their 
prophecies and individual statements, were not able to cease doubts about 
their own role in the development of these weapons in the first place, and 
the many confl i cti ng reports on the.; r dangers. Until further, more con-
vincing, evidence was available, evidence which was accepted by virtually 
all scientists, thi s group was not eligible to be' part of a credible coalition. 3l 
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Perhaps the best prepared group was the Friends, who had over the years 
developed a bold, insightful critique of the world problems of violence through 
their tradition of the peace witness. Speak Truth to Power, published in 
1955, and inspired by Robert Pickus, was one of the first statements of 
what was to become called the "third campi! analysis of foreign policy. In 
t his view, communism was not absolved from blame for cold war tensions, but 
the US was challenged to free itself from the shackles of twentieth century 
violence, embracing a new non-violent strategy of defense and freedom 
. 32 retentlon. 
Pickus challenged al l members of the human community, whether from east 
or west, to make moral choices on what he or she could or could not do for 
their government. Again, as in the writings of Muste, the call for individual 
witness resounded . To this call there were a variety of answers. Perhaps 
the most imaginative was that of Lawrence Scott, a member of AFSC. In a 
series of open letters addressed to President Ei senhower in 1955, Scott 
satirized the deterrence strategy of the US, using the upcoming civil 
defense drill in his native Chicago as a springboard: 
And what of local city officials? Headline says, "Chicago 
city officials ran the wrong way," (They are gone-with the 
wi nd as it were.) The Weather Bureau announced that "Wednesday I s 
Mythical H-bomb would have wiped out the emergency city govern-
ment which fled to suburban LaGrange Park." Even city boys 
ought to know enough to wet their finger and hold it in 
the air to find out which way the wind's blowing. I' m not 
much of a hand to write complaining about things, but the 
loss of 1,321,000 consumers, even if city official s are 
expendable, could affect our whole economy. 
Statements like these could very well alert and amuse the small circle that 
it reached, but it could not, and had no intention of, influencing the 
President or the government. When these became goal s , the peace movement 
wou ld start rolling again. 33 
Despite. the apparent ineffectiveness of Scott's methods, the issue he 
chose to address was becoming a widely discussed one in the mid-50s. From 
the early post-war years, the US had undertaken a civilian defense program 
parallel to that of Great Britain during the Nazi blitz . In the event of 
an attack, all civilians would blackout their residences and go inside or 
underground. There they would hose themselves down, bury their clothing, 
and resume life as normally as possible. Mock drills practiced around the 
country, like the one described by SC9tt, seem farcical today. In Beaumont, 
Texas, for example, a phone call informed the chief of police that the city 
had just been decimated--the number of casualities was placed at 250 out of 
the 20,000 residents. Even with that unrealistically small estimate, it 
Has over four hours .before doctors arrived on the scene of the temporary 
emergency hospital. Delays were due to traffic. a confused hierarchy of 
command, and a key doctor who could not be reached . In another drill in 
Urbana, Illinois, a man disguised as a downed Russian pilot turned himself 
in to the county jail. A national panic ensued, only to be calmed by the 
Air Force admi ssion of the "drill. II It became apparent that such cl umsy 
attempts at preparing civilians and authorities for the eventuality of 
a nuclear attack had to be replaced by effective and realistic plans .34 
As early as 1953. the AEC requested more money for civilian defense 
than the IItoken ll $49 million appropriation. Many spokespersons agreed, 
especially the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which called for the need 
of evacuation plans for all major cities and industrial centers. Further-
more, and more drastically, the Bulletin advocated the permanent decentrali-
zation of US population centers. The director of the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration (FCDA). Val Peterson, told the nation that he could evacuate 
the cities, but needed anywhere from 2 to 6 hours to achieve that end. 
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~1ost informed sources knew tha t ICBM technology was in the very near future 
and that such time would simply not be availabl e. Even if it was, the panic 
associated with the evac~ation of a city, especially if it was a false 
alarm, could do great damage to the morale and confidence in government of 
the populace. This type of reasoning led many people to believe that civilian 
defense was nonSense, that its only purpose was to persuade the American 
population to quietly accept the possibility~ indeed the eventuality of 
thermonuclear exchange. 35 
In 1953, the War Resisters League distribut~dleaflets to th~ few who 
would take them during the semi-annual New York City air raid drill. Such 
demonstrations continued, including fairly large contingents of students, 
until 1956 when 27 pacifists were arrested for their actions. During their 
trial, the demonstrators, members of WRL, FOR, and the Catholic Worker, took 
a tongue lashing from the magistrate, who denounced them as "murderers, " 
giving them suspended sentences. Later that year, in July, 19 were arrested 
during the New York City drill. Included were A. J. Muste of Peacemakers 
and Dorothy Day of the Catholic Worker .. This time they received less harsh 
treatment, with Commonwealth urging that, although they did not approve of 
the action, the pacifists should be allowed their voice, in the spirit of 
the current CO laws . These demonstrations were an example of the "cutting 
edge" aspect of radical pacifist theorY. By setting the example of non-
conformity and challenging government policy, the pacifists opened up the 
issue of civil defense to public debate . In later years their position would 
be accepted by many liberal s and holders of public office .36 
J 
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The event that truly brought the test-ban debate to the level of a 
national issue was the democrati c candidacy for president of Adl ai Ewing 
Stevenson in 1956. In April of that year, in an address to the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors, Stevenson proposed the unilateral cessa tion 
of US H-bomb tests,with no system of inspection, stating the current 
scientific belief that any thermonuclear explosion could be detected by 
existing instruments. The reasons given for his proposal were the dangers 
inherent in Strontium~90 from global fallout, the genetic risks to the 
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human race, and other humanitarian points. Stevenson ins.i sted that he was 
not in favor of weakening US defenses, in fact, that thi s proposal was 
risk-free since if the Soviets did not follow US's initiative, the US could 
start tests again in IInot more than eight weeks . " This step, he continued, 
could be the first initiative toward the disarmament that even administration 
officials had called for. The proposal met with charges of irresponsibility 
from the Eisenhower administration and IIcolossal indifference " from the 
public. The issue faded somewhat during the pre-convention jockeying and 
the democratic primaries . In August, :despite a last minute withdrawal of 
support by former President Harry S. Truman in favor of Averell Harriman , 
Stevenson Won the democratic nomination on the first ba1lot. 37 
The Soviet Union kicked off the 1956 American presidential campai gn on 
August 24 with an unannounced thermonuclear detonation in Siberia. On 
September 5, before the American Legion in Los Angeles, Stevenson made two 
seemingly drastic proposals: one to end the draft in order to strengthen 
US defenses, and the other a reaffirmation of his April test-ban proposal . 
The draft proposal was misunderstood and created such a furor that the H-bomb 
issue received little attention. The proposal came back into the national 
spotlight with the September 14 release of a letter from Soviet Premier 
Nikolai Bulganin offering terms similar to those of Stevenson for a test 
ba n. This opened Stevenson for vicious attack by Republicans who pointed 
out that his proposal was not only backed by the Catholic Worker, but by 
the Soviets themselves. Vice-President Nixon called the Stevenson plan 
IIcatastrophic nonsense. 1I Eisenhower disliked the democratic candidate's 
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IIpie-in-the-sky promises, II reminding the nation that tests took many months 
to prepare for, making immediate resumption in case of a Soviet viola t ion 
. "b "1 "t 38 an lmpossl ,1 1 y. 
Stevenson was hurt by the strong rebuttal s which he felt distorted hi s 
plan into one of unilateral disarmament, when in fact he favored the 
strengthening of US defenses. Accusing Eisenhower of "putting dollars over 
defense" in his first term, Stevenson spoke .against relying on the H-bomb 
for our safety: IIWe should not put too many of our eggs in the atomic and 
hydrogen basket." . Against the advice of his associates, Stevenson pushed 
the issue in his October tour of the West Coast, reaching what in retrospect 
was the high point of support for his candidacy. Working with this momentum, 
he prepared a nationwide television address entitled liThe Greatest Menace 
the Worl d Has Ever Known," to be presented October 15. Appeari·ng wi th the 
candidate, and speaking in his favor, were Senator Clinton Anderson, chairman 
of the JCAE, and Senator Stuart Symington, noted for his expertise on defense 
issues. Stevenson noted the dangers from Sr-gO and the support in a ban 
we would receive from our allies, England and France. The Stevenson campaign 
began to put the incumbent on the defensive in the issues of peace that had 
i n the past belong exclusively to Eisenhower. 39 
Stevenson's victory was very brief as the Soviet Union again interrupted 
the campaign. On October 19, 1956, a letter from Marshall Bulganin was made 
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publi c , restating his favorable view of a test ban while making a thinly-
veiled favorable refe.re.nce to the candidacy of Stevensan . Chief Soviet 
delegate Arkady Sokelev made a simultaneaus statement to the United Nati.ons. 
This intentianal bad timing met with a stern response from Eisenhower who 
resented the Hinterference by a foreign nation tn our internal affairs." 
As for Adlai Stevenson, the Soviet' s support of his plan practically ruined 
his bid for the presidency.40 
International influences continued to be important in the 1956 el ection 
as the Suez crisi s developed during the summer. With the exchange of nuclear 
threats by the superpawers, the world became aware of the real and immediate 
possibility of total annihilation. Eisenhower' s past as a military leader 
must have helped him during this crisi s , which gave him a chance to. show 
his leadership qualities. Furthermore, the. Soviet's violent crushing of 
the Hungarian uprising made the thought of cooperating with that nation a 
rarity in American thought. Stevenson was all but finished. When the votes 
were counted, Eisenhower came aut an top in forty-ane states in a landslide 
victary.41 
Neither Adlai Stevenson nar the issue af nuclear weapons testing vanished 
from the news media in the earlymonths ofEis.enhower' s second term. In a 
February 5, 1957 issue of Look magazine, the loser in the election claimed 
that the National Security Council had suggested a test ban plan similar to. 
Stevenson ' s in the September precedin~ the April articulation of his awn 
program. He hinted that Eisenhower's opposition to his campaign plan was 
political expediency taken at the risk of world health and possibly increased 
world security. Stevensan appeared to the nation again on a May 5 "Heet the 
Press" where he criticized the Republican's policy of "contamination without 
representation. II In the summer of 1957, both the rel ease of a JCAE heari n9 
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on the effects of radiation and s tatements by several internationally 
influential figures gave added credibility to Stevenson's stance. The 
Soviet announcement of a reduction by 1.2 million of their army gave the 
added impression that it was high time for someone in the US to act in 
favor of nuclear disarmament. 42 
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The group to s.o speak was formed by the needed merger of pacifists 
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and liberal s a t the initiation of Lawrence Scott. Scott arranged a small 
meeting in Philadelphia in the spring of 1957 to put an end to "radiation 
suicide . " Organizations represented included CCCQ, Methodists, FCNL, WILPF, 
Mennonites, FOR, and the Baltimore Peace Center. Many of these organizations 
were already fnvolved in tes t-ban work, the nature of which they revealed 
at the meeting. Influential liberals attended subsequent meetings at the 
Overseas Press Club in New York City. The organizational result of these 
meetings was the Committee to Stop H-bomb Tests. Scott's "Memo One-Shared 
Thinking," of April 30 set the tone for both SANE and CNVA in future years. 
A three prong a ttack was proposed: an educa ti ona 1 dri ve, lobby; ng efforts 
in Washington and the UN, and direct Gandhian action against the tes ts 
themselves. 43 
Scot~ expressed that both pacifists and non-pacifists should work toward 
the common immediate goal of a cessation of the tests, noting that such cooper-
ation would be necessary to achieve the necessary end of a test cessation: 
For years we pacifists have been members of an unacceptabl e 
minority, not to mention the occasional repression or 
persecution. Now we have come into the pacifist age and 
era. We enter that era with an inferiority complex which 
i s not the same as the spiritual grace of humility. This 
infertority complex manifests itself in at least two 
ways. In some it takes the form of i.nner obe; sance to 
men of power and prominence, particularly if these men 
be liber~ls whom we cari conscientiously admire. In some 
it manifests itself by lack of appreciation, and even 
contempt in some cases, for men of prominence who are 
liberals. In the one case it results in a false humility 
which causes us to betray the deepest insight men h.as 
been granted--the relevance and power of love and non-
violence. In the latter we just as surely betray our 
deepest by the resul tant bitterness and functional 
ineffectiveness. 
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He therefore suggested that the leadership of the group should be able to 
work with advocates of both methods, while also pointing out that a separation 
of the methods was advisable. By May 7, the dual chairpersonage of liberal 
NOrman Cousins, UWF member and editor of the Saturday Review, and pacifist 
Clarence Pickett, Secretary Emeritus of AFSC, was established . The group. 
which was .to be working with the traditional methods of political lobbying 
and education, was renamed the Nationa1J Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy .44 
The first actions and statements of SANE; as it became known. demon-
strated an American nationalism which would mark its entire existence. 
Despite some hinting of world federalism--"the sovereignty of the world 
community comes before all others"--SANE1s true patriotic colors shone through. 
Co-chairperson Norman Cousins editorialized in hi s magazine that 1I0ur best 
chance of keeping a [nuclear] war from starting i s by maintaining a position 
of real leadership in the world. II In the first of its many full page newspaper 
advertisements in the New York Tim~s and in other cities SANE claimed that 
IIwhat the world expects of America is not just bigger and better inter-
continental missiles and hydrogen bombs. The world is looking to us for the 
ideas that will make this planet safe for human habitation. 1I The ad con-
cluded with. a call for a nuclear weapons test ban. signed by many prominent 
citizens. the majority of whom were non-pacifist . Thi s group would come to 
be known as the IInuclear pacifists ."45 
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The November 15 ad was received so well that the response was described 
at an early SANE meeting as "almost unbel ievable." Al though SANE wa s never 
intended to be a membership organization, by June 1958 the group was 
represented by 130 chapters throughout the nation , gi ving a total of over 
25,000 members. Sanford Gottlieb, political action director of SANE, writing 
in retrospect in 1962, remembers that "SANE gave anxious citizens from 
varied backgrounds a single, meaningful issue on which to act--the cessa tion 
of nuclear testing." The overwhelming response, he continued, "was evidence 
of a vacuum in the American peace movement. II Indeed the successful binding 
of liberal, pacifist, and world federalist leadership made possibl e the 
first broad-based peace movement in two decades. 46 
This prospective coalition was not received without opposition, however, 
and many of the negative commentaries were in the red-baiting category. 
Despite the fact that Cousins warned that SANE and the US "must deal effectively 
with the threat of Communism,1I SANE1s efforts to bring a test moratorium to 
the world before the oncoming US test series seemed to 'Time lIwhat the sworn 
enemies of religion, liberty and peace itself were telling them to do. 1I In 
fact, concern with possible communist influence within SANE was widespread 
in its membership. Psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, historian Howard K. Beale and 
AFSC member Stephen G. Cary all expressed this type of concern to pacifist 
and vigorous civil libertarian A. J. Muste in the formative years of SANE. 
The overwhelming response to the initial call wa s pointed out as misleading, 
since the large majority of respondents were from a honogenous group of urban 
middle class citizens. Fully eighty per cent came from the states of New York, 
New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Illinois and Pennsylvania, while 25 per 
cent of the total came from New York City alone. Ads in southern newspapers 
received litt1,e or no response. 47 
SANE. from the outset. was intended to be a coalition forming organi -
zation. based on the single issue of ending the weapons tests: 
We felt strongly that this moral demand could not be ful-
filled by asking that the US Gov.ernment continue tests 
while they negotiated with other governments for a universal 
agreement on a testing ban. Such negotiations would be-
come totally mixed with the whole question of disarmament, 
inspection, and political settlement. as it is at present. 
and might take several years while the atmosphere would 
continue to be poisoned for the living and the unborn by 
radiation. . 
In order to have enough influence to make such demands of the government, 
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a search for support from all types of influential citizens and groups was 
undertaken. Norman Thomas . who at 1 east at one time was pol i ti ca lly respect-
able, was chosen to write to President Eisenhower for an appointment, at the 
same time. lI efforts should be made to talk to the Pope on this issue, lI read 
one set of early minutes. All the traditional peace churches and organi-
zations were involved, with the addition of many more clergypersons from 
various denominations . Television and radio contacts were sought out. Thi s 
group. with its inherent respectability. could actually "speak truth to power" 
more effectively than any unaided pacifist group at the time. 48 
Lawrence Scott. meanwhile, was more concerned with the satyagraha type of 
action at the nuclear testing sites . . His faction of the original Committee 
to stop the H-bomb Tests was organized, renamed Nonviolent Action Against 
Nuclear Weapons, and allocated a budget of $6000. CCCO leader George 
Willoughby served as chairperson of the new group. while Scott took on the 
role of coordinator. Several proposals were made for the first action . 
which eventually took place at a Nevada testing site. On Hiroshima Day, 
August 6,1957,11 pacifists trespassed on government property at Camp 
Mercury and were arrested. Theirs \'/as a new type of action, as evidenced by the 
response of one on-site official who incredulously asked A. J. Muste, "You mean 
there really isn ' t going to be a riot?,,49 
J 
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The pacifists ' statements in the Beatty, Nevada courtroom gave a good 
idea of the strength of their moral witness and the nature of their assumptions 
about the United States and the world. Lawrence Scott claimed "I have been 
led by the Spirit of God in entering the test area," while affirming his 
"l ove for America and the ideals for which it stands. II Bryce Babcock took 
more the world citizen approach as he claimed that "no individual or nation 
has the right to do thi s [poison the atmosphere], II while Jim Peck. later the 
author of a book describing his experiences as a CO during WWII, firmly 
stated that the creed of their strategy was lithe spirit of non-violence and 
friendship. II Although it i s true that NVAAN~J advocated criticism of east 
and west, the group specifically barred communists from its actions and 
frequently spoke of the necessity of US world leadership . 50 
Encouraging signs from other quarters made both SANE' s and NVAANW' s 
futures appear even brighter. Linus Pauling' s petition calling for the end 
of H-bomb tests was s igned by over 11,000 scientists in 49 countries, including 
almost 3000 Americans and 36 Nobel laureates . The document cited the dangers 
of radiation and of nuclear proliferation as rational es for the call. Despite 
efforts by the AEC and the Eisenhower administration to disprove claims of 
these dangers, by August 1958. in a poll by the Psychological Corporation, 
53 per cent of respondents felt that "radioactive fall-out from the testing 
of atomic bombs is likely to injure health. II ... Nineteen per cent disagreed and 
28 per cent classified themselves as "uninformed. 1I The percentage of yes 
answers was higher in the western United States, the location of the con-
tinental tests, at 58 per cent. To the question "if you were given scientific 
evidence that 50,000 people might die as a direct result of fall-out from the 
testing of atomic bombs. woul d you favor putting a s top to the tes ting of 
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of atomic bombs throughout the world? 1I 64 per cent answered yes. with 14 
per cent answering no. and 22 per cent lIunsure. II It seems as though the 
apparent disagreements within the scientific world were delaying a resolution 
to the spectre of bomb tests. 5l 
An effort to alleviate the international disagreements in science were 
the Pugwash conferences in Nova Scotia, the first of which convened in 
July of 1957. Here scientists from both sides of the iron curtain were able 
to freely discuss many previously taboo subjects. The newness was s'ummed up 
in the exchange between a Soviet scientist who remarked. "If~his meeting 
had been held five years ago, Senator McCarthy would have l(tcc6S!ed you 'of 
being disloyal and you might have lost your job,1I and the American who assented 
and replied. "if it had been held four years ago, Stalin would have had you 
shot.1I Further rumbling from the world of science came from the 18 German 
physicists who declared on April 13,1957 their unwillingness to produce 
nuclear weapons. At ' this point. the vital scientific debate was on the side 
of SANE. NVAANW .• and the newborn coalition.
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Chapter II I - Forming the Grand Coalition 
Shifting scientific opinion and subsequent public fears enabled a Grand 
Coalition of peace activism to bloom in the late 1950s. Led by the liberal 
National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the radical pacifist 
Non-Viol ent Action Against Nuclear Weapons (NVAANW), the coalition was formed 
specifically to seek an end to nuclear weapons tests by both the US and the USSR. 
The cho,i.ce of a single goal approach was understandabl e in light of the anti-
testing sentiment and information which was disseminated in those years. In the 
time between the bombing of Hiroshima and 1958, stated one report, lithe mega -
tonnage exploded was equal to the "total body weight of the entire human popu-
lation of earth. II Using the reali za tion of the fall-out menace as a springboard, 
the SANE and NVAANW-led coalition was able to pursue a common goal whil e employ-
ing different methods to insure that goal IS implementation. l 
The two leading groups gathered the support of many exi s ting organiza-
tions: SANE through correspondence and 1 iterature and NVAANI4 through the moral 
imperative of non-violent civil disobedience. Although the two wings of the 
grand coalition cooperated effectively through the first years of their exist-
ences, underlying differences began to become painfully apparent . The immediate 
and seemingly reachable goal of a test-ban strengthened the tenuous welds 
between the wings through the 19505, especially when their work was supported 
by government and scientific findings. The hearings before Chet Ho1ifie1d l s 
Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the JCAE made a detailed examination of 
liThe Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man" in the summer of 
1957. These hearings featured more than forty scientific witnesses from both 
sides of the debate, papers submitted by many others and discussion sess ions 
in whi ch open deba te a ttempted to inform the Congress persons of the "facts. II 
The result of these extensive hearings was to put the burden of proof 
on the AEC in order to continue its unchecked rate of testing. Scientists 
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from -both sides agreed that "any quantity of radioactive fallout is undesirable. " 
The debate focused instead on the necessity of testing in order to maintain 
national security and the possible peacetime uses of atomic energy. The 
concept of a "clean" weapon was discussed and generally dismissed by both 
independent scientists and those of the AEC. Such weapons would rely more 
heavily on fusion for their heat and blast effects, reducing the fall~out 
I 
inducing fission trigger to a bare minimum. All agreed that radioactive 
yield could be substantially reduced, but never eliminated. The AEC further 
admitted that the "consequence of further testing over the next several 
generations at the level of the past five years could constitute a hazard to 
the world' s population." 
The history of the government' s knowledge of the hazards which were 
just coming to light was describe.d, revealing the newspeak term of "sunshine 
units" coined by the AEC in 1954 for levels of Strontium-gO in human bone. 
Although there was no convincing evidence to set a new dangerous level of 
Sr-90, all agreed that a limit on megatonnage per year by all powers would 
be advisable. A 1955 top-secret report issued by the Offi ce of Defense 
Mobilization's Technological Capabilities Panel gives evidence of early and 
extensive knowledge of fall-out dangers. Admitting that fall-out "may over 
a prolonged period lead to decreased life expectancy," the panel does not 
recommend complete disclosure of the potential hazards to the citizens. 
Rather, "the public will need to be indoctrinated to accustom themselves to 
the fact that low level s of radiation can and must be lived with." The 
realization that the AEC was aware of the hazards being discussed at the 
Holifield Committee's hearings spurred the Democratically-control l ed Congress 
into action against the irresponsible admini stration. 
56 
The most controversial point of the hearings concerned whether or 
not a threshold of radiation ex i sted under which injury did not occur. The 
opposing theory, that of "linearity, " reasoned that all exposure was cumulative, 
that in fact there was no "safe" level of radioactivity that could be released. 
A heated debate between the proponents of the viewpoints ensued, making it 
clear that the evidence was not yet complete or understood. "This is the 
broad realm of ignorance which I think we all agree we are in," surmised Dr. 
Ernest Pollard, biophysicist at Yale, lI and to escape which we have to do a 
great deal of work. I merely suggest again that the conservative thing to do 
in obtaining that knowledge is to assume linearity and therefore no threshold." 
Dr. Edward Lewis, biologist at Cal Tech, agreed, urging the committee and the 
AEC that "the percentage or the number who are expected to be damaged shoul d 
be stated, instead of implying that there i s no danger from fallout or that 
the permissibl e dose will cause no damage. ,,2 
The hearings, despite the remaining disagreements and lack of reliabl e 
evidence, were seen by observers as a victory for the spokespersons of a 
test ban, since now scientists and legislators were in favor of erring on 
the side of reduced fallout, not human health. Both the Gallup pol l and the 
White House mail indicated a shift in public attitudes towards a cautious 
backing of a test ban. Not all were frightened by the new findings, notably 
those Hawaiian residents who held "bomb parties" to "latch the atomic fire-
works 700 miles away. The climate of fear of not only testing but of 
nuclear catastrophe, was exemplified by the remarkable success of Nevil Shute' s 
novel of atomic apocalypse, On the Beach. In Shute's scenario, the detonation 
of some 4700 cobalt bombs had rendered the atmosphere unfit for life, with 
the last remnants of human existence gathered in Australia, awaiting their 
radioactively induced deaths. The movie version of Shute 's novel was so 
startling that Karr Harr, deputy assistant secretary of defense, recommended 
that cabinet members not see it. In a backhand way, the novel helped the 
government's position, which held that testing was a necessary evil in order 
to avoid such a scenario of disaster. Concerning fallout, for example, the 
Technological Capabilities Panel held that lithe resul ts would only be to 
add a m~rginal number of casualti es to those immediate, direct effects." 
However, the work Shute undertook in educating a slowly awakening public was 
helpful to the developing coalition of peace workers. 3 
Internationally, the never ending creation of amazing and frightening 
technology threatened the existing machinery of collective security, enabling 
the peace coalition to be heard. In August of 1957, the Soviet Union 
announced a successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 
The launch of their Sputnik on October 4 quieted any doubters of their tech-
nological expertise. Meanwhile the US' s rocketry program appeared to be 
stalling, with two Atlas missiles exploding during test flight. The US would 
eventually develop thi s technology in even better form than the Soviets , how-
ever, and its existence put the danger of accidental or hastily considered 
nuclear warfare at a new high. Although the development of ICBM's allowed 
the Eisenhower administration to emphasize the importance of testing in order 
to compete with the Russians, the increasing awareness of the public to the 





Cri ses and opportunities faced the infant SANE in 1957 . Strategies of 
action had to be decided on concerning not only its own course of activism, 
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but the behavior of groups cooperating with SANE or operating under its aegi s . 
One item clear from the start was SANE' s policy of exclusionism,particular1y 
against corrununists. SANE's national board urged against cooperation with 
any pinkish organization or conferences. In July 1957, for example, the steer-
ing committee decided to send uinforma1 representation u to t~e Japanese con-
ference on Nuclear Tests only upon assurances that the meeting was "not a 
communist-inspired affair." These measures were understandable and most likely 
advisabl e at the time, when SANE was still an upstart group working against 
the grain of accepted liberal thought. In later years, however, thi s remnant 
of cold war policy would prove the undoing of the SANE coalition as a viabl e 
political force. S 
The importance of the coalition aspect of peace work was stressed by 
SANE' s actions during these the vibrant years of 1958-1960. The vo1umtnous 
correspondence of Sanford Gottlieb, SANE's political action coordinator, reveal s 
feelers being sent out to a diverse variety of groups and individual s, not all 
of whom were receptive. Gottlieb wrote to Donald Keys of UWF explaining hi s 
work with AFL-CIO in the past and his reasoning that labor was a natural ally 
for peace work. This might have been the case in Europe, but in the US, labor 
remained suspicious of what they saw as left-wing activism. Unlike the peace 
coa l ition of the 1930s, labor would not be a part of the liberal-based coalition. 
The expanding middle class theory of the US economy as es poused by leading 
intellectuals kept labor a conservative force. Whil e identifying themselves 
as members of the middle class consensus, labor was too blue-collar for member-
ship in the largely professional ranks of SANE. Attempts at rallying support 
from the working cl asses resulted in an initial acceptance of sponsorship of 
SANE' s 1958 disarmament conference by the Cooperative League, followed by 
a refusal due to lack of funds. The Committee for a National Trade Policy 
declined such a sponsorship.6 
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The financial concerns of the Cooperative League were echoed by several 
other potential sponsors. Leonard A. Herzenberg of the Federation of American 
Scientists wrote that his organization "will be happy to give you any help, 
other than financial, to the success of thi s meeting." The Church of the 
Brethren, an historic peace church, felt unable to sponsor the conference 
until they received more information, and even then were unabl e to contribute 
any financial support. SANE did, however, fare well with religious organi -
zations in this appeal for support. Organizations such as the United Christian 
Missionary Society, Council of Churches, Presbyterian Church, and the Unitarian 
Church accepted roles as sponsors. It is important to note, however, that SANE 
did not receive unanimous support from the clergy, as a refusal from the 
American Lutheran Church indicates. In May, the Reverend Daniel Poling used 
his pulpit in New York to attack SANE in its works. charging them, predicably, 
with communist-inspired activities. The sponsorship of denominations such 
as Unitarian and Presbyterian does speak to SANE' s ability to organize parts 
of the religious es tablishment that pacifist groups had had no influence 
over. Conversely, the refusal of sponsorship by the Brethren was due to the 
inclusion of non-pacifists in the coalition.? 
SANE had mixed response in these early years with more established 
organizations. Jay H. Cerf of the Foreign Policy Clearing House did not 
accept SANE's offer of sponsorship, a situation that group had in common with 
both the American Association of University Women and the League of Homen 
Voters. The acceptance of the Na tiona 1 Women's Conference is avail ab 1 e 
evidence to indicate that SANE did, indeed, have some female supporters. 
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Many of the female activi sts in these years were involved in the Women' s 
International League for Peace and Freedom. Early SANE was marked by a lack 
of female adherents and a use of a sexist language that seems generally accepted 
in mid-century political prose.8 
SANE sought out nearly every available ally just right of the Communists. 
It appears that no such limit was put on the right side of the pol tical spectrum, 
as long as the sponsoring organization was able to embrace the concept of a 
nuclear weapons test ban. 
The search for SANE alli es by Sa nford Gottlied as undertaken in 1957, 
when analyzed in the confines of coalition theory, seems bound to lead to 
problems. Although SANE wished to establish a "winning coalition," or' one 
with influence on government, the concepts of the "minimal winning coalition" 
and the "closed range" theory predict that SANE' s reach was too broad. In 
the case of the Foreign Policy Clear.ing House, the legitimacy that organi -
zation enjoyed seemed threatened by a sponsorship of SANE. If that organization 
was to join the coalition, considerations other than peace would alter its 
ability to cooperate effectively. In the case of the Brethren, on the other 
extreme, active membership in the peace coalition would be limited by that 
sect'sabsolute pacifism and governmental non-resistance. According to coalition 
. 
theory, SANE should have sought the cooperation of only those groups closest 
to its own liberal stance on the political spectrum, and of those groups, as 
few as possible in order to achieve results. 
The first National Conference of SANE was held in September, 1958. Major 
events of that year which altered SANE's outlook included the undertaking of 
new test series by both superpowers, followed by a test moratorium in the fall 
and the resignation of Lewi s Strauss as AEC Chairman, succeeded by John McCone. 
The early policy decisions of SANE indicate their desire to gain allies and 
legitimate power in thi s time of change. A debate developed at the conference 
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over the role of SANE as a long-range or short-range organization. James 
Warburg and Dr. Hugh Wolfe, members of the executive board, indicated their 
desire to see SANE become a foreign policy association, transcending the 
testing issue. A statement by Harrison Brown showed his disagreement, noting 
the progress being made in the direction of a lasting international agreement 
and the need to press further for a comprehensive system of inspection. The 
Rev. Donald Harrington agreed that the short-term goal was both more effective 
in its influence and more likely to avoid lIoverorganizingll and IIduplicating 
the work of other organizations." Robert Gilmore of AFSC added that SANE 
was an outlet for those who did not choose to join existing organizations 
with which they were not totally in agreement. 
The policy statement adopted by the first national conference indicated 
a broadening of SANE' s goals past an immediate cessation of tests, which was 
to occur with the bilateral moratorium in the fall, toward a stand on di s-
armament which would justify that committee's existence lIuntil international 
control of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved." SANE 
' stopped short, however of becoming what Warburg had called "a committee for a 
sa~e foreign policy,1I instead "encouraging established organizations in taking 
primary responsibility" in that field of interest. The other major part of 
the first policy statement concerned National SANE' s control over the local 
committees. A 1 though one del ega te had expressed the importa nce of "ferment 
of the grass roots,1I the committee felt opliged to demand approval of actions 
before undertaken by locals using the SANE name. In this way, the national 
group could keep control over their coalition on the local level, especially 
against subversive infiltration by communists. 9 
When SANE convened its second National Confere.nce in October of 1959, 
the world had experienced its first full year without a nuclear explosion 
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since 1944. However, the Ibeat-the-dead1ine" blasts of late 1958 filled 
the atmosphere and stratosphere with radioactive debris, causing another world-
wide fall-out scare. The Geneva conference, charged with negotiating a test 
ban treaty, was faltering. Meanwhile, SANE, inspired by the blast-free year, 
extended its goals beyond all recognition of their original purposes in an 
a ttempt to further its power and i nf1 uence over its growi ng coa 1 i ti on. The 
second national conference completely overlooked the controversial local 
committee issue in favor of grandiose policy statements. Whereas a year earlier 
talk and agitation for a general disarmament was left in the hands of "existing 
organizations," in 1958, the committee felt that "we must make our objective 
total di sarmament down to police 1eve1s." "We have also got to take on a holy 
war against poverty," continued Norman Thomas. "There are other organizations 
for this purpose, but there are no organizations, except this organiza tion, 
which are popular, which are made up of people who are interested in peace" 
[emphas is Thomas] . SANE now felt obliged to become the savior of the peace 
movement through its rapid rise to national prominence. 
Robert Gilmore had even bigger ideas for SANE. Although as a pacifist, 
he had to "adjust his views to SANE," Gilmore' s goals were still quite 
ambitious : "Under supportive action we should take this year I would li st: 
(1) universal disarmament (2) universal membership to the UN (3) disengagement 
to meet crises (4) conversion to peaceful economies ." Furthermore, "SANE should 
be the catalytic thrust" of the peace coal ition, possible recruits of which he 
listed as WILPF, AAUN, AFSC and UWF. SANE believed that they had gained so 
much influence and legitimate power that they could undertake these programs 
and be successful. Norman Cousins summed up the optimistic mood of the second 
conference by noting "never before have the people been so responsive,"· and that 
SANE "cou1d take proper pride for at least some of these changes (in the world 
situa tion) . ,,10 
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The year before the third national conference was chaotic on the world 
scene, and much of the climate that gave SANE such appeal deteriorated. The 
failure of the Geneva conference to deal with new scientific evidence con-
cerning detection of tests put the successful conclusion of that meeting in 
serious doubt. Eisenhower declared an end to the test moratorium although 
promising that the "United States would not resume testing first. I! The French 
joined the nuclear club with the first atomic detonation in the world for over 
15 months. Finally, the U-2 incident over Russia and Khrushchev's subsequent 
tantrum broke up the pending Paris Summit conference between the heads of 
state of the United States, the Soviet Union, England, and France. As if to 
tack on the punchline to thi s bad joke of a year, a Senate investigation of 
alleged communist activity within SANE was undertaken by Senator Thomas Dodd' s 
Internal Security Subcommittee in the summer. For the time being, only 
policy and coalition decisions of SANE which took place before the communist 
~ncident will be considered, since the Dodd investigation is an issue of a 
different phase in the peace coalition , one which will require close examina-
1T tion further on. 
At the third conference , held in Chicago in October of 1960, despite 
the cataclysmic occurrmces of the previous year. SANE codified the lofty 
suggestion made at the second annual conference. unable to cease the momentum 
toward a sweeping generality. liThe best hope for a world without war," read 
the policy statement, "lies in the achievement of universal, total disarmament 
with adequate inspection, down to the levels required for maintenace of 
internal order." SANE stated its belief in including the People's Republic of 
China in all such negotiations. A call for a restructuring of the world' s 
economy insi s ted that "a share of the resources hitherto wasted i.n the arms 
race mus t be channelled into the satisfaction of human needs. 1I Finally , 
lIat the international level, economic and technical assistance should be 
channelled through the United Nations to help wipe out poverty, disease and 
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ill i teracy among the 1 ess fortuna te peop1 es of the wor1 d. II SANE made all thi s 
policy while fully aware of the changing international climate for the worse 
and its own internal problems stemming from finances and local disagreements. 
This decision seems to be based on the momentum of successes achieved during 
the year, exemplified by a congratulatory memo sent to the locals upon a minor 
concession made by the US during the Geneva talks: "You and SANE people every-
where have contributed to a major breakthrough! II Hopes were raised beyond the 
point of no return. The SANE third conference" seemed to disregard the six 
months immediately preceding the convention, choosing instead to ride the 
cres t of their initial successes .12 
A report on finances at the third conference described SANE as IIdeeply 
in debt" and II strugg1ing on a week to week basis." During the year, s imilar 
sentiments were reported in a memo entit1 ed liThe Cri sis Facing SANE. II These 
financial problems were analyzed as stemming from SANE's unique system of 
fundraising at the local level, instead of nationally. Only one-third of the 
quotas from the chapters had been fulfilled in fiscal 1959-1960, leading to . 
a call for a "revi ew of the effectiveness of our 1 oca 1 s ." A 1 ack of communi -
cation between chapters and the national office was indicated, along with a 
lack of responsible action among the leadership of the locals. A mimeo communi -
cation known as InterSANE was established as an attempt to alleviate some of 
these problems. SANE was attempting to relocate the majority of their power 
in the national executive board, which although clearly more efficient. took 
away some of the force of grass-roots enthusiasm that had given rise to SANE 
in the first place. Slowly, the vitality of SANE was being sapped and replaced 
by an institutional machinery which could perpetuate the organization' s 
existence. 13 ' 
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An overview of the techniques and strategies of SANE in these successful 
years can give further indication of that group's desire to be at the forefront 
of a legitimate powerful coalition. Education was the most stressed activity 
of SANE. In 1959, the organization had distributed over 40,000 pieces of 
literature dealing with disarmament,·nuclear tests, political candidates, and 
other information which SANE considered vital. SANE, then, . worked as a clearing 
house for ideas which they embraced as articulated by other organizations. SANE 
was also involved in preparing background papers for political candidates on 
issues of concern to' the organization. Newspapers, magazines, televi s ion and 
radio space were filled with "SANE Comment." Contact from the early years with 
professional advertising agencies indicates SANE' s awareness of the importance 
of public relations. 
A second major tactic of SANE was an involvement in electoral politi cs . 
Thi s method is best demostrated in the 1960 pol itical campaign. SANE was then 
at the height of its power in a year of a national election which assured a 
new administration. In order for SANE to maintain power and political legitimacy, 
Sanford Gottlieb'recommended that"we must have a clear and dominant voice in at 
least one of the major parties." Gottlieb's preference was clear: "Kennedy's 
statement of October 9 on nuclear testing and disarmament was the most positive 
one made until that point in the campaign." SANE was not interested in pre-
senting its own candidates, but merely in "soliciting responses to key questions 
on disarmament and circulating them." Other techniques employed by SANE included 
door-to-door canvassing, street meetings, letter-writing campaigns and films, 
the latter technique assisted by the establishment of Hollywood SANE in 1959 
under the leadership of Steve Allen. Thi s emphasi s on traditional and non-
controversial methods is indicative of SANE ' s desire to maintain legitimacy 
through its activism.14 
If SANE was at the forefront of a growing and mobile peace movement, 
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who were its subordinate allies? To the press, Larry Scott's infant NVAANW, 
while as old as SAN~.was a subordinate group. Coverage of one of their first 
actions, which sent five pacifists to the Soviet Union, was given coverage only 
in the context of a SANE demonstration at the United Nations. Other pacifist 
activities, notably the Walk for Peace Campaign, which set its sights on 
Washington D.C., were cast in the role of SANE offshoot activities. A major 
indication of the power of SANE and its program was the switch of emphasis by 
many established groups toward anti-testing activism. SANE distributed a survey 
of established organizations to observe if thi s switch was oCCUrting the results 
of which proved that "many organizations have started major educational action 
projects against nuclear bomb tests." Other memos reported that WILPF, AFSC, 
FCNL, and FOR were all engaged in tes t-ban work. ~~ILPF was earnest in its work 
in the test-ban field, calling it lithe most critical question facing all 
humanity. II ~1any religious denominations were active in this area through the 
efforts of the Consul tative Peace Council. The National Board of SANE proudly 
announced that test-ba~ movements were active in Japan, West Germany and in 
England. AFSC was able to cooperate on an equal basis with SANE, a justifiabl e 
privilege for an organization a half century its elder . A co-sponsored gathering 
of 600 in 1958 in New York City featured pacifists A.J. Muste, Baya'rd Rustin, and 
ffiavid Dellinger as speakers. However, a full page ne\'Jspaper ad entitled liTo 
the Men at the Summit," co-sponsored by SANE, AFSC, FOR, FCNL, WILPF, and UWF, 
asked that checks be made payable to SANE, indicating adherence to the "parity 
norm" method of payoffs, with SANE as the most powerful member of the coalition. 15 
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The local committees, for all their lack of communicativeness and fiscal 
responsibility, were able to draw important speakers and respectable sized 
crowds to their events due to the prestige and legitimacy of national SANE. 
Representative Charl es O. Porter, Cemocrat from Oregon and sponsor of a test-
ban bill , addressed Greater New York SANE and 1000 1 isteners before flying to 
Eniwetok in order to protest the current US Hardtack I test series. James 
Wadsworth, head negotiator at the Geneva conference appeared for the same 
local in April of 1959. Linus Pauling. always available for SANE speeches. 
addressed a Brooklyn SANE. enlivening crowds with his estimate of some 75,000 
US nuclear weapons already in the stockpile and hi s appraisal of the AEC as 
"schizophrenic. 1I Local originality was apparent in the march of 100 mothers 
up Broadway by West Side SANE. The women pushed carriages and walked with 
infants carrying signs protesting irradiated milk and food. 16 
National SANE was equally impressive in its list of friends. A SANE 
originated petition sent to the Geneva summit urging the successful negotiation 
of a test-ban was signed by Albert Schweitzer, Bertrand Russell. Eleanor 
Roosevelt. Martin Luther King, Francois Mauriac, and other 1I1eading world 
figures." A night at Carnegie Hall with Linus Pauling attracted an overflow 
crowd of over 3000 in late 1959 . Here Pauling, never the optimist, predicted 
that l ess than one million Americans would survive a nuclear war. SANE was so 
legitimate in late 1959 that it used the pro-moratorium positions of President 
Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon to offset calls for resumed testing by 
Nevi York Governor Nelson Rockefeller and former Pres ident Harry S. Truman. 
Nixon proved that he was not the friend of all SANE's policies by announcing 
hi s plans to eat possibly irradiated cranberries for Thanksgiving . SANE was at 
the height of its power in early 1960, demonostrated by . 1 t~ call for a 
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Department of Peace and a supporting statement by Nageeb Halaby in that regard. 
The extent of their influence was exemplified in a pro-ban statement issued 
in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and signed by members of the business, 
labor, intellectual, and world federalist communiti es .17 
II 
The pacifi s t action group NVAANW did not strive, as did SANE, for a sense 
of legitimacy. This organi za tion1s purpose was to provide a positive moral 
witness to the immoral and amoral policies of the world powers regarding nuclear 
weapons and specifically the testing of these devices. As with SANE, when thi s 
original intense goal had been temporarily achieved by way of the bilateral 
test moratorium, NVAANW sought to justify its existence by extending its goal s 
to those of disarmament and world peace. NVAAN~J was also a coalition-mind.ed 
organization, although in a very different way than SANE. Rather than gaining 
a large membership and speaking with the voice of a multitude, NVAANW chose to 
be voices in the moral wilderness, setting exampl es which would inspire others 
to take some kind of action. NVAANW, like SANE, was never intended to be a 
membership organization, but unlike the liberal wing of the peace coalition, 
the pacifists succeeded in this goal. 18 
Since the issue of legitimacy was not as vital to this pacifi st organiza-
tion, whose tactics and beliefs were so extraordinary, the question of coopera-
tion with communists took on a different light than with SANE. While all the 
pacifists in NVAANW would have agreed with the civil libertarian views of A.J. 
Muste quoted earlier, communists were not permitted to participate in the actions 
of the group. The rationale was that by definition, communism did not embrace 
the philosophy of nonviolent resistance as a catalyst towards change. One of 
the bases of the technique of non-violent resistance is solidarity in purpose 
and behavior. If one demonstrator was to incite violence, unprotected and 
unsuspecting fellow protestors or innocent bystanders could be injured. Hence, 
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no communi sts allowed . The rule against Communi s t participation would become 
somewhat more flexibl e in the middle of the 1960s. Care was taken to avoid even 
indirect endorsement of the Communi st Party. For example, in a letter to CP 
leader Gus Hall offering condolences on the death of CP National Chairperson 
Eugene Denni s , A. J. Muste hastened to add: III trust you understand that thts 
was a truly personal communication and not one addressed to the Communist 
Party, USA. 1I19 
An early NVAANW document, IIAction after Nevada,1I written by Quaker Robert 
Pickus of California, indicates the coalition-formation by example strategy of 
the pacifist IIcutting edge ll organization. In an effort to build an lIorganiza-
tional frame,1I Pickus suggests that participants and witnesses of the Nevada 
action seek out newspaper editors and reporters, radio personalities, etc., to 
gain support and influence others. "Your purpose," reminded Pickus, lI is to 
urge that those who share the concern act to express it." Lawrence Scott added 
a footnote to the report which set NVAANW in the role of supplementing the work 
of existing peace organizations such as AFSC, FOR, WRL, FCNL, WIL, Peacemakers , 
and others who would not act through civil disobedience. Thus NVAANW was not 
attempting to IIgo it alone ll in the jungle of peace activism, although the organi -
zation kept a distance from the other peace groups, even other pacifist groups.20 
The philosophy of the original NVAAMW under Larry Scott was one of lithe 
application of the power of nonviolence in reference to a limited, politically 
realizable goal on which most of the peace movement was working coopet~atively. " 
Its tactics were natura l outgrowths of those used by Gandhi in India, American 
conscientious objectors in federal penitentiaries during WWII , and those involved 
in the southern sit-ins in the mid-1950s. Yet these tacti cs had to differ slightly 
when the injustice being protested was the testing of nuclear explosives. Unique 
and creative civil disobedience on a massive geographical scale was called for. ' 
The opportunity came with the Hardtack I H-bomb series in the Pacific 
and the voyage of the skiff Golden Rule. 2l 
liThe idea was an act ... an act that could not be bypassed, could not 
be brushed aside, could not be ignored, an act that was a symbol ," wrote Albert 
Bigelow, skipper of the ketch. liThe idea was to sail a vessel of protest into 
the bomb-test area. 1I Bigelow was a lieutenant commander of a destroyer escort 
during WWII who was morally aghast at the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
In 1952, he resigned from the naval reserve just one month before he became 
eligible for a pension. Converting to Quakerism, Bigelow and his family took 
in two of the much publicized "Hiroshima maidens" who had been brought to the 
United States for cosmetic surgery. Bigelow was involved in NVAANW from the start, 
being one of the eleven pacifists arrested in the Nevada Action at Camp Mercury. 
The crew of the Golden Rule~ a thirty foot ketch, consisted of Bigelow, 
William Huntington, mate, George Willoughby, officer, and Orion Sherwood, who 
at twenty-eight was the youngest member of the crew. After being turned back to 
California by a storm, the Golden Rule successfully set sail for Hawaii, the first 
leg of the journey, on March 25, 1958. Upon arriving in May, the crew was served 
with a federal injunction which prohibited them from proceeding to the testing 
area. After legal consultation which advised that the injunction was possibly 
illegal, the crew decided to sail in defiance of the federal government. None 
of these actions were undertaken in secrecy. Part of the technique of non-
violent resistance was to inform the powers in charge of all actions that would 
take place. A mile and a half from Honolulu, the four men were arrested, brought 
back to land and placed on probation. Again they sailed, this time the judge 
sentencing them to sixty days in jail to prevent a recurrence of their persistent 
action. 22 
A happy coincidence enabled the saga of the Golden Rule, which received 
extensive press coverage, to be transformed from a disappointing episode to a 
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pacifi s t legend. Anthropologi st Earle Reynolds and hi s family had just com-
pleted a circumnavigation of the earth in their ketch, the Phoenix. Intrigued 
by the newspaper accounts of the trial of the pacifists of the Golden Rule, 
Reynolds attended the hearings, taking notes and consulting lawbooks. The 
Reynolds' found themselves in legal and moral agreement with the pacifists, 
with Earle commenting, "If the Quakers can convert a Navy man, they really must 
have something!" Convinced by his wife Barbara, Reynolds decided to undertake 
the journey into the test site in the Phoenix. This action by the Reynolds, 
Earle a former employee of the AEC, a non-pacifi s t and "just not the law-breaking 
type," was living evidence of the power of nonviolence and the pacifists' witness. 
On July 2, 1958, the Phoenix entered the testing zone and was boarded by a 
Coast Guard vessel bearing a warrant for the arrest of Earle Reynolds. Sentenced 
to a two-year prison term, his conviction was eventually overturned by the 
Supreme Court in December of 1960 due to the AEC' s l ack of jurisdiction over 
the Pacific Ocean. 23 
The continuation of the pacifist voyage by the Reynolds family got spectacu-
larly positive press coverage and popular sympathy. It seemed that the giant 
federal government could be defeated by a small band of devoted pacifi s ts and a 
family of conscientious citizens. Reynold .became much in demand for interviews 
and speaking engagements, while the embarrassed AEC hinted at a possible com-
muni st conspiracy. This successful action by NVAANW gave it a leadership role 
in the grand coalition quite different than that of SANE. Its heroic acts 
would challenge the moral s and imagination of the American public, convincing 
them to become involved in the struggle for peace in whatever capacity they 
felt comfortable. More often than not, this outlet was the local SANE group. 
As a team with the existing peace organizations, student groups and women groups; 
the two groups were able to recruit more peace advocates than the United States 
had seen in many years. 24 
Other groups took a similar strategy to that of NVAANW on a smaller 
scale, yet the power of their moral witness was very strong indeed. Ammon 
Hennacy of the Catholic Worker, for example, undertook and completed a forty 
day fast in front of AEC headquarters in Washington, D.C. lias a penance for 
our sinfulness in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.1I Hennacy made the 
papers again when he led a picket at Cape Canaveral, Florida, in protest of 
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the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems . An intriguing and civilized 
protest was lodged against the three major nuclear nations when the Berkeley 
Society of Friends sent a case of irradiated asparagus each to President Eisen-
hower, Prime Minister McMillan and Premier Khrushchev in 1958. Such action by 
individuals and small groups seemed to reap results when Nikita Khrushchev 
sent a 1597 word telegram to a British housewife who had written complaining 
of the nuclear tests. 25 
This type of inspired activism, coupled with -its own success, caused 
NVAANW to reconsider its structure and purposes in a meeting in Westtown, 
Pennsylvania in the fall of 1958. Realizing the importance of a continued 
witness of the Golden Rule type and the need for s teady financial support, 
NVAANW reorganized itself at this meeting. Calling itself by the more general 
title, Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA). the group became the radical 
action wing of the existing pacifist organizations . Sponsors of the group 
now included FOR, WRL. and the Friends Peace Committee.AFSC refused to sponsor 
the group due to its disapproval of CNVA's methods of civil disobedience. 26 
Differences in philosophy and tactics began to emerge in the organization. 
Larry Scott. founder of NVAANW and coordinator of CNVA went into retreat for 
two weeks to write a theoretical treatise. "In the fall of 1958 it seemed to 
me that if the gains of the two previous years were to be held and a further 
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step taken towards the building of a peace movement of power we must present 
a constructive alternative to the Cold War which people would generally accept. 
Moral protest and a step toward disarmament such as the cessation of nuclear 
testing would not be sufficient base for a peace movement unless we would 
follow it up with steps toward world community under the rule of law." Scott1s 
proposal met with favorabl e reviews from CNVA but it was soon IIput aside, 
with almost no discussion." The new youth of CNVA felt that moral witness and 
civil disobedience tactics were the life blood of the organization and that the 
issue of world disarmament under law, while extremely important, was better 
left to the more traditio.nal peace groups. Unfortunately, the new CNVA provided 
moral witness against almost intangibl e evils, those without the "immediate 
political relevance" which would enabl e CNVA to work with other organi zations 
. . bl 1 . t' 27 1n a V1a e peace coa 1 10n. 
The first of these new series of events was Omaha Action, which was designed 
as a witness against the cons truction of an ICBM base in Nebraska, urging workers 
there to resign their jobs and find non-military work . A statement by CNVA 
member Ross Anderson laid out the ideal s and strategies behind this new genera-
tion of direct actions: 
Preparation for war now means preparation for mass 
extermination. More than half of our immense federal 
budget goes to produce the chemical, bacteriological, 
and nuclear means to wipe out the ea.rth's population. 
And we have the foolishness to speak of this as defense. 
So we show our bankruptcy both of ideas and morally 
guided conduct. This cuts to the heart the person who 
loves his country and wants her to pass on to all men 
the great values entrusted to her. 
Anderson' s statement indicates the continued nationalism of the radical pacifi sts; 
the agreement to let America lead the way to righteousness. He goes on to 
speak of the other major component of CNVA' s philosophy, that of open, non-
violent resistence linked, if necessary, with acts of civil disobedience. 
"I am as king permission to enter the gate at Camp Mead, July 1st, to hand 
copies of this statement to the workers. If permi ssion i s not granted, I 
must seek to ente.r without it . 11 28 
CNVA, predictably, did not receive permiss ion. Led by seventy-five 
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year old A.J. Muste, three pacifists climbed over the newly constructed 
barbed-wire fence, were promptly arrested and given suspended sentences. Despite 
television and other media reporters on the scene, the action did not receive 
as much publicity as the Golden Rule action. Both the citizens and the clergy 
of Omaha were unreceptive to the pacifists' witness , leaving the participants 
in Omaha Action with no housing or speaking platform. The mood was made even 
gloomier by the arrest of several of the demonstrators for viol ating their parol e 
by returning to the base, and their subsequent sentencing to six months in the 
local penitentiary.29 
Omaha Action' s lack of success led the leadership of CNVA- to again re-
consider its priorities. Under the current status of the Westtown agreements, 
individuals could initiate projects, and once given clearance- by the executive 
board, were on their own at the demonstration s ite . The executive board, 
in turn, was responsible to the wishes of the sponsoring agencies, who often 
disapproved of the uses of civil disobedience. The problem became (1) whether 
to continue CNVA as an agency at all (2) how much control over the activities 
should be given to the individual s at the site or to the executive board and 
(3) what sort of actions should be undertaken. These considerations were to 
be discussed at a major CNVA meeting in Pend1e Hill, outside of Philadelphia, 
in September of 1959.30 
Possible courses of action to be taken at the upcoming meeting were 
enumerated as follows : (1) "Lay CNVA down," (2) Continue CNVA as it was, 
without a paid s taff and "where the most CNVA might do on that basis would 
be as a consultative body of sharing fellowship on problems of direct action," 
(3) Continue CNVA in the present mode with a $500 annual a.11otment from the 
sponsoring organizations and (4) Continue CNVA IIwithout formal sponsorship.1I 
Funds would be raised upon the announcement of specific actions. This way, 
no sponsoring agencies reactions would have to be considered, giving more 
freedom and spontaneity to actions of civil disobedience. At the Pendle Hill 
meeting, the final proposal was chosen. A statement of "guiding principles" 
was adopted which affirmed CNVA's major purpose as a direct action group, 
participating in civil disobedience if it deemed such action necessary. "In 
all its work and projects," moreover, "CNVA should make a special effort to 
cooperate with other peace organi zations. " 
In retrospect, this decision was vital to the successful continuation 
of CNVA as the cutting edge of the peace movement. Under the sponsorship of 
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the older, established peace organizations, CNVA's actions would have eventual ly 
been attenuated beyond recognition. Furthermore, CNVA's decision to work closely 
with other organizations and to avoid duplication of their work incre.ased to 
overall vitality of the grand coalition. 3l 
The Committee emerged from the Pendle Hill meeting with a new statement 
of policy and a new organizational framework, but with many of the same problems. 
The two plans of action that were under consideration at that time were the 
Sahara project, aimed at the i nternational protest of the French tests, and 
Polaris Action, which sought to influence workers in New England submarine 
yards to find new employment in the spirit of Omaha Action. The Sahara project 
met with disapproval with much of the executive board including Orion Sherwood, 
a crew member on the Golden Rule,: \'tho quipped, "sounds artificial, or perhaps 
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just desperate. II In general, the overwhelming financial and logistical 
mrriers to be faced in the Sahara Project made the second project more attrac-
tive to the committee. 32 
The unfolding of Polari s Action showed CNVA's new preoccupation with 
civil disobedience as a tactic . This development led to the res ignations of 
George Willoughby and Larry Scott in 1959 and of Albert Bigelow in 1960. They 
complained that actions of CNVA were being undertaken just to do something, 
with no real thought or intelligence behind the projects. A second complaint 
concerned the lIinstitutional i zation" of CNVA, making civil disobedience not an 
individual witness, but a meaningless show, Thoughts of hiring a public relations 
representative in 1960 seemed to be indicative of the move toward institutionali -
zati on. To take the place of the resignees in a l eadership role was the young 
and energetic pacifist Bradford Lyttle. who would steer the organi za tion for 
the next several years through its most radical stage. It was this change in 
leadership that, on CNVA's side, hastened the demise of the grand coalition of 
an influential force in national affairs . CNVA under Lyttle's leadership became 
less concerned with "political relevancy" and coalition formation, casting the 
organization into increasing isolation. 33 
III 
If SANE and CNVA were the stock and wine of the grand coalition sauce, 
then the scientific community was the liaison, or binding, of the sauce, 
giving it cohesion and vitality. For it was these experts that government, 
media and the public turned to in the age of the manipulation of the atomic 
nucleus. Often, however, the scientists' views and opinions on politics 
shaded their empirical and "objective" calculations . Hence, an impurity in 
..... ~-
the metaphorical sauc~D'was present which, however slight, could cause thi s 
politico-culinary creation to break. 34 
Some members of the sc ientific community were available and extremely 
desirable for the peace movement coalition due to their insider's position 
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in government. On November 7. 1958, in the wake of the Sputnik launch. 
President Eisenhower announced the appointment of the first special assistant 
for science and technology. James J. Killian, the president of MIT. Further-
more, the Science Advisory Council of the Office of Defense Mobilization was 
reorganized under the executive branch as the President's Science Advisory 
Committee (PSAC). "For the first time since the fallout debate began," com-
ments one historian of the period, "the President had access to a broad spectrum 
of scientific opinion." One sign of a changing of the scientific guard in 
Washington was the Senate's refusal to confirm the appointment of Lewis Strauss 
as Secretary of Commerce in 1959. This action was regarded by many as a 
l egislative backlash against the prosecution of Robert Oppenheimer by the AEC 
in 1954. 35 
During the period of the grand coalition, the sc ienti sts played a vital 
role in the negotiation of a test ban. While the Phoenix was en route to the 
South Pacific testing zone and SANE was counting the receipts in response to 
its first ad, Eisenhower and Khrushchev were attempting to begin serious 
negotiations of a test ban treaty. Khrushchev, upon the completion of a winter 
Soviet test seri es . announced a uni l ateral suspension of tests on March 31. 
1958. Eisenhower, avoiding a propaganda defeat. and working under the advice 
of Ki l lian and against that of the AEC. on April 28 called for a conference of 
sci entific experts to meet at Geneva to discuss the feasibility of aninspected 
ban. Meanwhile. the Hardtack I series in the Pacific commenced. On May 9, 
Khrushchev assented to Eisenhower's technical conference plan. On July 1. 
the Geneva meeting of scientific experts was underway.36 
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The United States' delegation was refresh_ingly balanced in its political 
assumptions . Joining Ernest O. Lawrence of Berkeley, a known opponent of a 
test ban, were Robert Bacher of Cal Tech, who slightly favored a ban, and 
James Brown Fisk, an executive vice-president of Bell Laboratories, who was 
considered neutral and was described as "level-headed." After intensive 
bri efi ngs wi th several government agenci es, the tota 1 del ega tion of 18, whi ch 
did not include a high-level diplomat, headed to Geneva. The Soviet delegation 
included Semyon K. ("Scratchy") Tsarapkin, an experienced diplomat who was 
able to take a firm line ,on the political realities that the scientists were 
unaware of. 37 
The negotiations included discussion of the various methods of detection 
of nuclear weapons tests, especially seismographic evidence. A system of 
650 control posts was suggested by the Americans, but the Soviets, not wanting 
foreigners on their soil, would allow only 110. The British delegation offered 
a compromise of 170 land posts supp1emented by 10 shipboard listening stations, 
an arrangement which was mutually acceptable to the superpowers. The fi.nal 
report issued on Augus t 22 was vague on the key issues of the na ti ona 1 ity and 
frequency of on-site inspections. Nevertheless, the conference announced 
that an inspected ban was "technically feasible. " It was on this conclusion 
that President Eisenhower empowered the State Department to enter test ban 
negotiations with the Soviet Union. On August 22, Eisenhower announced that 
at the end of the current Hardtack II series in Nevada, the United States 
would put a moratorium on ali tests for one year, beginning October 31. 38 
The Conference of the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests proceeded 
slowly, but was proceeding, with the major disagreements developing over the 
composition of the inspection teams, yet it was the scientists who put up the 
J 
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insurmountabl e barri er to the negoti a t;ons . Chi.ef negotiator James Wadsworth 
was informed during the Christmas break in the conference that evidence from 
the underground explosions in the Hardtack II series indicated that information 
from the first underground blast, Ranier, was misleading. The agreements 
reached at the technical conference were therefore obsolete. Now, to be able 
to detect tests down to the 5 kiloton level, some 500 inspection posts would 
be required. Eisenhower, realizing the trouble this. would lead to in the 
Geneva negotiations, appointed a committee headed by Lloyd V. Berkener to 
investigate the new evidence. James Wadsworth confirmed the President's fears, 
1 a ter recalling tha t the new evidence "spread a pall over the negotiations from 
which they never recovered. 1I At home, many legi slators called for the adoption 
of Senator Albert Gorels proposal of an atmospheric ban. eliminating the 
techni.cal problems of underground detection. Senator Humphrey spoke in favor 
of the comprehensive ban, presenting the testimony of Cornell physicist Hans 
Bethe, whom he compared to Socrates, as evidence of hope. 39 
The report of the Berkner panel applied what was to be the fatal damage 
to the Geneva negotiations. Based on a tip from Dr. Albert Latter of the 
RAND Corporation and work done by Dr. Edward Teller of Berkeley, the panel 
investigated the so-called IILatter hole" theory in which an atomic explosive 
was detonated in a large underground cavern. Such an arrangement would 
theoretically IIdecouple" the resulting seismic force anywhere from ten to 
300 orders of magnitude. Thus, a bomb as large as 1.5 megatons could con-
ceivably be clandestinely exploded and not be detected under the proposed 
Geneva agreements. Despite the immense cost and technical difficulty of actually 
constructing such a cavern, the implicit agreement among US negotiators 
that the Soviets would cheat, if they could, made this evidence devastating. 
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In fac t, the Latter hole theory and the fi.ndings of the Hardtack II series 
were not all that persuaded the powers to disagree. In the US, many felt 
that a ban was a danger to national security. AEC Commissioner Thomas E. 
Murray, for example, later recalled that lithe imperative of our test program 
had no t nearly been achieved." The B.ulletin of the Atomic Stientists~ one 
of the original vehicles of information concerning the dangers of fall-out, 
editorialized that lithe call for cessation of weapons tests has lost its 
rational justification--at least, for some time to come. 1I40 
Edward Teller had a lqng history of scientific and political influence 
on government. Known as the "fa ther of the H-bomb II because of a key break-
through of his invention, Teller did more than any other scientist in the 
following years to ensure the healthy and proper growth of his brainchi1d . A 
bitter hatred of the Soviet Union probably due to his past as a Jewish,Hungarian 
immigrant helped to influence his political thinking. Teller seemed to have a 
knack for controversy. When Linus Pauling released hi s petition of scientists 
calling for a test ban , Teller and co-author Albert Latter responded with a 
widely-read article in ~ Magazine entitled "The Compelling Need for Nuclear 
Tests'" Continuing their literary assault on the test-ban advocates, the team 
published Our Nuclear Future in the early months on 1958. This book did its 
best to relieve tensions and fears associated with fallout, claiming among 
other things, that IIworld-wide fallout is as dangerous as being an ounce over-
weight or smoking a cigarette every two rlW.nths." Speaking of the effects of 
radioactivity on human health, Teller insisted that "for practical purposes, 
this danger does not exist. " His ability to influence channels of power with 
his opinions was well known. A diary entry of George Kistiakowsky, Special 
Assistant to President Eisenhower on Science and Technology, noted that, flit i s 
quite obvious that Teller has done a good job in the Pentagon . "41 
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In June of 1957, Teller and Ernest Lawrence informed first the JCAE and 
then President Eisenhower of the possibility of developing "clean" nuclear 
weapons , that i s , those producing a relatively low level of radioactive 
fallout. This news sparked heated controversy in the already tense fallout 
debate. Norman Cousins was especially aghast at the use of the word "clean" 
to describe a nuclear weapon, calling such usage "the language of madmen." 
"-Noting a bit of inconsist ncy in Edward Teller's scientific arguments, 
Cousins found it "most difficult of all to comprehend why it should be 
necessary to spend billions of dollars to develop a bomb to get rid of a 
radioactive hazard that is supposed to be negligible in the first place." 
The British periodical Punch echoed this type of sentiment: 
To call an H-bomb 'clean' 
Makes sense and sound divergent 
Unl ess itls meant to mean 
The Ultimate Detergent. 
Some scientific opinion was also startled at Teller's belligerency, with 
Kistiakowsky convinced that "Teller is the most dangerous scientist in the 
United States. ,,42 
Tellers emotional, psuedo-scientific s tand for continued testing met with 
a worthy opponent in Linus Pauling. Pauling, a Nobel Prize winner in 
chemistry, published No !"1ore War! as a response to Teller and Latter' s volume. 
Refuting Teller' s sc ientific arguments one by one, especially with regard to 
his us e of statistical information, Pauling injected his own pol itical views 
in stating that "we are truly forced into abandoning war as a .method of solution 
of world problems, the method of resolution of disputes among nations." That 
the controversy was embedded not only in sc ientific realities, but in personali -
ties and deeply held politi ca l convictions is evidenced in this head-on con-
frontation and others during the debate. The effectiveness of the scientists ' 
political voice was recognized by many, including peace movement analyst 
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Nathan Glazer, who surmised that the power of scientists who substantiated 
their political opinions by "science" was far greater than any exi s ting 
. t' 43 peace organlza 10n. 
Indeed no purely scientific eVidence can be presented in the discussion 
of national security in relation to the bomb tests, yet the scientists spoke 
as with fluent expertise on the subject. · Although the. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists felt it "inevitable--and legitimate--that their interests should 
extend also to moral aspects as well as to worldwide implications,\! scienti s ts 
often overstepped the 1 imits of their knowledge, speaking on "matters for 
which they have no particular competence." Teller, Willard Libby, and Ernest 
Lawrence were the most outspoken advocatesof the view that a move to cease 
testing would lead to the outlawry of nuclear explosions . Such an event, it 
seemed to these scientists, would open the door to Soviet aggression due 
to their large standing army, deny the human race the benefits of possible 
peacetime uses, such as canal building, and set a precedent of stifling 
scientific inquiry. The test-ban scientists took the view that was often 
expressed by SANE. The US should take the moral l ead in the world by stopping 
the tests, since while real dangers of fallout already existed, more were likely 
to be discovered. Henry Kissinger, then a professor of government at Harvard, 
summed up the situation of the scientists by noting that the experts used 
"whatever statistics of effects of radioactive fallout they can find to fit 
their political positions . 1144 
Despite the confusing testimony of the scientists, and the fact that 
they knew "virtually nothing about the dangers of low-intensity radiation, " 
the group as a whole was genuinely concerned with the po'ssible effects of 
fallout from the intensive testing of 1957 and 1958. Thi s concern and the 
82 
overwhelmingly convincing evidence to back up claims of possible long term 
health problems gave a credibility to the work of the SANE and CNVA-led coalition. 
Regardless of how a particular scienti s t balanced the concerns of human health 
and national security, no one disagreed that testing presented dangers. In 
this context, the political work of the peace organizations was able to take on 
added significance, esp-ecially when many pro.minent scientists shared the test-
ban view. Thus the very confusion and disagreement of the scientific community 
was an aid to the peace groups who worked with this emotional and intellectual 
displacement to convert formerly apathetic citizens into working advocatesof 
peace. 45 
IV 
Sc ienti sts were not the only members of the intellectual community to 
take a role in the test ban controversy and the peace movement in general . 
Groups such as the Boston Area Faculty Group, the Committee for Correspondence, 
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, the Universities Committee 
on the Problems of War and Peace, the Council for the Gradualist Way to Peace, 
and the Council for a Livable World were founded by, funded by, and foundered 
in primarily 'by academicians. These organizations, it has been noted by 
Donald Keys, of SANE, were "elitist and hi 'erarchi-c:a l , " a description which, 
in 'turn, has been applied to Key's affiliations. Some university faculty chose 
to participate in campus demonstrations with the students, but these professors 
were mainly "young and without tenure." 46 
An effort for the academic world to be activist in its own realm was the 
advent of the peace research movement. This movement is generally conceded 
to have started with the publication of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
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a periodical spurred on by University of Michigan Economist Kenneth Boulding 
in 1959. The fi rs t editori a 1 exp 1 a i ned the purpose of the effort: 
Our belief in the fruitfulness of an interdisciplinary 
approach in this area is based on the conviction that 
the behavior and interactions of nations are not an 
isolated and self-contained area of empirical material 
but part of a much wider field of behavior and interaction. 
The es tablishment of a peace research community met with mixed reviews in 
the rema i nder of the peace movement. Donald Keys, for one, hoped tha t such 
an.academic endeavor would not become a substitute for IIgenuine li action. 
James R. Flynn, a pol itical scientist, saw peace research as a form of 
activism which attempted lito move the administration ll just as surely as 
CNVA members IIclimbing aboard Polaris submarines. II All agreed, however , that 
the increasing involvement of the academic world in peace activism could 
influence other groups to join the ranks of the peace coalition.47 
One of the biggest and potentially powerful groups to be so influenced 
was the massive student body of the Unite9 States. Prior to 1957 only a 
handful of pol itica 1 student organi za tions exi sted-. The most notabl e seems 
to be the Intercollegiate Society for Individualists, apparently a right-wing 
libertarian organization. The issues that awakened the adult community in 
the mid-1950s also influenced the students, and by 1957 several groups were 
established across the continent. The overwhelming majority of the student 
peace groups that developed during the years of the grand coalition were 
related to IIparentli organizations. The major groups that fit this description 
were the Students for Democratic Action (SDA) which was closely associated 
with the liberal Americans for Democratic Action and National Student Council 
for a Sane Nuclear Policy (Student SANE), which was allied, financially and 
ideologically, to the liberal leader of the peace coalition. By 1958, SANE and 
its cohorts had mobilized students nationwide, though especially in the east. 
10st activity was at Cornell University, with notabl e representation in the 
New York schools of Columbia , City College, Brooklyn College, and Bronx 
Community College. 48 
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Student SANE was entirely dependent on the parent, National SANE for 
their livelihood and inspiration. A memorandum from the first student national 
leadership to the parents was notably polite and deferential in tone : liThe 
largest amount of political expression in a long time took place during the 
1957-58 school year in favor of a nuclear test cessation. Thi s activity was 
made poss i ble by the leadership of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy." Apparently in awe of the SANE campaign, the authors of thi s memo 
overestimated the future of SANE which was "supported by a group of sponsors 
with so much authority to speak on these matters and so much esteem in publi c 
l ife, that the campaign was quite sturdy enough to weather the storms of 
red-baiting through which it had to pass." Such hardiness would not always 
be the case .49 
The initial successes of these organizations was quite impressive . A 
3000 strong "student power" demonstration at Cornell was only overshadowed by 
marches of 10,000 and 20,000 in Washington, D.C. in favor of school desegration 
in 1957 and 1958, respectively. At Oberlin, the SDA chapter was outspoken 
agai nst Dull es' s trategy of "massive retal iation" because of the negative 
light it cast the US in throughout the world. Oberlin Student SANE was able 
to get Hans Bethe to speak to the college community in May of 1958. Support 
for pacifist causes was apparent in the 600 demonstrators, "mostly s tudents " 
who 1 i s tened to A. J. ~1uste speak on "Acts for Peace" in New York City. 50 
The first policy statement of Student SANE was a sort of elementary 
regurgitation of the parents I rhetoric. "We drift toward ' the moment, II 
lamented the two-page statement, "when the pressing of a single button may 
signal the end of life on thi s planet. 1I Specific policy proposal s included 
• 
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universal membership to the United Nations, cessation of the nuclear tests 
"\'Iith full provisions for control and inspection," and international control 
of outer space. Strategies included "study and political 'action" using 
techniques such as letter writing, petitioning, and other traditional methods. 
Concerning coalition formation, Student SANE treated its locals as did National 
SANE: any policy advocated under the organization's name was subject to 
approval by the executive board. However, Student SANE left themselves open 
to work with other groups, offering to publish their material in the Student 
SANE newsletter. An early example of this type of cooperation is cited in 
an ADA document which indicates Student SANE's working with WRL and other 
"pacifist organizations," but without accepting pacifist ideology. ADA went 
on to urge its student branch to cooperate with Student SANE.
51 
However helpful the student wing of SANE might have been to the furthering 
of the parent~ objectives i s unclear, but the young activists seemed to be 
inexperienced, aping the actions of the adults, playing the game of politics. 
A postscript to a communication between an Antioch local and National Student 
SANE read: "P.S. To those of you who open my mail for the F.B.!.: Regards 
to J. Edgar Hoover." This cavalier spirit indicates alack of serious individual 
thought behind peace work that the pacifist groups deemed as so necessary to 
the vitality of the movement. One pessimistic student in Redlands, California 
protested the lack of homework done by Student SANE and requested the publi-
cation of "a book dealing with all aspects of the question [of nuclear testing] 
since the question was raised." 
"Stunts 1 ike sending a raft into a partitioned ocean may be good, " he 
continued, confusing the action of NVAANW with that of SANE, "but they do not 
i nfluence government l eaders.,,52 
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The evolution of the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID) 
i s a demonstration of the motion away from parent-controlled student organi -
zations toward autonomous, creative student activism. SLID was the student 
branch of the inveterate and hopelessly ineffectual League for Industrial 
Democracy, estab1 ished after World War I as a labor organi 'zing group, but 
which had receded into liberal anonymity by 1950. In 1958, SLID characterized 
itself as a liberal organization, was involved in anti-communist demonstrations 
and distributed anti-communist literature. In these years, SLID did not attract 
large numbers, with an estimated national membership of 200 and a total of 13 
delegates at its 1958 national convention. In 1960, SLID was renamed as Students 
for a Democratic Society, (SDS) the very organization that would become 
synonomous with th~ New Left movement of the mid 1960s. Escaping the ti es of 
LID., SDS chose as its new leader A1 Haber who assured that "pessimism and 
cynicism have given way to direct action. ,,53 . 
The establishment of the Student Peace Union (SPU) in 1959 i s further-
indication of the new autonomy and turn to the left of the student movement. 
By 1961, SPU could boast 120 chapters and thousands of members. SPU was 
financially supported primarily by the radical pacifist War Resister's League 
and embraced policies of autonomous. local independence from adult organizations. 
internal organizational democracy and "free and open discussion." Its program 
was characterized by the "third camp" strategy of equal criticism of the policies 
of east and west. its insistence of not committing members "to a preci se state-
ment of policy," its assumption of the greatness of American society and its 
encouragement of the US to lead the world to peace and justice. SPU was a vital 
force in the new stage of the coalition that was to come, since its views were 
more responsive to the awakening students! tastes. 54 
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The student movement, by the end of the period of the formation 
of the grand coalition, 1958-1960, was too radica l for the liberal adult 
peace groups to accept. Many of their activities were sponsored and attended 
by pacifists. A two day "Student Institute on Nonviolence and Social Change," 
featuring Norman Thomas, A. J. Muste and Bayard Rustin as speakers, was co-
sponsored by the leftist foursome of the FDR Four Freedoms Club, SDS, SPU 
and the Young People's Socialist League. Other radical student organizations 
began to crop up around the nati on's campuses. SLATE a t Berkel ey, TOCSIN at 
Harvard and the Progressive Student's League at Oberlin were examples. The 
influence of Oberlin's SPU group was great enough that a protest it sponsored 
against a 1961 civil defense drill led to its cancellation. Creativity and 
college spirit combined at the University of Wisconsin in the "Anti-Military 
Ball" in protest of mandatory ROTC, subtitled "The Street Where You Lived" 
and "Dig You Later Atom Crater." Even Student SANE came around to the new 
way of working, evidenced by a letter to WRL spokesperson David McReynolds from 
one Student local complaining of the dullness of the "inactive" group and 
asking McReynolds to make a speaking appearance. 55 
The real power behind the student movement and the ticket to the students' 
entrance in to the grand coal ition was in their numbers and their youth. "For 
the first time in the history of any nation," remarks Kirkpatrick Sale, his -
torian of SOS, "there were more students than there were farmers." Besides this 
numerical reality, these activists had no real quest for respectability or a 
fear of the loss of a hard-earned stake in the society that they so freely 
criticized. This was a generation that had no vivid memories of Hitler or 
other figures and events that so influenced the thoughts and actions of the 
adul ts in society. And so it was the free-thinking students that enabl ed the 
pacifist movement to move into the next stage of the coalition by lending 
their support. The movement was to be to the left, against the grain of 
society, creating heat by friction. Unfortunately, the liberal portion of 
the tenuous coalition sauce would prove to be unable to take the increase 
in temperature. 56 
88 
89 
Chapter IV - Prema ture Fall of the Grand Coalition 
The prospects for the growth and sustained health of the grand coalition 
peace movement shone brightly in the early months of the decade of -the 1960s. 
Yet by the end of the first year of that peri'od, the liberal wing of the 
coalition, led by SANE, had been badly discredited by an anti-communis t 
assualt and the pacifist wing had turned away from the coalition, pacing 
quickly to the left. Although external conditions were increasingly hostil e 
and militaristic, SANE and CNVA had both been born of cri ses. Despite the 
fact that SANE was purged of communists and fellow-travellers from within, 
tha t organi za ticn had a 1 ready wi ths tood several bou ts of red-ba iti ng and had 
emerged 1 ike a knight in the annor of sanity. Furthermore, pacifists had 
been isolated from mainstream politi cs in previous years yet remained a vital 
force in the peace movement. The ans\'Jer to the puzzl e of the breakdown of 
the peace ocoalition lies not in any singl e explanation, but in an intangible 
combination of factors whose effect, taken as a group, far exceeded their sum. 
The conditions facing the peace movement in the summer of 1960 were, to 
say the least, challenging. President Eisenhower was scheduled to participate 
in a spring summit conference in Pari s with the heads of state of France, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. SANE had placed great emphasis on the 
potential importance of such a conference, and given this opportunity, 
responded with a full page newspaper advertisement throughout the country 
urging its successful completion. A further press release urged the super-
powers to "deal at the Summit with the problem ..of the survival of mankind while 
there is still time." However, a shocking and embarrassing event occurred 
which cast a pall over the conference. On May 1, a United States U-2 
reconnaisance plane was shot down over Soviet territory and its pilot, Gary 
Powers was captured and imprisoned. Despite confident reports that the 
Soviet Union would never publici ze such an event, Khrushchev did so on 
~lay 5. SANE, commenting on the collapse and subsequent confusion offered 
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a disturbing analogy to the events. i.n Europe duri'ng the late summer of 1939. 
However, the organization offered its congratulatlons to SANE members for 
the 5000 letters and telegrams received at the American Embassy in Pari s , 
urging continued pressure on the Geneva negotiators and on candidates in the 
upcoming national e1ections.1 
Ei senhower a rri ved in Pa ri s for the summit conference on May 15. At 
the first meeti ng, Khrushchev "1 aunched on along diatdbe, speaking from 
a prepared text. II The gist of hiS statement was that, given the flagrant 
violation of Soviet territorial rights by the United States, the Soviet 
Union could not participate in the conference. Eisenhower felt that the 
U-2 incident was used as a device by Khrushchev to renege on his invitation 
of the US president to the Soviet Union. Th~ pres ident felt that the Soviets 
feared an exposure of the Soviet people to the high living standards of the 
United States by Eisenhower' s television address . III think the Paris summit, 
had it been held," writes Eisenhower in his memoirs, "would have proved to 
be a failure and this would have brought the Free World only further di s-
illusionment. 1I Indeed, the breakup of the Paris summit and the impending 
failure of the Geneva conference were disappointing to peace advoca~son the 
international scene, but possible hope lay in the world of domestic politics 
with the election of 1960. 2 
The campaign and election of John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts may have, 
on the surface, seemed a victory for devotees of peace. but actually, his 
peace rhetori:c and defense policies were damaging to liberal peace activism. 
One of the bases of SANE's existence was the eventual banning of nuclear 
explosives . Although their program had been ambitiously expanded to include 
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disarmament down to police level s , the s ingle issue of the test ban had 
begun their growth and sustained it for three years . Now Kennedy was 
campaigning on a platform that emphasized a conventional rearmament, promising 
to close a mythical IImi"ssile gap,1I while reducing the United States' dependence 
on nuclear deterrence. Kennedy was in agreement with SANE's call for a con-
tinued halt on testing and a negotiated treaty since IIby the time the next 
president' s term of office had come to an end, there may be ten, fifteen, or 
twenty countri es with atomic capabil ities." How all these goal s were s imul -
taneously reachable is unclear, yet SANE and the liberal peace forces sup-
ported the Kennedy campaign. Sociologist Nathan Glazer in 1961 pointed at 
Kennedy's peace policies as one of the facts contributing to the lack of 
influence by peace organizations. Although Glazer indicates that this fact 
is a good sign concerning the Kennedy administration, a more valuable lesson 
for the peace movement lies in the ease with which SANE was taken in by 
carefully calculated political rhetoric. 3 
Kennedy's inaugural address emphasized hi s views on defense, virtually 
ignoring domestic issues. "On the Presidential Coat of Arms, the American 
Eagle holds in his right talon the olive branch," said the new president, 
IIwhile in ni s left he holds a bundl e of arrows. We intend to give equal 
attention to both." The new president eventually 1 ived up to this aspect 
of hi s campaign and inaugural promises. IIIn the past three years," said 
Kennedy in his final speech, delivered to the Fort Worth Chamber of Commerce, 
"we have increased the defense budget of the United States by over twenty 
percent ... the balance of power is still on the side of freedom.1I During 
his administration, combat-ready army divisions were increased from eleven 
to sixteen, while Air Force tactical wings were increased from sixteen to 
t\'ienty-one. Annual procurement of conventional weapons and ammunition nearly 
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doubled. One hundred thousand recruits were added to the army. Other 
increases in personnel and funding were also undertaken. 4 
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Kennedy's successful responses to crises with impressive showings of 
force did harm to the pacifists ' vision of non-violent resistence as a 
catalyst toward change. During the Berlin crisis, a parade of lSOO US 
troops down the autobahn was lIa reminder of our commitment ll to the ~lest 
Berliners. A face off of tanks across the newly erected wall resulted in 
the drawing back of Soviet armor. The brinksmanship of the Cuban crisis was 
further evidence of the aggressive military diplomacy of Kennedy that proved 
successful. IIWe agreed in the end, II remfni seed Robert Kennedy, then Attorney 
General, IIthat if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over Cuba, 
they were ready to go to nuclear war and that was that. So we might as well 
have the showdown then as six months later. II Support for such a seemingly 
bellicose administration by SANE was a credit to' the co-opting power of the 
government and a debit on the National Committee's account of effectiveness. 
SANE's liberal assumptions not only left that organization open for anti-
communist counter-punching, but for the attenuation of its message by the 
liberal administration. SANE would continue to prove its vulnerability to 
co-optation by the government until the limited test-ban treaty of 1963 
and that organization's self-laudatory statements would finally demonstrate 
the emptiness of its message. S 
I 
The event that could have marked a resurgence of peace activism, had it 
not been for internal divisions carved in earlier years, was the resumption 
of atmospheric testing by the Soviet Union in September of 1961. IIEven the 
professional ban-the-bomb groups, II red-baited Time, IIwhom the communists have 
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busily encouraged and who normally save their ire for th.e United States, 
were up in arms against Russia." After the third shot in Siberia, President 
Kennedy announced the United States' resumption of underground testing, 
ominously warning that lithe foul winds of war are blowing," The Russian 
series raised fallout levels to new highs in the American South. leading to 
a scare, which, in the past, had given new sources of support to SANE and the 
peace coalition . This time, however, the absence of US fallout increased the 
anti-communist sentiment which had ruined SANE as a viable influence. 6 
"I must report to you in all candor,1i said the President in a nationwide 
television address on March 2, 1962, "that further Soviet series. in the absence 
of further western progress, could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear 
attack and defensive capability so powerful a"s to encourage aggressive designs." 
The moratorium on US atmospheric tests, after 3 years, 5 months and 26 days was 
to come to an end. The Dominic series commenced on April 25. 1962.7 
In short, the election of John F. Kennedy brought a sense of newness to 
the nation. Through a stylish first lady, bold economic plans. tough dealings 
with the Soviets, and a general vitality, the Kennedy administration indirectly 
pull ed issues away from the peace coal i ti on. SANE and CNVA had called for a 
rethinking of priorities, a new critique of foreign and nuclear policy, and a 
return to the classic American moral values. Kennedy succeeded in achieving 
these ends through traditional political means. The response of the nation 
indicated that Americans would rather wear convention straw hats or lapel pins 
than to demonstrate in fron t of government buildings or climb aboard " atomic 
submarines. 8 
In addition to outside forces. internal strife decreased the power and 
legitimacy of the peace coalition. Perhaps the event that did the most lasting 
damage to the coalition was the anti-communi st assault and subsequent purge 
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of SANE. In May of 1960, SANE attracted some 20,000 persons to a rally in 
the new Madison Square Garden in New York City. Speakers included Walter 
Reuther, Eleanor Roosevelt, Alf Landon and Norman Thomas. After the rally, 
more than 5000 citizens joined together in a march of solemn solidarity 
across Manhattan to the United Nations to conduct a midnight prayer. Follow-
ing the rally, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, a vigorous opponent of the test ban 
treaty negotiations, revealed to the Congress and press that one of the chief 
organizers of the rally, Henry Abrams, was a communist. IICommuni s ts were 
responsible," charged Dodd, IIfor a very substantial percentage of the over-
flow turnout. 1I He proceeded to serve subpoenas to 37 SANE members before his 
subcommittee on internal security of the committee on the judiciary.9 
Doddls timing could not have been worse for SANE, which had been debating 
a resolution similar to the one used by the ACLU to prevent communist member-
ship. This resolution would require that members employ the same standard of 
judging the policies of all nations. Now Senator Doddl s interference would 
force SANE to either take a stand against the Cold War policy of blind anti-
communism or to adopt their resolution under pressure from a Senate sub-
committee. Dodd, an old friend and UWF associate of Norman Cousins, announced 
SANEl s decision: IINot only did t4r. Cousins act immediately to suspend Henry 
Abrams," he told the Senate, IIbut when he saw me in Washington, he asked for 
the subcommittee's assistance in ridding the Committee for a Sane Nuclear 
Policy of whatever communist infiltration does exist. He offered to open 
the books of the organization to the subcommittee and to cooperate with it in 
every way. II 10 
Cousins denied the Senator' s claim. Although he had questioned Abrams 
concerning his political affiliations and demanded his resignation, he saw , 
to it that SANE release a civil 1 ibertarian response to the Dodd Committee. 
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liAs a matter of principl e and practice, 1I read the statement released to 
the press," we resent the intrusion of a Congressional Committee into the 
affairs of an organization which during its entire life has acted only in 
accordance with its declared principles. 1I However, the SANE committee also 
adopted the exclusion clause which stated that IIpersons who are not free 
because of party discipline or political allegiance to critici ze the actions 
of totalitarian nations with the same standards by which they challenge other 
nations will not be welcome as members. " The national leadership was fully 
aware that its decision. would alienate certain sectors of SANE's membership, 
especially the pacifists, yet their reasoning had been well described by SANE 
member and journalist Barbara Deming: "If one wants more support," she noted, 
II pub 1 i c i rra ti ona 1 ity mus t be deferred to. II 11 
As a result of the new language in SANEl s principl es , all SANE local s were 
required to renew their charters, including the new policy. Twenty-five locals 
in New York State, the area with the most activity, chose not to renew. Their 
displeasure at the infringement of civil liberties taken by SANE was expressed 
by Robert Gilmore, a pacifi st member of the executive board, who offered hi s 
resignation: 
SANE should recogni ze that one cause which contributes to 
the possibility of mass annihilation is the condition under 
whi ch one . . . group of men regards another . . . not as 
fellow human beings but as alien creatures. If SANE con-
tributes to the spread of this disease within its own ranks, 
it contributes just as surely to the human condition leading 
toward destruction it ·was founded to battle against. 12 
A. J. Muste also resigned from SANE, admitting that communist infiltration 
was a potential problem, but disappointed that SANE had not taken a stronger 
stand. He feared that activists who had perhaps once embraced communistic 
or socialistic values (as had Muste) would be lost as an addition to the 
coalition. "If they find in a peace organization the same kind of dogmatism, 
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suspicion, and obsession with orthodoxy that finally drove them out of the 
communi s t party of its fronts, II Mus te spoke from experi ence, II they wi 11 
stop working [for peace].11 Moreover, Muste felt that the Dodd investigation 
had offered SANE the opportunity to become a truly vital independent force 
in national politics. The reaction by SANE seemed as harmful to American 
ideals as past travesties despised by those very liberals. "What need is 
there of the bruta1iti'es of outright totalitarian regimes,1I asked Muste, "or 
even the crudities of McCarthyism , if conformity can be obtained by such 
gentle pr:essures?1I13 
Resigned pacifists Gilmore, Muste, and Stewert Meacham~ chairperson of 
AFSC, offered the fo 11 owi ng dra ft of SANE's response to the Dodd Committee: 
IISANE has not and will not trim its sails to suit opponents of a sane nuclear 
policy whether they be members of Congressional committees, private citizens, 
or anonymous . .. SANE has not and will not be controlled by the Communist 
Party nor any outside interest or organization. II Thus the resignees were not 
denying the evil of communist infiltration, only demanding that the duty of 
avoiding such a possibility be left to the organization. 14 
Not all members of SANE disagreed with the actions taken by the national 
committee. N()rman Thomas, for one, did not want to see SANE IIdiverted into 
being primarily a civil liberties agency.1I Nathan Glazer characterized 
Cousins' actions in response to the Dodd Committee as "political wi sdom. 1I 
Some pacifists also stayed on with SANE to weather the storm, most notably 
co-chairperson Clarence Pickett. SANE, meanwhile, informed the locals of 
the continuing response of the national committee, assuring the members that 
no names would be turned over to the investigating committee nor would those 
called to testify be forced to have their names made public. 15 
Despite these comforting words, national SANE used the crisi s to assert 
absolute control and authority over the local committees, enforcing the 
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orthodoxy that Muste referred to. "These matters involve a precarious 
equilibrium. Impulsive or imprudent action can jeopardize the careers of 
the individuals involved and do serious damage to the organization." There-
fore, demanded a patronizing executive board, tlNo new releases or advertise-
ments or public comments, director indirect dealingwithany phase of 
the Senate inquiry are to be issued Stlocalchapters except on specific 
authorization from the National Office." [emphasis in original]. National 
SANE strongly advised those called before the subcommittee not to take their 
fifth amendment privileges although "this in itself will not be automati c 
cause for dismissal from SANE. ,,16 
At the third National Conference, co-chairpersons Cousins and Pickett 
attempted to pas s a resolution in support of their leadership during the 
crisi s. The resolution passed, but only after being amended to mean that 
such support was offered concerning polici es "having to do with substance 
and not wi th organi za tion." Furthermore, the resol uti on concerni ng the 
exclusion from SANE of certain groups, now extended and specified to include 
"communi sts, fascists or individuals who are not free because of party di s-
cipline or political allegience to apply to the actions of the Soviet Union 
or the Chinese Government the same standards by which they challenge others, " 
passed by a bare majority of 29-2'8 with "several abstentions." SANE, at this 
point, was demanding orthodoxy from its members, and was teetering on a shaky 
organi za tional foundation. 17 
The group that resigned in protest from SANE was left with no organization 
to carry forth their programs for peace and disarmament. A meeting in the 
New York Statler Hotel was cal l ed to remedy this situation. An organization 
was proposed which would have a pol icy "largely the same as that of SANE," but 
which would practice a policy of non-exc l usionism. FOR executive secretary 
Alfred Hassler indicated hi s disapproval with thi s arrangement, which threatened 
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to increase "interorganizational rivalry and competition" in the peace 
movement. Hassler could not imagine "that an organization whose core con-
sists of people like Henry Abrams and Corliss Lamont, together with a lot 
of others who have been expelled by SANE, can have any influence in this 
country at all for peace." The editorial board of the pacifist publ ication 
Liberation also rejected the idea of an opposition committee. 18 
Linus Pauling was to serve as chairperson of this new group, a develop-
ment which Hassler was not pleased with. "His tremendous competence in his 
own field," mused Hassler, "did not seem to me to be matched by an equal 
sophistication on the political level ." Hassler closed his letter to Muste 
by inviting him to work for FOR in a greater capacity than his current role 
of secretary emeritus. Hassler' s offer is indicative of a general with-
drawal of the various peace forces into their respective corners. 19 
The overall effect of the Dodd investigation was the effective dismantling 
of SANE ' s elaborate structure of ideological support. Their financial base 
seems to have slipped as well. One contributor tempered his apparently 
unusually small gift of $25 with the comment "I have to confess that my faith 
in what SANE will be able to do has been seriously shaken. I find it difficult 
to escape the belief that Norman Cousins virtually surrendered to Senator Dodd 
and the committee on UnAmerican (sic) Activities. 1I Despite this gentleman's 
confusion concerning Dodd's committee assignment, his words demonstrate that 
the disillusionment with SANE was not unique to pacifists and communists. 20 
The Soviet Union's favorable attitude toward SANE increased that organi-
zation's vulnerability to red-baiting. For example, three Soviet scientists 
addressed a letter to SANE urging them to adopt a policy of universal dis-
armament. This communication received publicity in the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists. Acceptance and approval of SANE's actions also came from a higher 
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source in the USSR. Semyon K. Tsarapkin, ranking diplomat at both the 
Geneva technical talks and the actual negotiations, asked that SANE be given 
a hearing at the Geneva conference. Such help from the Soviets did even 
further damage to the battered 1 iberal and anti -,communist skin of the coal ition 
1 eader. 21 
II 
When the smoke began to clear from the Dodd-set fire of anti-communism , 
SANE did not appear to be in serious trouble as an organization. The fourth 
national conference was well attended, with 183 delegates from 60 local 
committees. Yet the policies of coalition-formation which became unveiled 
during the spring peace marches and other joint effort indicated the malai se 
of SANE compared to its condition in pre'-Dodd days .22 
In its policy statements, SANE indicated that its role at the "vital 
center of the peace effort" had become a partisan backing of the "peace race" 
policies of President Kennedy. For example, frequent references to the 
"peace race" in the under-developed countries which arose during the first 
plenary session of the fourth national conference were obviously in approval 
of the Kennedy administration's efforts in that realm. Norman Thomas was 
more direct in his approval: "We are now in a position of supporting the 
President' s stand that a settlement on Berlin i s negotiable." Homer Jack, 
executive director of national SANE, addressed a New York gathering with 
the admission that "the political dimension i s the very frontier of our 
organization," while reaffirming "our desire to convert the arms race into 
a peace race." Specific proposal s that year included opposition to civil 





The aims of post-Dodd SANE may not have been drastically changed. but 
the methods by which they cooperated with other wings of the peace movement 
were. Dr. Jack chose to stress some points about SANE that had been glossed 
over previously. "SANE is not pacifist, II was one such statement, "we are 
pragmatic, not absolutist." This backhanded swipe at the departed pacifist 
conti gent i s evidence of the growing rift in the once coherently woven peace 
community. Certainly SANE' s legitimacy was done irreparable harm by the Senate 
investigation, as what small influence it had became unusable. For example, 
Homer A. Jack I s 1 etters to the heads of s ta te of the four nuc 1 ea r na ti ons , 
urging renewed attempts at a summit meeting received an answer only from 
Chairman Khrushchev. President Kennedy apparently wanted to afford no 
pub 1 i city or encourageent to the disgraced 1 i bera 1 s. 23 
In an attempt to score victori es similar to those of the Aldemaston marches 
of the British organization Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, SANE planned 
a nationwide series of 1961 Easter marches throughout major cities in the US. 
"We know that if a broadly-representative mobilization for peace is to be 
undertaken in America," read a confident announcement of the action, "it will 
probably have to be sparked by SANE. II Yet there was fear of other groups at 
the sites. In the days before the purge, SANE would have rejoiced at such 
opportunities to coordinate a multiple-group action. Now, the organization 
was struggling to maintain what legitimacy it still had. 24 
The task of eliminating unwanted elements from a demonstration was not 
easy. David McReynolds, who exhibited notable political savvy, knew that 
"it i s utterly impossibl e during a demonstration or on a picket line to ask 
everyone on the line for his political credentials." The national committee 
warned the locals of simultaneous demonstrations by the AFSC, in \oJhich the 
emphasi s might be on unil ateral disarmament, prayer vigil s , or even civil 
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disobedience. "If there are parallel activities in your community and your 
SANE group i s unable to find a common, unifying formula,1I advised the national 
office, "we hope your local SANE' group will conduct its own activity . 
There is no need to hide the fact that there different approaches to peace. " 
Indeed, cooperation at joint demonstrations became increasingly rare . At a 
Times Square rally in the ~pring of 1961, for instance, a group of Friends 
engaged in a Ifpeace vigil" refused to join a SANE march . Both the liberal 
and the pacifist wings of the coalition felt repugnance of each other Js tactics 
of action. 25 
The issues advocated by SANE had become so compl ex that its role as a spear-
head to a powerful coalition was severely damaged. No longer were the days 
when any uncommitted or unaware, non-communist citizen was free to join or 
cooperate with SANE in any way possible. Orthodoxy and uniformity became the 
desire of the anonymous and arbitrary national committee. 
"Folk singers, sloppy dress, and beards should be discouraged. They spoil 
the image and provide ready handl es for those observers who are ready to label 
any peace demonstration as composed of "crackpots" or "beatniks . " Other 
memoranda to the locals warned of the negative effects of "beards Inl banjoes, 1I 
during the peace walks of 1962. Further recommendations included that al l 
signs be "uniformly painted" and slogans cleared first with the national 
committee. The issue of who sponsored the march in which community was partially 
settled by the advent of "the operational umbrella," Turn Toward Peace (TTP), 
yet "only organizations which are members of Turn Toward Peace will be allowed 
to march." SANE had come from coordinating the peace movement to attempting 
to dictate its activi tes. 26 
Before the spring peace walks of 1962 could take place, the US resumed 
testing in the atmosphere, an event which met with a demonstration sponsored 
) 
by SANE in New York City. Here, a disaster occurred whi.ch would be the 
catalyst for the final break of the fragile coalition between law-abiding 
liberals and pacifists who answered to a higher authority. During the 
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march through Times Square, a group of pacifists protested some rough 
treatment by pol ice of g demonstrator at Duffy Square by sitting down on the 
busy thoroughfare. blocking traffic at one of the busiest intersections in 
the world. New York City police forcefully arrested the pacifists. who had 
locked arms in a circle, inspiring protests and chants of "shame. shame. 
shame" from the SANE marchers. Mounted police charged through the crowds. 
with several injuries to non-pacifists occurring. 27 
Police later justified their actions by recalling that the pacifists 
"struggled, kicked and resi sted arrest." Furthermore. the credibility of 
the march, which_ involved the cooperative effort of Women Strike for Peace 
(~/SP), General Strike for Peace (GSP), WILPF, WRL, SPU, SANE, and CNVA was 
challenged by the fact that lIa few of the marchers had beards and were 
described as 'beatniks'." A CNVA protest outside AEC's New York headquarters 
the following day was discredited by the same accusation. At the trial, 
held on April 6, of the 26 marchers who had been charged with resisting arrest, 
testimony of police brutality was countered by charges of non-cooperation of 
pacifists and the presence of beatniks. 28 
SANE attempted to dissociate itself from the actions of the pacifists, 
while condemning'the police for their "unbelievable brutality" in a letter 
to New York Mayor Robert F. vJagner Jr. Executive director Dr. Homer Jack 
ca lled for "an independent fact-finding investigation by an impartial group 
of 1 eadi ng ci ti zens. II "We do not condone the behavi or of a sma 11 group of 
persons who violated the demonstration discipline,1I wrote Jack. IIhowever, the 
vast majority of the thousands of demonstrators present in Duffy Square 
were instructed to behave in a di sc iplined manner and remained disciplined 
throughout." Try as they might, SANE was unabl e to cast off associations 
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with pacifi sts and unilateral ists in the ensuing media storm. CNVA expressed 
similar helplessness with regard to the media, lamenting that "no newspaper 
carried the facts, as CNVA presented them in a news release. 1I CNVA expressed 
further concern over a loss in leadership in the peace movement, the "deterior-
ation" of relations with the New York City Pol ice and other municipal authori-
ties, and the 1 inkage of the Duffy Square viol ence and the fundamentally 
pacifist CNVA. SANE's letter to Wagner is evidence of the frustration SANE 
was feeling as they lost their grip over the coalition. The two groups 
were ready to head in separate directions without intending to look back. 29 
Coalition theory can be employed here to analyze the purge of SANE ,and 
its subsequent attempt to meet its detractors on the right. The assumption 
of "rational actors" breaks down in the debate between Norman Cousins, with 
his cooperation with Senator Dodd, and A. J. Muste, with his "Crisi s in SANE" 
series in Liberation. Both these men were rational, had strongly held con-
victions, viewed the same set of events, and wished to be members of a "winning" 
coalition, that is, one that could 'affect decision-making within the government. 
Yet each devised different policy alternatives for SANE. Hence, policy dis-
tance theory is an attractive choice of models in this case . SANE was the 
actor who wi shed to be included in the winning coalition which is as close 
as possible to its views. In thi s case, that coalition was the Democratic 
party! Concern with legitimacy and national strength overshadowed SANE ' s 
desire to be working with traditional "peaceniks" or pacifists. 
The pacifists, on the other hand, had no desire to work with the es tablished 
political parties, instead preferring to work within the universe of their 
spirituality. Although they had compromised their ideal s somewhat by entering 
t 
the liberal coalition in 1957, the exclusion policy adopted by SANE was 
too amoral to accept. Their reality was different than that of SANE. The 
decision was made to pursue the pacifist tdeal--a path down the road of 
radicalism. As will be seen. SANE's choi ce to meet the challenge from the 
right rather than from the left would leave that liberal orgariization in the 
dus t of a new storm of radical activism led by students l ater in the decade. 
III 
CNVA was in the process of s ta.lking into the misty left of the American 
pol itical spectrum, "drifting slowly toward becoming a sect," a path which 
\lieu 1 d dull their rol e as "cutti ng edge" of the peace movement pyramid. The 
actions that the CNVA would undertake, following the new leadership of 
Bradford Lyttle, would be on a larger scale. more physically demanding, and 
more reliant on civil disobedience than ever before . This new monolithic 
rel iance on the tactic of "holy" disobedience as an end in itsel f was the 
development which would complete the changing of the guard at CNVA. 30 
Polari s Action, the first CNVA activity in which Brad Lyttle had a major 
role, was a moral witness staged in New London-Groton, Connecticut. Over 
a period of several months, workers fo.r the United States Submarine Base 
and the General Dynamics Electric Boat Division there were urged to relocate 
themselves to a peaceful sector of the economy . The constant prayer vigils 
and pamphleteering which CNVA was patiently employing at the site were not 
reaping results in the mind of Lyttle. He submitted in 1960 to the national 
committee a "Prospectus for Civil Disobedience in Polari s Action,1I which 
meticulously outlined the possibi l ities by land and sea, the 'possible legal 
penalties faced, and the expected response from the community. Despite the 
serious tone of thi s document, Lyttle' s enthusiasm with the method of 
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satyagraha was cl ear: "I do not know how the publ ic in New London-Groton 
will respond to an announcement that some of us intend to non-violently 
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roard the Patrick Henry (an atomic submarine located at the base), \1 concl uded 
Lyttle in his Prospectus. "Any person planning to join Polaris Action during 
its civil disobedience phases should be prepared for any~hing . 1I31 
The civil disobedience occurred by sea when several pacifists rowed to 
the submarines and climbed aboard, promptly being arrested. Three submarines 
were eventually violated in this way. The action met with some limited success, 
including a reluctant acceptance of the pacifists ' presence by the local 
inhabitants, the offer of several workers to quit their jobs if CNVA would 
find alternative employment, and significantly, the participation of several 
college students in the civil disobedience phase of the action. In contrast 
to these successes was the disapproval of the action by certain old-guard 
CNVA members. 32 
In his letter of resignation, Albert Bigelow, the skipper of the Golden 
Rule in 1958, questioned the sagacity of Polaris Action. asking if the project 
VIas undertaken solely "so there would be a sumner activity." Calling the 
civil disobediences to be committed as "attention-getting devices," Bigelow 
ana lyzed the project in terms of the theory of Gandhian satyagraha . 
The innuendo regarding J.B. Osborn, Captain of the U.S.S. 
George ~Jashington, in the box on the first page of the 
promotion leaflet is deplorable . Is this non-violence a 
proper beginning toa satyagraha appealing to Osborn's--and 
all men 's--nobler nature to convert them from a gravely 
mistaken but none the less sincerely-held error? 
Perhaps part of Bigelow's indignation was due to his history as a navy officer 
holding the same errors, yet his point was clear. He concluded his letter with 
the unfortunate reality that in order to disassoctate himself from Polaris 
Action in particular, he was forced to resign from CNVA. Larry Scott also 
expressed concern over the use of Gandhian methods, referring especially to 
J 
the current CNVA practice of "going limp" when arrested, instead of accept-
ing their fate. liThe practice of going limp when arrested is not civil 
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disobedience--·it is passive resistance, II wrote Scott, "Gandhi knew that and 
did not practice it himself, or allow it i'n the Gandhian action discipline. 1I33 
A. J. Muste quickly sent a long response to Bigelow, urging him to 
reconsider. Mustel s theoretical analysis is valuable in that it illustrates 
the basic changes that CNVA was experiencing at this juncture. A concern i s 
expressed about the "sponsorship" of various actions . Muste bel ieved that 
establishing a new support base for each project was a wasted effort and 
therefore favored a more formal organization or "institutionalization. 1I 
III donlt regard organization as a necessary evil ,11 he wrote to Bigelow, III 
think it is necessary. Period." More important was the new emphasis of CNVA 
from single, tangible, and popular issues to a frontal attack on practically 
invi s ible weapons delivery systems. Muste continued: 
I have noticed that some who opt strongly for selzlng on 
the popular issues are also strong on insisting that the 
literature shall educate people on the need of basic economic 
change, although that is not what bothers the masses in an 
"affluent society. II In otherwor<is) there the emphasis is 
on what people need to know, not on what they are at the 
moment fired up about. [emphasis in original] 
Muste was playing conciliator between the old guard, personified by Bigelow 
and Larry Scott and the young blood of Lyttle and his increasingly scholastic 
foll owing. 34 
Muste continued to play the middle by refuting Lyttlel s extreme of insist-
ing "that the missile i s the focus of the nuclear deterrence pattern and 
should be the sole focus of radical pacifist action." Some kind of compromi ses 
should be drawn, he urged, s ince both strategies have reaped success, and CNVA 
needed all the help it could muster. "Both sponteneity and organization are 
indispensable,1I concluded Muste. "Those of us who lean toward one have our 
particular blind spots and temptations, and those of us who lean toward the 
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other, theirs. 1I The Lyttle-led forces of organization would'. loom large in 
the future, however, and Bigelow would not reconsider his resignation. "I am 
tempted to say that Brad i s really uninterested in other people's ideas , 1I 
said Thomas Olson in 1961, "but the rest of us have been so backward in 
presenting alternatives that he may simply never have encountered a \'Jorth-
while alternative tb his own type of thought.1I Olson concluded that III don ' t 
expect to put much effort into a CNVA organized as poorly as we are at 
present. 1135 
Other citizens, pacifi st and non-pacifist, expressed similarly negative 
sentiments in reference to CNVAts new monolithic reliance on civil di s-
bedience. Arthur Harvey, a pacifist, refused an offer of membership into 
CNVA in 1962, citing the irresponsible use of Gandhian tactics as hi s reason. 
Liberal observers tended to be less than kind . Robert Martinson, writing 
in the Nation, explained that "civil disobedience i s a responsible and 
appropriate response for the civil rights struggle in the South, but may 
become gauche and self-defeating when carried over uncritically to the peace 
field." Despite such criticism, which was widespread, CNVA continued in its 
radicalization, with Brad Lyttle exerting greater influence than ever before .35a 
Lyttle's first project as the unofficial, yet uncontested leader of CNVA 
was the San Francisco-Moscow Walk for Peace. After years of hearing "tell it 
to the Russians" from citizens at US action sites, and after a failure in 1958 
to gain entry to the Soviet Union, a group of demonstrators, pacifist and 
non-pacifists, left San Francisco, unheralded, in 1960. A $6000 donation from 
Unitarian Scott Herri ck and the anonymous donation of a used Buick convertibl e 
made the trip possible. On May 28,1961, the demonstrators reached the 
United Nations in New York City. Pacifi st Ed Saunders added to the witness 
with a 66 hour standing fast in front of the AEC in Washington . In the press 
coverage the walkers did receive. which was slight. A. J. Muste was cast 
as the 1 eader of the group, but as the march continued, Lyttl e emerged as 
the spiritual head of the group.36 
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After a flight to London on June 1, the demonstration took on an 
international tone with walkers joining from several European nations . The 
walk continued under the auspices and strategy of CNVA, however. In the end 
of June, the group entered Belgium, with Lyttle claiming that they would enter 
the USSR whether or not permission was received. On August 7, the walkers 
entered the communist block in East Germany. On September 19, they crossed 
the Russi.an border . Finally, on October 3, after crossing Europe at the rate 
of 40 miles per day., the walkers staged a quiet demonstration in Moscow's 
Red Square. On October 5, CNVA participated in a debate at Moscow University 
I/lith professors and students. After two hours, the professors called an end 
to the meeting, to be met with cries of "nyet! II from the students. The debate 
continued for another hour. After an October 6 audience with Mme. Khrushchev. 
the walkers returned home. arriving in New York on October 16. 37 
Press coverage of this spectacular third camp event was conspicuously 
absent. qnly upon their demonstration in Red Square did CNVA attain f ront page 
coverage in the New York Times, and that story was slanted to the Cold War point 
of view. "Soviets prohibit Speech,1I read the headline of the story which spoke . 
especially of the 1 imits put on the demonstrators, not the magnitude and physical 
hardship of their journey. In all, over 307,000 pieces of literature were 
distributed in many languages on a journey of 306 days. The debate at Moscow 
University also received front page coverage. but again. the article dwelled on 
the failure of CNVA to convince the students away from the Soviet line. A letter 
to the editor just prior to the Moscow demonstration complained of this lack 
of coverage in the United States compared to relatively extensive exposure in 
Europe. Thi s reader was impressed by the action and wished to see al l forms 
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of media devote some time or space to it. Unfortunately, after the excite-
ment of the Red Square action and the appearance at Moscow University, the 
demonstrators were relegated once again to the back pages. Their arrival 
and subsequent press conference received only miniscul e stories in the 
Times. 38 
Other newspapers exhibited simil ar level s of interest in the story. The 
. October 4 issue of the Cleveland Plain Dealer featured front page coverage 
of a photo and a brief s tory, noting especially the refusal of Soviet official s 
to allow CNVA to "address" the crowd in Red Square. A small story on October 6 
related the occurrences at Moscow University with the protests of the students 
being roughly translated, "let lem ta1k!" After this coverage, no further 
news'of the walk appeared in this paper. In a survey of other newspapers, 
the Wall Street Journal ventured four sentences on the Red Square action, the 
Christian Science Monitor was devoid of coverage, and the Times of London 
featured a small story and a photograph in the back pages. Jhe English paper 
emphasized the role of the four Britons in the march and the Soviet refusal 
of speaking rights to the demonstrators. 39 
In retrospect, it seems that the lack of media coverage afforded to the 
San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace was due to the unilateralist stand of 
CNVA and their recent estrangement from the mainstre~ SANE coalition. Even if 
the action was too dangerously political to cover, the human interest side 
of the march, which included two marriages along the way, should have given 
the march some pUblicity. CNVA was rapidly losing support of persons of 
influence and means. The Everyman series of expeditions was an attempt to 
regain the glitter of the Golden Rule. 40 
Everyman I, II and III were three different l arge trimaran sailing vessel s 
that sailed a total of four times--three times toward the Pacific testing 
) 
zone, and once to the Soviet. Union . Support for these projects, which came 
in response to the renewed testing of the Soviets and eventually of the 
US in the atmosphere, was raised through the effo·rts and reputation of 
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A. J. Muste. Letters went to a wide range of contacts, including Norman 
Cous ins a nd Steve Allen of Na ti ona 1 SANE. The ro 1 e played by Mus te in 
raising money for the CNVA, whose image \'/as decaying in the minds of reliabl e 
contributors to pacifist causes cannot be overstated. "It's very difficul t." 
wrote one contributor, "virtually impossible, to ignore an appeal over your 
name. The enclosed .isnlt much , but I do hope it will help," Norman Cousins 
replied with the heartwarming offer, "please put me to work.,,41 
Despite thi s sterling effort by Muste. the Everyman journeys did not 
enjoy the same notoriety or success of their ideological ancestor, The Golden 
Rule. CNVA's financial difficulties were becoming aggravated as one member 
of the executive board decried the lack of "badly needed office space" and 
the Everyman campaign ran up a $12,000 deficit . The action phase of the 
project was equally disillusioning . . Everyman I was boarded by the Coast Guard 
just outside of San Francisco en route to th.e Marshall Islands . Anattempt 
to sail this vessel again yielded identical results. Everyman II experienced 
a similar fate after sailing from Honolulu. Everyman III attempted to sail 
to the Soviet Union via the northern route through Scandinavia in order to 
protest the resumption of the Russian atmospheric tests. Refused permission 
to land in Leningrad, the ship was towed out of port by a Soviet ship, as 
the crew unsuccessfully attempted to scuttle their vessel . With results like 
these, and no Reynolds family to bail them out, CNVA would remain in dire 
straights. Even A. J. Muste could appeal only so often. 42 
CNVA was, by the end of this period, in a bad way. Not only did they have 
virtually no exposure to the publi c and no influence on the peace movem~nt or 
the sources of national or international power. they were losing the support 
of many pacifi sts. The problems of limited exposure was a familiar one and 
remained handled in much the same way by the new CNVA leadership as it had 
been by the old. "I do not worship Imass l as an end in itself," wrote Brad 
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Lyttle in January of 1962, IIbut believe that a mass following i s one of the 
elements a movement should work for if this can be done without basically 
sacrificing greater ideological and spiritual values. 1I The problem of losing 
support, especially from the pacifist community, was new and troublesome to 
CNVA. Not willing to sacrifice his ideals of pacifist action and particularly 
the uses of civil disobedience. to the ousted philosophy of the old guard, 
Lyttle and CNVA looked for new issues and 'sources of support. The next period 
in the history of CNVA would concern itself more with civil rights and young 
activists. 43 
CNVA was not alone in thi s period in its activism on the left. Several 
other groups, some old. some new. were active in the field. Examples include 
the Tucson Direct A~tion Peace Project (TDAPP) which staged a civil di s-
obedience action at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in early 1961 . "Our ' project, 
read their newsletter, "is dedicated to God. the perfection that is within 
us. 1I A brief period of activity by an organization known as Women's Direct 
Action (WDA) was a forerunner to the current Women' s Pentagon Actions in its 
reliance on civil disobedience as a tactic. There is no evidence to show that 
either TDAPP or WDA was associated in any way with existing peace groups, 
i ncluding CNVA, or that TDAPP was involved in any other actions. Yet what 
i s clear i s that radical pacifist action was not limited to a single organi za-
tion or philosophy any longer. A negative consequence of this sp'reading of 
radical pacifist action was a concurrent spreading of the financial base of 
such action. Hence the centralized action group, CNVA experienced a further 
44 dimini shing of its already dwindling support. 
Lawrence Scott, after leaving CNVA in 1959, did not cease hi s tirel ess 
work for peace. Founding the Peace Action Center (PAC) and initiating a 
two year vigil at the Fort Detrick, Maryland research center for chemicals 
bacteriological, and radiological weapons, Scott attempted to continue 
the work of NVAANW and the old CNVA. Programs of PAC, which was "open to 
all who share with us a religious belief in pacifism, regardl ess of their 
personal or formal religious affiliation," included continued efforts to 
obtain a halt on nuclear weapons tests of any kind, anti-civil defense 
programs, and a leading role in the movement of peace groups in 1962 to 
eliminate the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Coalition activity 
was still at the forefront of Scott's strategy, exemplified by his support 
for the early "Acts for Peace" organization of Robert Pickus, the ancestor 
of TTP, and the "fast for peace, JI in which he enl isted the he1 p of CNVA, 
FOR and WRL in 1961. PAC began to malfunction in early 1963, with Larry 
Scott concerned over the concurrent trends of establishing "communal peace 
action centers " and heading in the direction of a "centralized national 
organization. II PAC was formally disbanded in late 1963, with leader Scott 
lamenting that IIfor the first time in twenty years he has no definite plan 
or project for others to carry out. ,,45 
The W.ar Resister 's League was fortunate to have as its field secretary 
David McReynolds, an energetic and quite literate pacifist who embarked 
on a massive speaking tour in the spring of 1962. Causes he espoused during 
thi s tour included pacifism and unilateral action toward peace . . McReynold's 
tour included audiences as disparate as the Americans for Democratic Action, 
the first Unitarian Church and the Bridgewater Raritan High School. It seems 
that more groups were willing to hear out the pacifist theory, even if 
financial support for their witness was not availabl e to back up the initial 
11 2 
11 3 
curiousity. WRL was also involved in the TTP campaign . which in the period 
of 1962-1963 which will fol l ow, will take a primary spotlight . Individual 
padfists were often able to influence audiences more profoundly than group 
actions, which were sometimes viewed as the desperate work of fanati cs. 
McReynolds' appeal is well demonstrated by a note of thanks from a General 
Strike for Peace representative after a speaking engagement at Columbia 
University . "Bless you for not letting the differences in our political 
notions, and even our approaches to the same notions, prevent you from sup-
porting ~s with your wisdom and eloquence."46 
Pacifist activism in this period closely fol l owed the pattern predicted 
by minimal closed range theory . Disillusioned by the civil liberties abomi-
nations of post-Dodd SANE, the pacifists rediscovered their niche on the left 
of the political spectrum. Here they could join other radicals in orde'r to 
formulate a new plan of activism which could not be subverted by liberals 
\'/ho paid too high an allegiance to the American security state. Although 
this choice would effectively isolate them from t he liberal peace coalition, 
the turn to the left would help encourage the radicalization of the nation ' s 
students, who would grasp the movement and send it forward through Vietnam. 
IV 
The interest of high school s and col l eges in hearing McReynolds i s but a 
small indication of the swelling of the s tudent branch of the peace movement 
during the early years of the 1960s. One writer noted "thesymptoms of the 
shaking of student apathy," in a 1962 article, but SPU demonstrated its 
vitality at an earlier date . By 1961, SPU had thrown off all ideological 
shackl es of the adult grou ps , instead taking the lead in bolder policy. 
Their program statement of 1961 was extremely critical of the United States 
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government, accusing it of extending the conditions of the cold war in order 
"to maintain her interests in Europe, South America, Africa and Asia. 1I Still 
confident that "America can 1ead,1I SPU called for "unilateral initiatives 
toward di sarmament. II To show that such demands were not made without a base 
of support, SPU staged a 1962 march on Washington which drew over 7000 student 
demonstrators. 47 
Though not a leftist organization) SPU's ties with WRL and some of their 
pol icy statements show a real "third camp" approach to peace work. Contact 
with SPU through David ~1cReyno1ds from the US Sociaiist Party indicates what 
some leftist groups thought of the possibilities of that group. Furthermore, 
SPU showed a kind of maturity toward coalition-formation that could have 
inspired a floundering SANE and an isolated CNVA. "We distinguish between 
as effective uni ty and a fa1 se unity, II read an SPU reso1 ution. IIA unity in 
the student peace movement that is not based on certain methods and goal s 
common to these organizationsinvo1ved i s a false unity.1I These methods and 
goals included an equal criticism of eas t and west and an emphasis on II a free 
society in which there is individual human dignity.1I SPU's openness for allies 
is demonstrated in their statement of purpose which does not commit lIany member 
to a precise statement of po1icy.48 
These statements of strategy and policy were revealing of the liberal 
assumptions still underlying the work of SPU. The primacy and importance put 
on US morals was a common strand in all of the American peace groups active 
at the time. The IIhuman dignity" plank in their platform was as much as 
reference to black civil rights in the US as it was to Russian and Peopl e ' s 
Republics totalitarianism. The east coast establishment elitism which 
charac terized SANE and UWF was also apparent in SPU, with much of its member-
ship drawn from selective eastern colleges and universities. Also revealed 
I'las the tacit assumption that s tudents can work only within the student peace 
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mo'vement. Yet despi. te these 1 ibera 1 and subordi nate assumptions, SPU was 
drawing many s tudents (estimates range from 3000 to 5000 members in this 
period) into a movement that would soon feel free to lead the adult movement, 
a movement that would be the driving force of the Vietnam protest of later 
years. 49 
But these events were in the future, and many sources indicate the growth 
pains associated with the early SPU . For all their maturity and the fluency 
of their policy statements, SPU was in financial trouble from the very start 
of their work. A letter to WRL field secretary McReynolds, who often held 
the purse strings of SPU ' s outside support, from a National Chairperson of 
SPU bemoaned lithe really grave financial situation of the SPU at the present 
t ime," adding, "If we were a business concern, we would have to declare 
bankruptcy. II A personal plea from National SPU secretary Donald t4cKelvey to 
HcReynolds put the deficit of SPU at $1500 and urged him to contact A. J. 
Muste, who had helped SPU in 1961, and who was an expert fund raiser, as 
demonstrated by his appeal for CNVA's Everyman seri es. McKelvey described 
SPU as lIa real mess," indicating the need for "substantial, ongoing support 
from the adul t community ... 50 
McReynolds' reply to the SPU contained , in addition to a $400 loan granted 
by the WRL, some insights into the fiscal and policy problems within SPU. 
~1cReynolds expressed distress at SPU's use of telephone call s of "intolerabl e 
length and cost." Concerning policy, McReynolds points out that SPU had a 
hard line on communism which he feared was harmful (as it had been for SANE) 
while at the same time fearing a "neo-Trotskyist influence via a wing of 
YPSL. " Nathan Glazer, in his 1963 analysis of the student peace forces, 
warned of SPU's leftism, explaining it as a rebellion against anti-communism 
which ignored what he saw as the very real dangers of that ideology.51 
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Student SANE , meanwhil e , was getting away from the grasp of i ts parents. 
The results of their third National Convention sent a shiver down the spine 
of the staff of National SANE. Apparently, leftist leadership had been 
elected by delegates that the national office termed "unrepresentational. " 
Adult SANE' s analysi s of the student wing indicated good reasons for pessimism: 
Politically. student SANE seems to be divided into three 
groups: Ca) a liberal, independent-minded group with its 
main base in the high schools; (b) 'a large "middle" group 
which is strongly marked by the attitude that criticism of 
Communist action is automatically red-baiting; and (c) a 
small, hard core which is close to the Communist Party in 
outlook and motivation and which is extremely adept at 
manipulating the middle group. 
With all their cards stacked in the nation' s high school s , it i s apparent that 
SANE-style student activism was becoming a thing of the past as col l ege students 
became more experimental politically. 
The recommendations of the National Committee were not surprising in light 
of their continual patronization of both their local committees and their 
student wing. Actions to be taken included the declaration of the results of 
the Third National conference as "inval id, II a demand that all Student SANE 
groups apply for charters. which had not been required previously, and the 
creation of a new, adult SANE appointed, leadership body for the student wing. 
These moves were made with the realization that SANE would be "misunderstood 
and accused of red-baiting," yet the Committee felt action was necessary in 
order that SANE not "abdicate responsibility on the campus, which today repre-
sents a most hopeful sector of the peace movement. II Despite the National 
Committee's attempts to salvage their campus group, student SANE was formally 
disbanded in 1962, with their members joining the ranks of SPU and the fledgling 
Students for a Democratic Society,52 
The evolution of SDS demonstrates the dilemma facing the liberal peace forces 
in the early 1960s. The choices, in retrospect, were clear--either radicali ze 
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or be quelled under the imminent reaction tothe new wave of lefti s t activism. 
Hence the pressure on SANE in this period was from both the left and the 
right. On the left, pacifi sts tired of compromising their ideals only to 
be red-baited in their activities, while students saw SANE's weary emphasis 
on -?l?esQectabi1 ity" as an anachronism. On the ri ght, conti nued demands for 
SANE to purge itself of subversive forces kept the National Committee on 
its guard. Although hindsight is clearer than most visions, it is clear 
tha t SANE made the wrong choice in opting to meet the cha 11 enge of the ri ght-
ists. For in the future, it would be the students who would organi ze circl es 
around the "squares." 
SDS was the true harbinger of future s tudent activism. Its leaders were 
from virtually all the important s tudent groups of the period, all of whom 
joined together in a more radical approach to politics. Peace was not the 
primary focus of SDS before Vietnam, yet the techniques and analyses used 
by SDS in the formulation and implementation of its programs succeeded in 
radicalizing a large portion of student activists . The Port Huron statement, 
drafted cooperatively during the 1962 SDS National Convention, has become 
the classic early statement of the "new 1eft." Based on the ideology of 
humanism, the document stressed the inter-connectedness of all of society' s 
ills. SDS, aware of the privileged position of the university student, 
planned to reform thos'e institutions and then, through the universities, 
implement real social change. Despite these ideological leaps, SDS did not 
come to the forefront of student activism until 1963. In a 1962 meeting of 
CPC, for example, SDS was not even mentioned in a review of the "student 
peace scene." Donald Keys' synopsis of peace activiti es also overlooked 
the budding group . Finally, David ~1cReyno1ds, while "heartened" by SDS's 
commitment to non-violence, sent his regrets in response to an invitation 
) 
to attend the 1962 SOS National Convention, the very birthplace of the 
new 1eft!53 
SOS finally gained national prominence in the mid-1960s through its 
work on economic conversion and civil rights. Yet it seems that SOS's 
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power of attracting students into radical activism was not due in large part 
to the issues it chose to emphasize, but in its techniques. Characterized 
by the politics of the "new insurgency," SOS was able to capture and 
implement the helplessness felt by many youths in the 1960s. SANE, continuing 
its campaign against "beards and banjos,1l and working closely with the 
democratic administration and the security state, lost both the students. 
and as a result of its reaction to the Dodd investigation, the radical 
pacifists. The pacifists felt required to radicalize in order to maintain 
a powerful message and not to be enveloped in the numbing peace rhetoric 
of the Kennedy adm3nistration. The peace movement was now fragmented beyond 
all usefulness. Some sort of new organizational framework was needed to 
re-muster the peace forces into an efficient activist unit. 54 
J 
Chapter V. Back to Chaos--A Full Circle? 
The resumption of atmospheri c nuclear weapons testing by the United 
States in the spring of 1962 brought on despair among many advocatasof 
peace. For the first time in more than three years, both superpowers were 
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testing without restriction in the atmosphere. In fact, the United States 
detonated nearly one-third of all its bombs between the years 1945-1962 in 
the final year of that span alone. For the USSR. the ratio was nearly one-
half. In all, the US had exploded at least 249 nuclear weapons and the 
USSR at l eas t. 111 in the seventeen years following the bombing of Hiroshima. 
England lagged behind with lIon1y" 22 tests and France, the newcomer, had 
exploded 5 atomic weapons, all IIscrawny shots, two of which were near 
fizzles," in the Sahara. The pace of testing once the moratorium had been 
broken was astounding. From September 1 to November 4 of 1962. the Soviet 
Union exploded some 50 thermonuclear devices, including an enormous 58 
megaton super-bomb. In a similarly short period, the US tested 26 bombs, 
mostly in the megaton range, from April 25 to July 11 of 1962. These 
detonations followed 45 underground shots in the first half of 1961. 1 
These events, bringing with them a predictable cloud of radioactivity 
which hovered worldwide for months and created a leve,l of Sr-90 double that 
of 1960, did not serve as an incentive for united peace action as did the 
tests following Bravo of the Castle series in 1954. Each peace group, in 
its own way, took drastic action, but attempts to coordinate the actions 
were generally unsuccessful. Despite the fact that "some official s argue 
that both the US and USSR will have reached the point of diminishing scientifi c 
returns" upon the termination of the 1962 series, SANE joined an electoral 
barrage with both old and new groups in an effort to co-opt the governmental 
process before the reverse reaction occurred. CNVA meanwhil e , went further 
120 
toward civil disobedience than ever before. chal l enging not only nuclear 
testing, but the deterrence sys tem itself. An organi za tion arose in 1961 
which sought to coordinate the increasingly diverse peace organizations. 
Turn Toward Peace (TTP), as it was known, was a massive effort to institu-
tionalize peace work in order to achieve better financial backing and more 
unified purpose. 2 
I 
The idea of coordinating the noticeably unorganized peace movement was 
not a new one. In a personal effort by Theodore Roszak. historian at Stanford 
University, for example, letters were sent to SANE, ADA, FOR, FAS, AFSC and 
individuals such as Norman Thomas and Linus Pauling outlining hi s plans to 
rejuvenate the American peace movement in 1960. Roszak, citing the May Day 
demonstrations of 1890 which had had some success in gaining an eight hour 
work day for American laborers, called upon all groups working for peace to 
stage s imultaneous demonstrations on an agreed day. "Such a demonstration," 
wrote Roszak, "woul d be only the 1 ogi ca 1 outgrowth of the scattered peace.-
parades and rallies that have broken out in the last few years." 
Roszak's plan was designed to be legiti·mate in the eyes of the established 
instruments of power. The first indication of this desire was his recommenda-
tion that the principl es set down as the basis of the mass demonstration be 
those of SANE. Furthermore, Roszak was apologetic for his technique: "To 
be sure, a demonstration does not solve everything . It i s only a gesture, 
a display. And it is admittedly a naive and unsophi sticated thing to do." 
Yet Roszak was convinced that his idea was vital and new. He referred to 
the successes of eND's Aldermaston marches in Great Britain, but did not 
mention that these marches were based on a program of unilateral disarmament. 
The i ntracacies and detail s of policy and technique which might have seemed 
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petty to Roszak were not discussed, but it was these omissions that had 
foiled such plans in the past. Someone on the inside of the peace movement 
was needed to forge the proper all i ,anc-e. 3 
Robert Pickus fit the bill. One of the major authors of the infl uential 
Quaker pamphlet, Speak Truth to Power, Pickus was an experienced pacifist 
activist. In Speak Truth to Power, written in 1955, a case is made for an 
alternative to war--nonviolent resistance . The treatise speaks not only of 
spiritual witness and applied Quakerism, but also of hard political rea l ities 
and the national defense implications to the US. There is no trace of inaction 
or submission in this primer of activism. "Where commitment and readiness 
to sacrifice are lacking, non-violent resistance cannot be effective . 1I liOn 
the contrary, II reasoned the final section of text, "it demands greater dis-
cipline, more arduous training, and more courage than its violent counter-
part. 114 
Pi ckus eventually relocated in Californi a and founded, in 1959, a local 
organi zation known as "Acts for Peace ." Realizing the importance of local 
ac tivi sm, Pickus limited his activiti es to coordinating peace work in the 
San Francisco Bay area. Under lIinitial goals" for Acts for Peace, Pickus 
included a 3000 person mailing list in some 30 communities closest to San 
Francisco, a financial base of 2000 persons, each contributing one dollar 
per month, lIa core of pacifi sts whose understanding and commitment keeps 
steady and coherent a program involving all kinds of people, II and finally 
visibility and recognition throughout the area of a vital 
factor in public life: an organized peace movement, which 
addresses itself to the whole community; a peace movement 
marked not by membershi p cards, but by peopl e who share a 
common set of values, seek to give concrete expression to 
these as they relate to the problem of war, and feel them-
sel ves tied to others through "Acts for Peace" in a common 
endea vor . --
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Pickus was apparently trying to recreate through a master plan the winning 
combination of NVAANW (the pacifist core) and SANE (the movement) in the 
1958-1960 honeymoon period. The Acts for Peace campaign was limited to 
California in its scope, but attained some prominence among national peace 
organi zations, especially FOR which provided publ icity services for Pickus ' 
group. However, a request for a $1000 grant wa s denied by FOR. 5 
Pickus was critical of national efforts, since not enough attention was 
paid to local creativity, sentiments or values. Listing through the established 
peace organiztions, he notes that WILPF and FOR were primarily national organi -
zations which would not "even consider addressing the whole community,1I and 
whose local work "with few exceptions, is feeble when measured in terms of 
effective peace action." Pickus described AFSC as having strong constituenci es 
in a number of areas, but unable to develop "leaders or participants in peace 
action." He dismissed WRL as a narro\'J New York City group . "There is little 
understanding," worried Pickus, "in most parts of the peace movement of how 
to proceed. " 
Pickus had a plan. Together with Sanford Gottlieb, political action 
director of SANE, he founded Turn Toward Peace in September of 1961. What had 
started as a Bay area idiosyncrasy had been transformed into "a national 
effort. II More than seventy-five organizations were solicited to cooperate 
in the TTP campaign. Included on the list were major labor unions, veterans 
groups and the usual roster of peace groups. liThe Central Idea" of TTP, stated 
an early call, "i s a seri es of concrete steps the US coul d take whi ch are not 
dependent upon protracted negotiations and prior Soviet agreement, but which 
are actual s teps toward a disarmed world under law. " Hoping to avoid the 
anti-communist attack which had battered SANE, TTP was quick to point out 




Most importantly, "the Campaign has purposely rejected the lowes t common 
denominator approach, and is not asking for agreements on specific proposal s. 
Rather, it makes clear that there is agreement on d;rection~ and beyond thi s 
that many different policy proposals are needed." The program of TTP was 
very s imilar to the SPU-based student coalition of 1960-1961. Unilateral 
initiatives are urged, all types are welcome, given an interest in peace, 
and "false unityll is avoided in order to attain a working peace movement. 
If the approach could be agreed upon; if the range of 
peace organizations (which are not Soviet apologist 
in their political orientation) related their work and 
acted together to organize the largely unorganized 
American peace public we would have a base--which we 
should have built years ago--for an effective American 
peace movement. 
The master plan was underway .? 
Pickus prepared a blueprint of the plan which spelled out what had to be 
done and which individuals or organizations were most qualified to undertake 
the tasks. The plan was remarkable for its casting of the right group in 
the right role. SANE, of course, was on the forefront of legitimate influ-
ential activism. Homer Jack was responsible for organizing regional con-
ferences and planning "large public meetings ll in major US cities. Norman 
Cousins, always the editor, was responsible for developing the mass media 
campaign, while Sanford Gottlieb was implanted as a thorn in the side of 
Capitol Hill and the White House. The best parts of SANE were to be 
effectively utilized while the organizational work was out of their hands. 
CNVA was responsible for "dramatic public action'lI Possibilities 
enumerated included 24-hour vigils in front of the offices or homes of the 
most influential government decisionmakers concerned with Berlin and the 
weapons tests. The established organizations such as FOR, AFSC, and WILPF 
were scattered around the other chores, which included seeking public per-
sonalities to speak. sponsoring a national petition, preparing a newsletter, 
and es tablishing some kind of IIcommunity focus." A s tudent branch of TTP 
was es tablished by October 1962 in an attempt to coordinate rapidly acceler-
ating campus activism. 8 
The program and policies advocated by TTP are not spelled out in the 
~ar1y documents, nor were they by Pickus' Acts for Peace, nor would they 
ever be. The point was that TTP was strictly organizational, trying to 
coordinate the various efforts toward peace by groups with vastly different 
means toward that common end. Some themes on IIcampaign content ll were 
offered, however. TTP was founded during a time of crisis (specifically 
in Berlin) but was not an lIemergency campaign." Concrete policy proposal s 
were to be made in order to avoid the pitfalls of IIsurviva1ism, morality and 
negotiatism . 1I Unfortunately, the provision made for those not willing to 
accept TTP as more than a temporary entity for cdsi s management among 
peace groups would be invoked too often, resulting in the indefinite post-
ponement of the formation of IIconcrete pol icy. II Even during severe cri ses, 
the reaction of TTP was often less than effective . Norman Thomas, for 
example, described the peace coalition's reaction to the Cuban crisis as 
IIsmall dogs barking at an express train rushing toward war,1I adding that its 
response was IIbe1ated and largely irre1evant. 1I9 
At the start of the TTP campaign, limited and qualified enthusiasm was 
the order of the day. Speaking of world conditions, Pickus wrote, IIIf 
only things would stay this bad (and not get worse) for six months, we might 
be abl e to build a coherent peace movement. 1I Norman Thomas agreed: "It i s 
the peace effort we ,have needed for so 10ng. 1I But soon, almost immediately, 
the problems of coalition building, so familiar to SANE, would beset TTP. 10 
In September of 1961, a IIbasic l eaflet" was prepared and sent to all 
potential cooperating individual s and organi za tions. Alfred Hass l er, 
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executive secretary of FOR. reported hi s own \'fairly necitral response" 
to the li.terature. Hassler sensed problems in building an organization 
;'without having adequately developed the substance of its message." an 
indication that Pickus' plans of "concrete policy" were not taking shape. 
Specifica lly, Hassl er objected to the 1 eafl et 1 s references to the "present 
fragmented s tate of the peace movement" and its claim that IIpersonal, 
bureaucratic and ideological obstacles" had prevented a successful peace 
coal ition. Al though Hassl er did not wholly disagree. he felt that such 
comments were better·left to lIdiscussions among ourselves" rather than 
worsening the already tarnished image of peace activism in the eyes of the 
public. 
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Ha ssler went on to raise a key point of debate. He disagreed that 
organizational miscues were the s'ources of the peace movement's ills, but 
rather IIhistorical circumstances." Interested in protecting "whatever prestige 
and effectiveness the existing organizations have now," Hassler was willing 
to join the TTP campaign, but entered with a stated reluctance. Under such 
conditions of hesitancy, the vital parts of the TTP coalition seemed unlikely 
to meld together as a vibrant whole. ll 
The recurring problem of the power of a national organization over its • 
local affiliates took on ~n analogous yet twisted form in TTP when cooperatlng 
groups were implicated by the coordinating agency's words or policies. ' Examples 
of this would occur often s ince many groups with extremely different and often 
strongly held beliefs lent their names and reputations to TTP. An early con-
troversy-of this type arose over a comment made by Pickus quoted in the 
New York Times characterizing TTP as cooperation between "non-Soviet apologist 
groups . " Stewart Meacham of AFSC quickly telephoned Pickus to protest "'language 
of this sort:>" but was not satisfied with the TTP organizer' s hurried reply. 
) 
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A letter of December 8, 1961 made r1eacham' s complaint more lucid. "In 
light of the exclusion of such language from the written document," Neacham 
pointed out, referring to an Executive Council decision, '~ou should have 
avoided it in speaking for TTP. II ~1eacham questioned Pickus I freedom to 
speak for TTP without first consul ting the Executive Council. "If you con-
sider it your right and duty,1I concluded Meacham, "not to be bound by the 
Executive Committee in the exercise of your TTP duties I feel a very serious 
question has been raised.,,12 
Despite such initial difficulties, TTP was able to gather fairly sub-
stantial support from influential organizations. "Because of TTP's great 
potential," many of the groups were able to overlook the initial and inevitabl e 
personality and organizational conflicts. Cooperating agencies, those which 
contributed time and money as well as their names, included members of the 
political spectrum from the Catholic Worker, WRL, and CNVA .on the left, 
through the religious organizations of AFSC, FOR, Friends Committee on 
National Legislation (FCNL), centralist SANE and WILPF, and on through the 
American Veteran's Committee and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. 
Student participants at the cooperating 1 evel were SDS and SPU. On the 
communicating level, those organizations which were involved essentially on 
a name-only basis, participants included The Church of the Brethren, CCCO, 
and several AFL-Cra unions including United Auto Workers. In all, by March 
1962, TTP was composed of no l ess than thirty cooperating or communicating 
agenci es. 13 
II 
The gathering of the various groups, some of which did not have peace 
as their primary goal, under the aegis of TTP was seen as a potentially pro-
gressive event for the peace movement by some observers and participants. 
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Some radical s felt that the inclusion of organi zed labor could place more 
e~phasis on societal and economic conversion as opposed to elaborate 
schemes designed to patch the existing order. However, two controversies 
arose that would complete the end of the TTP fantasy. and a new wave of 
peace activism would prove unable. to take hold. The first controversy 
concerned the so-called TTP handbook, which attempted to spell out those 
elusive concrete policies which had been sought while also instructing loca l 
groups how to organize themse1 ves. The second disagreement withi n TTP con-
cerned that group's roles as national organizer versus the initiator of 
local activist groups. 
The publication of a handbook which 'would describe the major substantive 
goals of TTP," was urged by cooperating agencies since their support of an 
agency with no set policy seemed a waste of personnel and funds as well 
as being politically risky. During the summer of 1962. a handbook was 
drafted by a TTP committee and then handed over to Alfred Hassl er . (FOR) 
and Homer Jack (SANE) for revisons, checks for accuracy with the results of 
Executive Committee meetings, clarity of prose. and other fine points . 'In 
general. summer is a hard time for peace activism since many peace workers 
and target citizens are away from their homes. This condition helped lead 
to confusion and controversy over the "much-debated handbook." Stewart 
Meacham (AFSC) was extremely upset about the final results which. in his view. 
misrepresented the decisions made in Executive Committee. His objections 
included (1) the fact that such a handbook had never been authorized, only a 
"kit" to distribute to TTP community coordinator~; (2) that the handbook 
set up a previously undiscussed central control system over the local centers; 
(3) That the concept of Community Peace Centers was "an unwarranted extension 
of TTP purposes , " 
J 
128 
Al Hassler replied to each of Meacham' s objections, claiming indirectly 
that Meacham had either not been listening at Executive Committee meetings 
or did not read the minutes or handbook carefully enough. Referring to 
Committee minutes, Hassler claimed that the omission of references to a 
handbook per se was not hard to understand since lithe kit was to include 
the handbook. II "If Stewart was not present during that part of the dis-
cussion,1I wrote Hassler, "then thi s of course is unfortunate and doubly 
unfortunate if nobody thought to tell him what had happened during that part 
of the meeti ng from which he was absent. II Replyi'ng to Meacham 's second 
objection concerning central hierarchical control, Hassler indicated that 
the minutes of a different Committee meeting laid out the decided policy 
that community councils were to be highly autonomous. 14 
The issue of the primacy of community peace centers in the overall plan 
of TTP was the source of a second major controversy_ Although Meacham 
questjoned this policy, Hassler pointed out that Pickus' purpose in founding 
both 'Acts for Peace and TTP was to develop local activism. In fact, a set 
of Minutes from June 1961 said so directly: liThe primary purpose of TTP 
is to establish Community Peace Centers ,.11 The centers were to be di stri-
bution centers for the literature of the cooperating agencies as well as a 
location for organizing local activity. Contributions to the locals would 
be distributed as one quarter to the national office, one quarter to the 
region (of which there were seven in the US) and one half remaining at the 
local peace center. The importance assigned by the Executive Committee 
to the peace centers was not shared by many, including Raymond Wilson of 
FCNL who considered the peace centers as a plus, but of lesser priority than 
the seeking out of new affi'i a~S and "stressing substantive material."1S 
Even some local peace centers themselves were concerned with the umbrella 
effect of TTP over all other considerations. Mary Holmgren, coordinator of 
Ba ltimore TTP, wrote: 
For a time TTP seemed to give us some real hope of 
reaching out to mass membership groups and bringing 
them into relationship with the pe.ace movement. But 
the emphasis for the past months has been on selling 
and building support for the local peace center--
an entirely different kind of program--and virtually 
abandoning the efforts to enlist the help of national 
organizations in the cause of peace~ or to help the newly 
enlisted groups to strengthen this relationship and reach 
their constituencies. 
The problem with the local peace group concept, as Holmgren saw it, was 
competition for funding among "peace groups' field organizing efforts. " 
Furthermore, the "pacifist image!! of TTP, which tended to isolate the 
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campaign from the broader community would be furthered at the local leve"l . 
How ironic that TTP should desire a local base and be criticized for its 
lack of centrality while SANE was ruined because of its over-emphasis on 
the National Office. Now. with the focus of TTP in question and the original 
limited pefiod of enthusiasm over, personal c~nflicts and self-serving 
organizational maneuvers would be revealed. 16 
Stewart Meacham, in early 1963, wished to review the manuscript of the 
TTP handbook before it went to p}~ess. Due to a lack of communication with , . 
Joyce Mertz, 1 i a i son with the coopera ti ng organi zeit; ons, Meacham's comments 
were received too late to be taken into consideration . Their communication 
following this incident showed signs of personality conflicts blistering 
to the surface of their stationaries. Stating that "I shall not attempt to 
deal with the ~ubstantive questions" of the handbook, Meacham explains that in 
his attempt to revise the ha"dbook "I was not trying to be tricky. . . I am 
sorry this occurred but what you suspect about my motives just is not correct. ,,1 7 
Looking out for ones I organization first was a tactic used by not only 
Meacham of AFSC, but by WILPF . This phenomenon i s no coincidence since both 
organi za tions had specific moral and political reputations to uphold. National 
) 
Administrative Secretary of~~ILFF Mildred Scott Olmsted stated her case 
concerning a 1963 Committee meeting. 
I am disturbed by the minutes of the June 12 meeting. 
On the first page, third paragraph, beginning liThe 
Council approves and also suggests": this seems to 
me quite inaccurately reported. It was my motion and 
it was not a suggestion but a direct instruction ... 
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Olmsted had another complaint concerning the language of the minutes. Since 
TTP was to sponsor the World Without War Fund Drive, Olmsted wanted assurances 
that the drive was not an "anti-communist" affair since the support of such 
an event would not be condoned by the WILPF. 18 
These valid, yet uncompromising stances taken by several of the coopera-
ting agencies was not so much a cause than a symptom of the malai se of TTP 
in 1963. Some felt that the national aspect of the campaign was not going 
fa r enough whi 1 e,others felt it was too broad a nd all-encompass i ng. Some 
felt that the local activity should be stepped up, while others felt it 
should be discontinued completely. The TTP campaign was born with great 
hopes, but the inability of the cooperating organizations to subordinate 
their individual goal s and ideals to the whole, to the concept of the move-
ment, made them uneasy parti cJpan~ts from rthe: start. And despite Larry Scott' s 
optimistic assessment of TTP's potential in early 1963, by that time, the 
idea was torn and frayed. 19 
An assessment of the peace movement in 1963 by James R. Flynn , a political 
sc ientist, noted that TTP did "not even approach the effectiveness of the old 
National Council for the Prevention of War (a 1930s umbrella organization)" 
and indeed its lack of activities by that time show Flynn' s assessment to be 
true. SANE's announcement to the locals of the 1963 spring peace walks 
makes only passing reference to TTP, whereas the previous two years had 
relied on TTP sponsorship. Although TTP would remain an entity until 1967, 
) 
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when it was reorganized as the \~orld Without War Council of the United States, 
Inc., and despite some fleeting anti-Vietnam work in 1964, TTP was finished. 20 
A page of what amounts to satiric epitaphs was distributed by Joyce 
Mertz in September of 1962. Mertz's hypothetical query, IIWhat is Turn Toward 
Peace?" was self-answered in the voices of an influential cast of characters. 
"A front for the gradualists. 1I answered pacifist David Dellinger; IIA Front for 
the unilateralists/' replied sociologist and electoral activist Amatai Etzioni. 
Stewart ~1eacham characterized TTP as Ita rigid centralized structure," while 
Robert Gilmore, executive director of TTP disagreed. offering the comment 
"a monstrous conception of Byzant:ine complexity.11. The self-serving attitudes 
of certain organizations were demonstrated by the reply of Homer Jack of SANE, 
who descri bed TTP as "a p10t to eat SANE"; and by Emily Parker Simon of WILPF 
who said, II some thing we do things as an aid to. 11 Al though this page was 
typed by Mertz in jest and probably in haste, it is revealing of the inner 
conflicts which crippled TTP as an activist organiztion. Despite the sad 
fact of TTP's demise that Mertz's comments reflect, the document is refresh-
ing in its humor and unusual self-deprecatory tone. Perhaps a lesson could 
have been learned by the established peace organizations, which, with the 
weight of the world on their shoulders, maintained a constant guard of 
seriousness. 21 
III 
The rise and fall of TTP was a startling realization that the coalition 
peace movement could not simply be willed into existence by creating a coor-
dinating body_ Needed and missing elements were clear definitions of local 
as opposed to national activism, organizational commitment and subordination, 
and some kind of ideological framework within which to work. TTP's specific 
dO\'Infall s included its attempt to form too wide a coalition and its 
) 
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redirecting of traditional sources of peace activism support to .its own coffers 
leading to "increased financial competition in the peace movement. II The 
minimal range theory states that, in principle~ a coalition is unlikely to 
"win" if its members are drawn from vastly distanced positions along the 
political spectrum. Furthermore~ policy distance theory predicts that a 
potential coalition member will join a group only if the views of the coalition 
roughly match his or her own. A group such as the United Auto ~Jorkers must 
have had second thoughts about teaming up with the radically pacifist Catholi c 
Worker. An issue, such as nuclear weapons tests, was an immensely helpful 
device for achieving a sense of unity. But in 1962, the issue of testing 
was muddled and confused through a fear of Soviet supremacy in missile tech-
nology . The issue that was used became the electoral process itself . Striving 
for new heights of legitimacy, the coalition, in a new gui se , entered an 
electoral phase. 22 
. SANE, of course, was involved in thi s new trend of legitimacy, as were 
AFSC, WILPF, and even SOS. TTP was often miscast in the role of an agency 
with a primary emphasis on electoral politics. ~1ore significant than the 
involvement of the established groups was the purpose of' engaging in electoral 
peace activism. Political Action for Peace (PAX), a New England group, 
Leo Szilard's Council for Abolishing War, Platform for Peace in the Pacific 
Northwest, Voters for Peace in the Midwest, Lobby for Peace in the West, and 
Voters for Peaceful Alternatives at Cornell make up an incomplete list of 
national and local organizations which originated during the 1962 campaign 
alone. ActiVities of these groups ranged from issuing position papers for 
candidates to direct sponsorship of "peace candidates, II most notably H. Stuart 
Hughes, a Harvard hi storian, for Uni.ted States Senator. Even pacifists debated 
the merits of electoral work during this period in which peace groups 
experienced a temporarily renewed confidence in the democratic process . 23 
SANE, in the election of 1960, never actually sponsored or endorsed 
candidates, but did give its tacit nod to the candidacy of Kennedy for 
President. In 1962. the debate over giving actual endorsements was raised. 
Hilliam J. Butler, former director of the ACLU. explained to SANE the reasons 
against the endorsement of political candidates. 
The stated goal of Sane (sic) is disarmament not by the 
Democratic Party, not by the Republ ican Party. not by the 
United States, not by the Soviet Union, but by all govern-
ments regardless of their political inclinations . 
Sane can be more effective in bringing pressure on all 
governments if it does not participate in political 
controversies . 
Butler was concerned not only with maintaining SANE' s third camp orientation, 
but also with the' possibility that disagreements over candidacies could 
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"drive a wedge into the present effectiveness of the National · Board. " Finally, 
Butler argued that endorsing a particular candidate's peace position was an 
indirect endorsement of all that persons policies, some of which might have 
been contrary to SANE's program and goals . 
Norman Thomas, a political veteran, presented the case in favol' of SANE ' s 
endorsement of political candidates in the 1962 election. Thomas! argument 
was based on the principle of legitimacy over a guaranteed tent in the third 
camp: 
The principle of endorsement, carefully given at the request 
of a congressional candidate, would make possible wiser and 
harder efforts by our members in his district . In some cases 
it might have a prestige value of consequence . Even short of 
success in electing a SANE-endorsed candidate a strong 
campaign and substantial vote would add to, not subtract from , 
our weight at the Capitol and in the White House. 
Thomas saw a venture into electioneering as a possible reviving influence on 
a sagging SANE committee. Thomas goes on to express an interest in a "Peace 
Party" for the 1964 el ec ti.ons . Finally, that eternal and effective nentfs i s 
of National SANE, i.ts locals, were present in the thinking of Thomas, who 
felt that without the entry of National SANE into the endorsement business 
"runaway local organizations .. " will act on their own.,,24 
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Although SANE did not directly endorse any candidates in the 1962 elections, 
local committees were given encou~agement to do so, first clearing their 
choices, of course, with the national office. In addition to SANE ' s work in 
th i s field. both WTLPF and SOS made a ttempts to work with i n the e 1 ec tora 1 
process. At a WIlPF sponsored "Peace Action Conference," efforts at letter 
writing and questioneering of candidates were described, with no mention of 
direct sponsorship or endorsement of candidates. However, WILPF was interested 
in working with- the many groups that were involved in this type of activism. 
SOS establ ished a "Peace Elections Program" in the summer of 1962 which sought 
to "provide every student group that shows an interest in political action 
for peace with full information on what other groups are doing and what they 
could do under conditions prevailing in their communities.,,25 
The real action in electoral politics was not in the established groups 
with concernRfhow new forms of activism might effect them organizationally, 
but in new groups established especially for the purpose of electioneering. 
The group with the most monolithic reliance on the electoral method was New 
England's Political Action for Peace (PAX). This group, founded in 1959, 
reasoned that through political campaigns the issues of peace and disarmament 
would get greater and more respectable media coverage than through other 
methods. PAX's first candidate was William K. Hefner for one of r1assachusetts' 
U. S. Congressmen in 1960. "Although Hefner lost," read PAX literature, "hi s 
efforts reopened the dialogue on foreign policy long quiet in hi s district, 
and aided i n locating many new workers for peace. 1I26 .., 
PAX was not a membership organization, explained Marshall R. Kaplan, 
executive director, because of the "similarity with our work and that of 
SANE. II PAX' s tactics included solicitation and sponsorship of peace candi-
dates, acting as a clearinghouse for news of peace politics, affording 
financial support for campaigns ·of interest, undertaking research, and per-
forming other services in the interest of peace politics . PAX' s interest 
in coalition activity is well documented, especially in financial matters. 
A communication to New England CNVA, the most active branch of that group 
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at this time due to Polaris Action , asked for a mailing list of potential 
supporters. PAX chairperson Kaplan personally appealed to A. J. Muste to use 
hi s fund-raising talents in favor of PAX, a request Muste refused, citing 
hi s busy schedule. In 1962, four campaigns were supported by P,AX: Elizabe'th 
Boardman, Democrat for U. S. House in ~1assachusetts, vJi1liam Hefner, Democrat 
for U. S. House in Massachusetts, Helen Bliss, ~mocrat for U. S. House in 
New Hampshire, and H. Stuart Hughes, Independent for U. S. Senate in Massa-
chusetts. Although PAX listed some 18 candidates worthy of support, the 
campaign of H. Stuart Hughes was the race which would give an indication of 
whether or not peace politics had a future at al1. 27 
Hughes, professor of history at Harvard University, announced hi s 
candidacy on March 27, 1962, stating his intention to gather the 75,514 
signatures required to place his name on the ballot , as an independent by-
passing the primaries. To the amazement of many observers, Hughes amassed 
over 118,000 signatures in support of his candidacy. PAX,I'IHid<! convinced 
Hughes to run, had great hope in this Senate race since it received national 
coverage and also since Hughes had a slight chance of making a respectable 
showing at the poll s. Hughes, who was "so youthful in appe.arance he almost 
seems to be a graduate student,1I ran on a platform of unilateral initiatives 
toward disarmament, the US 's disavowal of first use of nuclear weapons. 
the abandonment of overseas US missile and bomber ba ses , the permanent 
cessation of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, and the admittance of the 
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People' s Republic of China into the United Nations. His lack of political 
savvy was indicated by the publication of a book just prior to his candidacy 
which clearly advocated unilateral disarmament. Another indication that 
Hughes was a stranger to pol itical campaigns was his announcement at his 
first press conference that "I am an agnostic," inspiring one well -seasoned 
reporter to rema rk, "There goes the ba 11 game. 1128 
The August primaries decided the opponents of Hughes. Edward Kennedy, 
the thirty year old brother of the President, who admittedly had been expelled 
from Harvard for cheating, but who eventually graduated from that ins titution 
in 1954, and Henry Cabot Lodge, also of influential descent and a Harvard 
graduate, were the Democratic and Republican nominees, respectively. The 
election was analyzed throughout the country .. The Hughes campaign, which 
received donations primarily from Massachusetts, but also substantially from 
New York and California, claimed that lithe Hughes candidacy has put more 
people to work for peace in this state than any time since World War IL" 
Hughes himself claimed that he would be happy with as feltl as 5000 votes at 
the final count since his objective was to bring the issues of peace and 
disarmament to national prominence. William F. Buckley Jr., from whom a 
negative diatribe is sufficient endorsement for many liberal candidates, 
predicted Lodge as the winner of the race since Hughes would draw away 
from Kennedy the "neu trali s t-pacifist-collaborationist vote." His views 
of Hughes' thoughts on unilateral ism were similarly negative. despite the 
candidates Meet the Press explanation of hi s plan as "unilateral initiatives," 
as opposed to hi s absol ute unilateralist plan in Ali APproach to Peace. "All 
of those of Mr. Hughes' persuasion," Buckley surmised~ "must be prepared, 
if necessary, to subvert American foreign POlicy.,,29 
Hughes' views on foreign policy came to light during the Cuban crisis, 
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when instead of contributing ..to non-partisan unity, he issued a .I'war.ning" not 
to invade Cuba. As the polls began to pour in, Hughes was faring noticeably 
well, with above 5 per cent of the electorate. In a poll taken among the 
student body of Harvard, Lodge was the clear winner, with Hughes in second 
position. A similar poll taken among the faculty of the Harvard Law School 
yielded the same results. But on election night . Kennedy emerged victorious 
and the Hughes campaign, which had attempted to demonstrate "the deadening 
similarities of the two major parties" failed, with Hughes receiving only 
52,000 votes, or 2.7 percent of the vote. Although well above the 5000 vote 
minimum for satisfaction Hughes had stated in the summer, it was a di sappoint-
ing showing for peace politics activists. 30 
PAX was not alone in its quest for peace through the electoral process. 
Another newly founded electoral peace group worth mention here is the Hungarian-
born physicist Leo Szilard's Council for the Prevention of War. Founded on 
June 16, 1962, Szilard's Council was committed to performing research in the 
electoral field, based on support by strongly devoted citizens willing to 
contribute 2 per cent of their income to the cause. The campaign, as described 
by Szilard, was based on faith in the American democratic process: 
There are many intelligent men in Congress, who have 
insight into what goes on; the movement could help 
these men to have the courage of their convictions. 
There are others in Congress who are not capable of 
such insight; the only thing to do with them is not 
to return them to Congress and to replace them with 
better men. . 
The Council for the Prevention of War was the most financially successful of 
) 
the new electoral groups, surpassing even the respectable amounts raised 
by the Hughes campaign. 3l 
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Despite claims by peace-pol itical activists that these campaigns brought 
new workers into the coalition, the electoral phase of the peace movement 
effectively widened the rift in the once united front. The debate within 
SANE itself is an example of the difficulties this issue raised. Further 
evidence i s found within the pacifist community, where despite their characteri -
zation by one writer as "anarchists as well as pacifists [who] eschew pol itics 
as a matter of principle,1t the pressure to move in the electoral direction 
was building. 3la 
Jerome Grossman, pacifist and campaign manager of the Hughes campaign , 
argued that lithe nuclear age i s no time for politics as usual," Claiming 
that news coverage was received which \'lOuld have otherwi se been impossibl e. 
Grossman enumerated the reasons to continue electoral work despite the 
peace candi da tes I devas ta ti ng defeat in 1962. As a 1 ever of power, entering 
the electoral process was unrivaled, Grossman argued. Through the two major 
parties (Grossman was opposed to further independent candidacies), a peace 
candidate might be elected, affording "real" power to the peace movement. 
The most important advantage of pacifist witness in electoral politics , con-
tinued Grossman, was to learn how to organize, to decrease the steady rate 
of the pacifists' journey into isolation. Finally, Grossman appealed to 
the pacifists to regain some sense of legitimacy, lost through the desperate 
civil disobedience of the past two years, in order to provide peace witness 
"in a manner traditionally acceptable to the general public." 
A. J. Muste, whose name was often written in on political ballots, including 
one fo r the governorship of New York and the US Presidency, argued the case 
against electoral activity by pacifists, stating "I am a skeptic. 1I Muste 
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pointedly i.lluminated the frustrating dilemma faced by the pacifi s t between 
getting a hearing and maintaining one's ideal s. The support of political 
candidates was not an efficient form of education for the public said Muste, 
since "it is only if a peace candidate presents a radical analysis and a 
radical program that education worthy of the name actually goes on .1I Muste 
described the temptation of a candidate to alter their true views so as to 
present "what people 1 ike to hear, what they will 'buy, I how much they can 
'take . '" t1uste's major case against pacifist or even peace movement involve-
ment in electoral politics was the danger of furthering the "mystique" of 
elections. Disputing the validity of the vote as a symbol of free society, 
Muste hoped that peace activism could provide alternatives to thi s and other 
myths of American democracy. 
Muste gave practical arguments against the efficiency of electoral peace 
work, citing the extremely high financial requirements and the exhaus tion 
and possible frustration of peace workers faced with the. unlikely task of 
getting their candidate elected .. As alternatives to electoral activity, 
Muste offered strikes, s it-ins, Gandhian action, tax and draft refusal as 
other examples of "real " political action. The result of the debate seems 
to have been the general aceeptance of ~1uste's critique among the pacifists. 
This can be seen by following the activities of Brad Lyttle's Committee for 
Non-Violent Action, which, in the turbulent period being discussed, was 
far from electoral in nature. 32 
Employing coalition theory to analyze the electoral efforts of the peace 
movement is helpful, s ince most theories were developed in order to deal 
with voting patterns. The campaigns of PAX were never truly expected to 
win an election, but only to demonstrate the future viability of peace 
candidacies. Hence, they were asking citizens to cast their ballots as 
symbols of discontent rather than as an expression of their electoral pm'ler. 
) 
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According to the axioms of minimal winning coalition theory , this strategy is 
doomed to failure since votes must be case in order to elect a winner, not to 
demonstrate a point. A.J. Muste was insightful in his fear that the goals of 
the electoral peace movement would further a fal se mystique concerning the power 
of the populace through their voting rights. Muste and other radical pacifists 
urged that alternate forms of power, which were in the .hands of the radical s, 
should be employed in the struggl e for influence. 
IV 
Concurrent with thi s new evaluation and emphasi s on el ec toral methods by 
peace groups was a bri ef but noti ceab 1 e glance to the 1 eft by many organi za ti ons 
and individuals . Joining SANE in the call for lI un i1atera1 steps toward dis -
armament" were the re 1 i gious coa 1 ition group CPC, the Committee of Correspond-
dence and the ADA. Although this type of plan was far from radical, it is 
notable in its similarity to the unilateral rhetoric of the pacifists. ADA went 
so far as to call for an "uninspected ban" in nuclear weapons tests in the spring 
of 1962. SANE issued many statements which seemed to indicate at least a flir-
tation with more radical ideas and language. Newly elected national co-chair-
person Benjami n Spack went on record as bei ng in favor of "any and all forces 
for peace" while Homer Jack insisted that "the ri sks of a test ban, even with 
imperfect inspection, are far less than the risks of continuing the arms race. " 
More directly, a full page newspaper advertisement published by SANE urged the 
public: "Raise hell--it ' s time you did." However, SANE appeared unprepared to 
take the steps necessary to radicalize the remnants of the coalition it once led . 
Homer Jack reminded the members that SANE was "not paranoid. We are heard and 
we mean to continue to be heard. We do not feel hopel ess ." Polster' s evidence 
shows that the public went through a similar phase, with the popUlation slightly 
against the resumption of US atmospheric testing until March of 1962, when test-
ing did resume and public opinion swayed over to support the president ' s decision .33 
) 
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One group that continued to radicalize was CNVA . The work of this 
organization in the period of renewed testi'ng by the four nuclear powers and 
electoral activity by the liberal wing of the peace coalition was marked by 
isolation and demonstrations relying heavily on civil disobedience. The 
Everyman voyages have been described. In their reference to the Golden Rule 
days of NVAANW, they were unique in this period. r·10re typical were the 
New York sit-ins at the AECoffice in protest of US resumption of atmos-
pheric tests, civil disobedience at the White House, a Pentagon demonstration, 
and a week long vigil and 100-hour fast at the White House. An indi ca tion 
of the trend toward isolation was the establishment of a communitarian 
living situation at the Polaris Action Farm. Located near Voluntown, 
Connecticut and comprising some 40 acres, 10 arable and 30 wooded, the Farm 
was home for between ten and fifteen full time New England CNVA members and 
was financed lar.gely by contributions, although the arabl e acres were begin-
ning to be cultivated. 
Based on the success of Polari s Action Farm, Brad Lyttle theorized that 
the nonviolent direct action wing of the peace movement could be more successful 
if based on similar enterprises. Lyttle's reasoning was both economic and 
"religious." Rent for office space and residences for staff would be greatly 
reduced, food costs could be slashed by gardening and other needed faciliti es, 
for example a printing press, might be located in the communities. Lyttle 
further suggested that, once a location is settled, small business enterpri ses 
such as printing, woodworking, or construction could aid in contributing 
toward community self-sufficiency. 
Far more important to Lyttle were the "religious values inherent 
in communitarian life on a farm . " Since civil disobedience often resulted 
in prosecution, members in need of financial and emotional support could be 
J 
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he1 ped by fell ow communitarians. Furthermore. since lIa person who engages 
in civil disobedience and goes to prison soon realizes that he cannot hold 
his job if he keeps up that behavior, " the community could offer employment. 
Lyttle was aware of the possibilities of isolation in such a olan, but 
disputed that a separation from the "real world!! was necessarily implied by 
hi s pl an. Referring to Israel i kibbutzim and Gandhian ashrams as exampl es 
of isolated communities which were "strongly extroverted in their outlook, " 
Lyttle insisted that a community can choose to be involved rather than 
iso1ated. 34 
Despite Lyttle's theory that CNVA could be an integral part of the peace 
movement through its own intention, signs were appearing that the isolation 
of that organization was very real and approaching the point of irreversi -
bility. In early 1962, Ted Olson, a CNVA member, warned the National Committee 
that the "lack of communicat!on between us and them ~ the problem, and one 
not surmountable from either side of the impasse." "If a movement is to be 
built," predicts Olson, lIit will be a movement of ordinary family men and 
women, not monks. II Missing from Olson's analysis i s the long-held conviction 
that CNVA monks formed a non-compromising core of an effective peace coalition. 
The time had come, as Olson saw it, to truly integrate radical pacifi s t action 
into the greater peace community .35 
Clarence Pickett, pacifist co-chairperson of SANE, indicated a second 
sign of danger in CNVA, one that had been developing since the emergence of 
Brad Lyttle as guru of the group. In a letter to A. J. Muste, Pickett expressed 
his fear of the institutionalization of civil disobedience, preferring that 
such action should be taken individually. As if to answer Pickett's rhetorical 
question in that letter,"are we hairsp1itting?" with a resounding No, Ted 
Olson resigned from CNVA in June of 1963, citing CNVA' s institutional nature 
as his reason. The loss of Ted Olson, a Eaptist minister and charter member of 
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NVAANW, was the first major resi gnation from CNVA during Lyttl e ' s undisputed 
leadership. Witho.ut a semblance of unity among the pacifi sts and members of CNVA, 
there lay little hope in CNVA' s goal of leading a unified peace movement. 36 
v 
Many similariti es exis ted in the conditions affecting peace activism 
between the period of renewed atmospheric testing and the period of the 
great fallout scare of 1957-1958 .. International crises that threatened to 
be resolved in thermonuclear exchange occurred in both periods. A constant 
poisoning of the atmosphere with low-level radiation and harmful isotopes 
\'Ias undertaken by both superpowers. Government I s growi ng fearof nucl ear 
proliferation and the shortcomings of deterrence strategy led to a sense 
of legitimacy for responsible spokespersons seeking moves toward disarmament. 
I 
In the earlier period of atmospheric testing, as we have seen in Chapter II, 
a coalition of liberal s, pacifists, and world federalists was born which , 
functioning as a unit, was abl e to mobilize opinion regarding the singl e 
issue of nuclear weapons tests . In the latter period however, despite the 
similar exterior conditions, the peace movement was shattered into small 
groups, each competing for already limited financial assets , each with a 
different focus on the various issues. 31 
Although the differences in the situation of the peace movement in the 
two apparently similar periods seems to stem from internal divisions, upon 
closer investigation, various external factors can be discovered in the latter 
period which were missing earlier. One example is the conservative back1ash 
of 1962 that was felt and widely described by peace activists. This trend 
was manifested in a Congressional investigation of some peace groups, the 
most publicized of which was Women Strike for Peace (WSP). A second exampl e 
) 
of external differences between the two peri ods was the embracing of 
certain key issues by established power. This tre.nd was manifested in the 
anti-civil defense movement first in the peace movement and then in local 
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and federal legislating bodies. Both these developments would greatly hamper 
the abil ity of the peace coal ition to reorganize in a period of dangerous 
internatiorial tensions and health-threatening fallout. 
The renewed power of Robert Welch1s John Birch Society in .1961 was seen 
as the first sign of an extreme right resurgence by observers with as different 
outlooks as Life magazine and A. J. Muste. In an article entitled liThe 
Unhelpful Fringes," Life attacked both the John Birch Society, described as 
lithe IWW of the right," and the uni1aterialists on the left. Muste, fearing 
"hard-core ultraconservatism," urged the editors of the pacifist periodical 
Liberation to devote space aimed at unveiling the new menace. The meeting 
of the WILPF-sponsored National Peace Conference in February 1962 devoted 
part of its activities to a discussion of "Meeting the Attack from the 
Right. II Citing a New York Times report that over 2000 rightist organizations 
"not including the far right," were currently in existence. Mildred Scott 
Olmsted insisted that persistence in pursuing the program of WILPF would be 
the only way to withstand the attack. She acknowledged, however, that 
"threats to children, to husband's jobs, splits within families and a cold 
shoulder treatment from church and friends--this is hard to take."38 
An analysis by Sanford Gottlieb, political action director of SANE, 
explained that right-wing resurgences in US history have often come with 
crisis situations. , Remembering Gerald L. K. Smith and Father Coughlin during 
the depression and Senator McCarthy during the Korean War, Gottlieb felt that 
a "complex stage of East-West relations" allowed the current upsurge to occur . 
liTo the extent that the grotesque bl ack-and-white vi ew of the 
) 
world now prevailing in right-wing quarters takes hold of the American 
public, our task becomes impossible. 1I Gottlieb recommended that SANE 
undertake the job of revealing the differences between Russian and Chinese 
ideology and tactics in order to demystify the communist "menace.1I39 
One of the first clear signs to the peace coalition that the lI radical 
right" was of immediate and direct danger was the challenge of the tax 
exempt status of FOR by the Internal Revenue Service in 1961" FOR soon 
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issued a "statement on the rise of right-wing movements Jl which reaffirmed 
their 46-year fight against totalitarianism "whether of the right or of the 
left." The threatened organization called on churches of all creeds and 
denominations to offer "forthright condemnation ll of such trends, specifically 
against HUAC and the John Birch Society. In January of 1963~ FOR's status 
was, after 30 years, revoked .. FOR IItook a very serious view of this develop-
ment and felt that this action may well be an opening move against the peace 
movement in general. 1I WRL, for one, promised to support FOR in every way 
possible. 
The revoking of FOR' s tax-exampt status brought a wave of protest from 
the media, including editorials by the New York Times .. Village Voice, New 
York Post, and the Progressive. Senator Gaylord Nelson of W;scensin and 
Senator George McGovern of South Dakota spoke against the IRS action on the 
floor of Congress in May of 1963. On June 24. 1964. FOR was re-granted its 
status, but the incident alerted the peace movement to the real dangers of 
right-wing opposition. 40 The student groups. too, were under attack, with 
Advance, an independent socialist student organization, being placed on the 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy's list of IICommunist front organizations. 1I 
SPU. in i.ts 1963-1964 program statement, ominously protested the oncoming 
repression by government, indicated by HUAC activites, the McCarran act, 
and a "general reduction of civil 1 iberti es . ,.41 
A further indication of the reaction of the peace movement to their 
vision of a right-wing attack was a newly potent clarification of their 
generally anti-communist views. David McReynold of WRL was especially 
active in thi s field. While affirming that WRL would not actually exclude 
a Communist, he emphasized that such a potential . member "would find it hard 
going" due to WRL's third camp orientaUon. McReynolds explained.to 
another correspondent that Itthe theory of communism as stated by those 
who began the movement (Lenin, Trotsky. Stalin, et a1) is very basically 
incompatible with the pacifist philosophy. II Th e anti-communist affirmation 
was not only harmful to peace movement-public relations, but also within 
the movement itself. For example, a controversy was caused within CNVA in 
1963 by a report of one member calling another "communist ll or "commu.nistic." 
"Unfortunately,1I wrote Robert Pickus to an AFSC spokesperson seeking the 
facts, "your senSible suggestion that these matters should not be blown 
up beyond their importance has not been followed." Of course, CNVA was 
having problems other than right wing attacks during this period, but 
this imbroglio is neverthel ess good evidence of the effect that the new 
'. emphasis on anti-communism had on the machinations of the peace movement. 42 
The most startling and far reaching result of the renewed anti-communist 
hysteria which was perceived by the peace movement to be symptomatic of a 
right-wing backlash was the Senate investigation of Women Strike for Peace 
(WSP). This organization was initiated by Dagmar Wilson. a woman who wanted 
to take some action against the renewed atmospheric tests. Spurred on by 
news of the jailing of Bertrand Russel in England. Wilson summoned together 
her friends in order to organize a nationwide demonstration on November 1, 
1961. Around 50,000 citizens participated throughout the country. The group 
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gained instant prominence and some legitimacy as a result of its mention 
by President Kennedy in a press conference. HI think these women are 
ex tremely earnest,1I said President Kennedy in January of 1962. III under-
stand what they are attempting to say, and therefore , I consider that their 
. 43 message was recelVed. II 
Using advertising on televi s ion. radio and published media, WSP spread 
messages deal ing especially with mothers I rol es in peace activism. 1100 
not use fresh milk for at least four weeks after a nuclear test.1I read one 
such ad. This type of approach brought on the ire of many feminists who 
felt that all women, not jus t mothers, should work for peace. Margaret Mead 
responded to SANE ' s request for an endorsement on a IIfeminist ll pamphlet 
in 1 ate 1962: 
The iss ue is not the individual children of individual 
mothers; in the end such a position leads quite clearly 
to war because mothers who are willing to work only so 
their children can grow up change very easily into mothers 
who are willing to sacrifice their own and other women's 
children for something they value, as against what other 
people value. 
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Such internal divisions within a single constituency of peace workers certainly 
was not rare, and in the case of WSP, was dealt with by a lack of policy _ 
Denying that she was the IIleader" ofWSP, Wilson claimed that "nobody is 
controlied by anybody in the Women Strike for Peace." So loose was the 
organi za tional framework of the group, explained one writer, that Wilson 
IIsees no threa t of a Communi s t takeover. ,,44 
HUAC Subcommittee Chairperson Clyde Doyl e thought otherwi se. Citing a 
speech by Nikita Khrushchev which s tated the Communist Party' s desire to 
agitate for peace and U,S. Communi s t Party leader Gus Hall IS statement that 
"it is essential to give full support to the existing peace bodies," Doyle 
and the HUAC feared serious infiltration in the US peace movement. The sub-
committee called numerous witnesses , mostly members of WSp, an organization 
that was al so known as "Women for Peace " in the West and "Homen International 
Strike for Peace" for a short while in New York. These witnesses were 
allegedly connected in some way with the Communist Party, either presently 
or in the past. The most frequently used pieces of evidence used by the 
government were s ignatures on petitions in support of Communi.st candidates 
for office, articl es in communist publications either written by or referring 
to the witnesses, and past membership in the CP, USA. The witnesses, with 
the notable exception of Dagmar Wilson, invoked fifth amendment privil eges 
in response to the major
J 
of the subcommittee's questions. 45 
The hearings put WSP and the entire peace movement on the defense against 
anti-communist attacks. The final part of Wilson's testimony was only fodder 
for hungry mediapersons and Subcommittee members; 
Mr. Nittl e: Would you knowlingly permit or welcome Nazi s 
or Fascists to occupy 1 eadershi p positions 
in l~SP? 
Mrs. Wilson : Whether we could get them or not, I don't 
think we could. 
Mr. Nittle: Am I correct then. in assuming that you plan 
to take no action designed to prevent Com-
munists from assuming positions of leader-
ship in the movement or to eliminate Communi s ts 
who may have already obtained such positions? 
Mrs. Wilson : Certainly not. 
Es pecially damning were the news reports, confirmed by subcommittee members, 
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that Wilson ' s actual reply to the first question above was "If only we could have 
them on our side." The stand that many pacifists had felt SANE should have 
taken to the Dodd Committee was now demonstrated by WSp, but the situation 
was different. WSP did not have the legitimacy of pre-Dodd SANE, it was 
not a keystone to the engineering of a peace coalition. 46 
SANE did, however, take note of WSP's stand and supported it in their 
publication of a cartoon in SANE World which pictured the committee members 
in sess ion. One whispered to the other, III came in late, which is it that 
i s un-American, women or peace?" A public radio broadcast by Jack was 
J 
entitled liThe Will of the WISP versus the Humiliation of HUAC. II It praised 
the non-cooperation of WSP in the hearings and their "bitterly sarcastic" 
treatment of the lIinquisitors. 1I However. Jack spoke against I~SPts policy 
of open membership as revealed in the testimony of Dagmar Wilson. SPU also 
came out on record against the hearings and against the existence of both 
HUAC and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,but was IIregretfu1 tI at 
IoJSP'S lack of political distinctions. Even during a unity in the face of 
adversity, the under1yi ng differences between the various groups i.s most 
noticeable in their statements. 47 
VI 
Perhaps even more devastating than the internal divisions within the 
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peace movement was the coalition's blindness to and denial of these divisions. 
Optimi s tic reports of the future abounded. IIIn January 1963," wrote Lawrence 
Scott, then involved with the Peace Action Center, "the American peace 
movement is in good condition to move forward." One author spoke of the 
peace movement of the period in the following way: "All in all. it has 
everyth i ng men need to bu i 1 d a strong politi ca 1 movement if they ca n fi nd 
enough people receptive to their message. II Mildred Scott Olmsted had similar 
hopes: III think that there is an excellent partnership possible between the 
organi za tions. II Yet, despite such favorab1 e impressions of the coal iti on by 
contemporary observers. it is clear that at thi s point in time. the peace , 
coalition was badly fragmented. 48 
True. the breadth of action taken by the various groups was impressive. 
Projects underway in 1962-1963 included legislative lobbying, literature 
distribution. demonstrations which could be called instantly upon a move 
on testing by the government. petitions of phycho10gists, nuclear physicists 
and physicians, 1 etter writi ng campaigns, marches to Wash; ngton, a speakers 
) 
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bureau at SANf. civil disobedience, even a 53 minute silence in Iowa City 
called by the mayor. each minute representing a billion dollars spent by 
the government on defense. Barbara Reynolds and her yacht Phoenix sponsored 
a Peace Pilgramage by two Hiroshima survivors. In light of all these actions. 
however, Homer Jack of SANE could ask, HWhy can't the peace organiztions 
coopera te more closely?,,49 
The simple fact of the large number of peace organizations i s certainly 
one factor in their lack of effective cooperation. as was the desire for 
individual organi za tional autonomy. but one cause of their own downfall that 
the peace coalition could not change was the co-opting of their policies 
by established power. Donald Keys of SANE noticed this trend in early 1963, 
likening the government ' s interception of peace issues to their similar 
handling of socialistic ideals and programs. By slowly accepting these 
changes, Keys surmised. the government was able to avoid drastic change. We 
have already taken note of the "peace race" rhetoric of President Kennedy 
and the resulting attenuation of the peace group's programs. Turn Toward 
Peace joined the ranks of those organizations hoping to work with the President 
in his "peace" plans. TTP suggested what seems to amount to a blank policy 
check: "We will seek to build support for the constructive proposal s the 
President had advanced and would like to advance.,,50 
An excellent case in point of this period is the issue of civil defense. 
In 1954, any individual or organization which advocated the abolition of 
the United States J civil defense program wouldhave been dismissed as either 
subversive or uninformed. But by 1961 ,anti-civil defense programs were in 
progress by a 11 the 1 egitima te peace groups and eventually by sta te and 
federal legislatures, with the New York Times headlining: "shelters validity 
.) 
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widely doubted. " SANE undertook its anti-shelter program with support from 
Eleanor Roosevelt who said, ,tWe had better bend our efforts to preventing 
nuclear war and not worry about how we can preserve our skins." Norman 
Cousins editorialized in the Saturday Review that "life will not be resumed 
as usual," noting that the firestorms associated with a thermo-nucl~ar 
attack would leave no oxygen for those in shelters. FOR initiated a "Shelters 
for the Shelterless" campaign in 1962 which attempted to reroute money for 
fallout shelters toward needy communities worldwide. CPC switched its major 
emphasi s to civi l defense issues early in 1962. Yet this type of critique 
failed to be piErcing in light of the legislator' s simultaneous attack on 
the US shel ter program. New York State Assembly member, r1ark Lane, for 
example, spoke vehemently against that legislative body's pending civil 
defense appropriation, charging that Speaker Joseph F. Carlino stOOQ to 
gai n from his interest in the "Lancer Survival Corporation," a home shelter 
installing company. "It was one of the rare occasions when we mourned success," 
wrote Al Hassler when "the CD Campaign collapsed too soon" under pressure from 
the US Congress. Although Hassler was mourning the end of the Shelters for 
the Shelterless campaign, there was also reason to mourn the government~s 
co-opting of the "easier" peace issues. 51 
It is ironic, yet painfully real, that moves by the government to co-opt. 
or intercept issues of importance to the peace movement has hurt, not added 
to the momentum of, the coalition. Too often the government' s reasons for 
i ts moves were all wrong to the moral s of the peace workers. Yet once 
the policy change the peace movement had called for had been achieved, a 
milestone had been reached, usually resulting in at least a temporary stalling 
of activities. In the history of the coaltion up to 1962, due to the immediacy 
of the issues, popular sentiments, or a particularly strong cooperative spirit, 
) 
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the peace coalition had a bumpy road, but survived the co-opting event. 
Yet in 1963 the fatal IIconces sionll by the government would arrive. The 
tes t ban--the reason for the formation of SANE and the liberal peace 
coalition--was to be signed in treaty form in Moscow in the summer of 1963. 
This was an ironic blqw from which there was to be no recovery. When the 
peace movement did reemerge, it was no longer liberally based, no longer 
seeking to influence through legal or moral suasion. 
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Chapter VI. The Peace Movement Without an Issue 
Although all the peace groups made efforts to expand their programs . . 
beyond the test ban issue in 1958, the coalition peace movement remained 
very much attached to the pattern of weapons testing. Because of the mora-
torium on tests which began in November of 1958, the organizations were able 
to advocate wider issues of disarmament, a s tronger United Nations, and a 
freeze on nuclear stockpiles. Yet the major support for these groups was 
gained through activity concerning the immediate and real danger in the 
public's minds--the tests. Using pictures of milk bottles bearing the skull 
and crossbones, pregnant women with confused expressions of fear, and 
equally confused men standing atop their fallout shelters armed with machine 
guns to ward away neighbors from their limited supply of food, organizations 
such as SANE, WILPF, and AFSC were able to mobilize a sizeable public voice. 
The radical pacifists, too, attempted to move. away from the single issue 
of weapons tests, beginning with CNVA's Omaha Action. Despite protests of 
the originators of NVAANW, the reorganized CNVA staged an assault on the 
deterrence system of the United States. This sort of issue failed to attract 
a large public following, increasing the movement toward isolation by the 
pacifist wing of the coalition. Turn Toward Peace attempted to reconcile 
SANE's dependence on legitimate public support and CNVA's insistence on 
morally pure activism, yet organizational conflicts between various groups 
seeking influence doomed the campaign. 
Despite these setbacks and the fragmented qual ity of the peace movement 
in 1962, the coalition was still able to work, sometimes effectively. For 
example, a poignant joint demonstration was held on Hiroshima Day of 1962. 
Even in the fi rst half of 1963, the movement was abl e to pull together in a 
) 
push toward the test ban, although opposition ralli es were common. But 
when, in th.e summer of 1963, a limited test ban treaty was initialed in 
Moscow by the three major world powers, the remnants of the peace coalition 
drifted apart permanently. In the face of government IS co-opti ng of the 
testing issue and a ban achieved for reasons of maintaining United states 
nuclear supremacy, the movement lost the issue that had originally given it 
life. Th.e Hberally based coalition would disappear for many years. l 
I 
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When the Geneva conference for the Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Tests 
finally recessed permanently in January. 1962. it had been two years since 
any progress had been made there. The breakdown of the Paris Summit con-
ference over the U-2 incident had cast its failure across Europe to the 
negotiations in Switzerland. Attempts to start anew at test ban negotiations 
were undertaken by a UN-sponsored eighteen nation disarmament committee, 
comprised of five countries from each power bloc and eight unaligned nations. 
Commencing its work on March 14, 1962. the conference was disturbed five 
weeks later by the first US atmospheric tests in over three years, Neverthe-
l ess, the committee continued its work under UN ausp;ces. 2 
The next major step toward reaching a~ agreement was made in August, when 
two draft treaties were tabled at the. conference by the United States. One 
draft was concerned with a comprehensive ban. The US called for 12 to 20 
on-site inspections per year, a figure considerably lower than demanded at 
the Geneva conferences, but still unacceptable to the Soviets, who rejected 
the on-site inspection system as a form of disguised espionage. This draft 
treaty was rejected. The second draft treaty, authorized by the US Committee 
of Principal s as a "fall-back position. 1I was an arrangement for a limited ban 
i n need of no inspection system whatsoever . Thi s draft, too, was rejected 
by the Soviets as a "legali zation of underground testing, II, a field in 
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which the US was more sophi s ticated. The subcommittee recessed in September, 
1962, making no recommendations. 3 
The seventeenth General Assembly of the UN did make some speciftc 
recommendations concerning the test ban, however. Resolutions were passed 
that called for an end to all tests by January 1, 1963. Nevertheles s , 
the unprecedented rate of testing that marked 1962 continued unabated. A 
fal se sense of success was achieved when Khrushchev was led by his advisors 
to believe that the US would accept a quota of only three on-site inspections 
per year. The Soviet leader wrote to Kennedy, indicating that he understood 
the need for a token number of inspections to receive the consent of the 
Senate and would consider reopening the negotiations. Kennedy was "exhila-
rated. ,A 
A number of letters were exchanged between the heads of State, with 
Khrushchev indicating his disappointment and feeling of betrayal associated 
with his having been misled to believe that the US would accept three 
inspections. Despite thi s, informal talks in New York were arranged between 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director William C. Foster, 
N. T. Fedorenko, Tsarapkin. and British diplomat David Ormsby-Gore. The 
talks did not progress well and ended with the month of January. It was in 
these talks, however, that the Soviet Union, for the first time, agreed to 
have any foreigners whatsoever on their soil in order to achieve a test ban. 5 
As the spring progressed, both the US and the USSR seemed genuinely 
interested in reaching some sort of agreement regarding a cessation of test-
ing. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. felt that the decision to move strongly in 
the direction of the ban wa s made by President Kennedy based on his realization 
that continued testing would lead only to a need for more tests. A more 
likely explanation is that the scientific advisory system, headed by 
Jerome We1sner, felt that, as predicted in 1961, the amount being learned 
from each atmospheric test was dropping rapidly . The US could safely stop 
all t ests and proceed with laboratory work concerned with delivery systems. 
Furthermore, Kennedy' s fear of nucl ear prol ifera tion is well documented . 
14hatever the rationale, overtures from the US to the USSR began via 
Norman Cous.ins, who was scheduled to interview Khrushchev in April of 1963. 
Cousins communicated to the Soviet Chairman, somewhat inaccurately, the US' s 
interest in a comprehensive ban with minimal inspection. 6 
Receiving a cynical, yet positive response from Khrushchev, the US 
and UK drafted a letter to the USSR in which an offer was made to send 
"very senior representatives " to Moscow for the purpose of negotiation. 
Khrushchev assented on May 8. The US Senate indicated its favorable mood 
toward such a treaty. although one limited to the three environments of the 
atmosphere. underwater anct in outer space, in May_ Senators Humphrey and 
Dodd co-sponsored a resolution with 34 other senators calling for such an 
agreement. Kennedy put the final preparation of the stage in place in a 
speech to the graduating cl ass of American University in Washington, D.C. 
on June 10/ 
"Liberated" of the traditi anal constraints on foreign pol icy by the 
prestige of his handling of the Cuba situation, Kennedy chose to emphasi ze 
a new phase of Soviet-American relations, not lithe usual threats of 
destruction, boasts of nuclear stockpiles and lectures on Soviet treachery." 
Referring to peace as "the necessary rational end of rational men, Kennedy 
reminded that "enmities between nations, as between individual s , do not 
last forever." Minimizing anti-communist sentiment, Kennedy hailed the 
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Russians IIfor their many great achievements,1I going on to praise the 
Soviets for their valiant sufferings of World War II, placing emphasis on 
the similarities of the two nations. The President went so far as to 
acknowl edge that part of the bl arne for the Col d War belonged to the US. 
Finally, Kennedy announced the pending negotiations and the US' s intentions 
to refrain from atmospheric testing IIS0 long as other states do not do so. " 
This speech helped create a favorable atmosphere in which to negotiate. 
Khrushchev called Kennedy' s performance lithe greatest speech by any American 
President since Roosevelt. 1I Not coincidentally, the Soviet jammings of 
the SSG and the Voice of America, which had been subsiding, were ceased 
completely, apparently to reciprocate the US gesture of good faith. 8 
The Moscow talks began on July 15, 1963. Concurrently in Moscow were 
the Sino-Soviet ideological talks, which were progressing badly, finally 
resulting in a Soviet publi c denunciation of the Chinese regime. Both the 
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USSR and the us seemed assured of the success of their meeting, however. 
Khrushchev was described by chief US negotiator W. Averell Harriman as 
lI,jovial . 1I The original draft tabled by the USSR was almost identical to that 
of the1958 talks. A ban was called for in three environments, with no 
i ns pections, no withdrawal clause, with the treaty fully accessionab1 e by other 
states. The first US draft called for a ban iri all environments, but the only 
result of thi s draft was to serve asa "requi em for the comprehensive, II with 
earnest negotiating continuing only in relation to the limited goal. After 
rewording a preamble which originally gave the impression that the treaty 
intended to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether, changing the ti.tle to a 
specifi c numeration of the environments affected, and the dropping of the 
requirement that all other nuclear powers must sign to make it effective 
(the so-called n-th country problem), the treaty was complete. Comprised of 
five short articles, the draft was initialed on July 25, only ten days after 
9 
the negotiati'ons had commenced ~ 
The treaty was hailed as "a first step toward peace, " by President 
Kennedy, lIa good begi nning," by Chairman Khrushchev, and lithe basi s for the 
poss ib 1 e grea t events, It by Prime Minister McMi 11 an. noticeably restrai ned 
responses. Prime Minister Nehru of India,. the most vocal statesperson in 
the test ban de.bate following Bravo, was more enthusiastic, calling the 
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treaty l1a turning point in the history of the modern world." Adlai Stevenson 
agreed that this "first stepll was "an historic day for the world ." Ex-president 
Harry S. Truman indicated that he was J·'for the treaty one hundred per cent. II 
Averell Harriman, whose tough stance and ,fami 1 iarity with the Soviet negotia ti n9 
style won him the title "the great man of the meeting," was serenaded by "For 
He's a Jolly Good Fellow" by his Georgetown neighbors upon his return from 
Moscow. SANE labelled the treaty a "victory."lO 
As the treaty now moved to the Senate, debate within the US was intensified. 
Opposition to the treaty, led by Edward Teller, lewis Strauss , SAC General 
Thomas Power and fOrmer Chiefs of Staff Arl ei gh Burke, A:rthur Radford, and 
Nathan Twining, was fierce. Points of opposition included the fear of Soviet 
cheating and the need for further testing in order to perfect older weapons 
and create new and more devastating ones to add to the US's deterrent. Admiral 
Strauss was more belligerent in his opposition, stating "I am not sure that 
the red uction of tensions is necessarily a good thing. lI · President Kennedy gave 
his assurances that the US would keep its "vigilance high" in its pursuit of 
laboratory work, underground testing, and satellite detection system. In 
response to . Teller's claim that continued tests were needed in order that 
we not "gi've away future safety," Kennedy claimed that the power of our bombs 
) 
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was sufficient and their size small enough that delivery system development 
vias of primary importance. Opposition also came from France, which announced 
it woul d not enter the agreement, and from China, which called the trea ty 
I! a dirty fraud." Both these nations were infants in the nuclear society 
and must have seen the treaty as an attempt ,to stunt their growth. 11 
On August 5,1963, eighteen years after the bombing of Hiroshima, the 
"glorious day" of the treaty s1'gning took place in Moscow. Khrushchev, Rusk 
and Home signed simultaneously for the powers. UN Secretary General U Thant 
was present by request. Ironically, the US delegation. while including several 
Senators from both parties, did not include Adlai Stevenson, one of the original 
legitimate sponsors of such a n action. The treaty received qualified support 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ~~est Germany, strong support from Secretary 
of Defense Robert S. McNamara and a slew of scientists, lobbying efforts by 
by SANE and eventually, on September 24, the votes of 80 Senators. Pres i dent 
Kennedy s igned the treaty on October 7, 196~, culminating tbe search for a 
test ban treaty. The initial joy was dimmed somewhat by the refusal of France 
and China to enter the agreement, yet the treaty that many had seen as a first 
step toward disarmament and the end of the peril due to radioactive fallout 
had been achieved. Unfortunately for the peace movement, this achievement 
took away their issue. Their response was one of celebration by the liberal s 
and indifference by the radical pacifi sts who continued to move out of the 
,rna ins tream. 1 2 
II 
SANE responded jubilantly to the news of the treaty, despite tha t docu -
mentis limited nature. Homer Jack was present a t the signing ceremony and 
SANE, parti'cipated in the Citizen' s Committee for a Test Ban Treaty ' s lobbying 
efforts in the Senate. A SANE~inanced full page newspaper advertisement 
urged citizens to write their Senators in favor of the treaty. Anticipating 
the overwhelmingly favorable vote, SANE announced that lIa celebration is 
clearly called for.1I Recalling its birth as a single issue emergency 
campaign , SANE acknowledged the importance of work for general disarmament, 
yet "the test ban has remained a major goal . ,t Th e question became IINow 
that the test ban treaty is signed, what more ha s SANE to do?'i13 
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Suggestions for the emphasis of the post-ban SANE included reorganization 
of the world economy to a peaceful basis, electoral work and the establish-
ment of the Peace Party, and a solution to the problem of nuclear pro-
i iferation. The generality of these goals was of concern to some peace 
organizers, including Donald Keys, who said, IISANE has been a cri'sis instrument 
and now there are no major crises that hold the threat of imminent nuclear 
clash.1I And despite Homer Jack' s confident assessment that IIfew if any--
except SANE's detractors on the extreme right and left--feel that SANE1s 
work is finished,1I Keys saw a IIlack [of] fundamental and stirring appeal to 
the hearts and minds of people. II The National Review was more direct in its 
appraisal of post-ban SANE, noting that the organization lI i s headed for 
cuckooland ll and a unilateralist stance. 14 
Although SANE did not know where to turn, one thing was certain. President 
Kennedy's administration had succeeded intaking away SANE ' s issues. It was 
clear that although Kennedy spoke o"f the need for peace and was abl e to 
achieve a test-ban treaty where Eisenhower had failed. the source of the 
treaty's inspiration was not altruism . liThe continuous build-up in the power 
and invulnerability of our nuclear arsenal in recent years, II said Kennedy in 




l imitation had arrived. " Charl es Bolton, writing in the Nation, realized 
that the treaty was only a IImeans for perpetuating American nucl ear advantage 
in the arms race. " Indeed, this analysis was, in part, how the administration 
wrangled support from the Joint Chiefs. Scientific advisor George Kistiakowsky, 
writing in retrospect, recalled that the treaty lI exerted virtually no effect 
on the arms race,II15 
Despite the nationalistic reasons behind the treaty, SANE and other 
organizations celebrated the document as a great accomplishment of the Kennedy 
administration. This trend is noticeable in the suggested slogans of the 1963 
SANE peace walks, which included several quotations by the President. SANE 
even entered the world of fashion, a tribue to the "Camelot ll image of the 
Kennedy administration, by calling for IIchampagne parties 1t in celebration of 
the test ban treaty which IImight open the door to a story with real content 
on the society page. 1I Finally, although the majority of the nation and 
much of the world mourned the violent death of the President in Dallas, SANE 
felt the loss as IIparticular1y severe for the peace movement. 1I In reality, 
Kennedy was tbe most powerful foe the peace coalition had, because of his very 
interest in peace. Although the end sought was the same,the methods used 
by Kennedy to achieve peace were not in keeping with the highest ideals of 
SANE. Donald Keys quietly called for a return to these ideals by SANE and by 
UWF, a return to lithe impul se which gave them birth and kindled their follow-
ings. 1I16 
III 
Pacifists, in general, did not share SANE' s enthusiasm for the Kennedy 
administration. A. J. Muste, for example, indicated his disapproval with 
Kennedy's study of Mao 's g,uerilla tactics. preferring the "more democratic " 
methods of Gandhi . And in thi s period, CNVA demonstrated its reliance on 
) 
satyagraha with the most extreme and potentially dangerous action in its 
short hi story--the Quebec-Washi ngton-Guantanamo Walk for Peace. 12 
Although the 3300 mile walk was undertaken as a witness against US 
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pol icy in Cuba, with its "major emphasis on foreign pol icy, not civil rights, II 
the demonstration was transformed into a civil rights actton due to the 
\'Ja 1 kers' incarcera tion in strictly segregated Al bany, Georgia. The walk 
originated in Quebec on May 26; passing through the Griffin Air Force Base 
to protest the deterrence system on July 3. All was proceeding according to 
plan whe~,upon arriving in Griffin, Georgia, the site of some recent civil 
rights demonstrations, some walkers were cattle-prodded by. local police. 
IIThi s is the first peacetime project I know of, II wrote Lyttle to fellow 
pacifist David Dellinger, "which is losing participants because of danger 
of death. II The walkers, diminished in number, headed southward toward 
Cuba. In Albany, Georgia, they were imprisoned for unauthorized parading by 
Chief of Pol ice Laurie Pritchett~ known throughout the South for his extreme 
bigotry. No violent treatment was received by the CNVA marchers in Albany, 
but instead more subtle and systematic silencing was incurred. 18 
"There'll be no damn s i ngi n' and no damn prayi n' in my jail, II announced 
Pritchett, and each walker was placed in a solitary cell. One participant 
of what was later known as Albany Action wrote of his imprisonment: 
The front of the cell is of iron bars, rather less than 
five inches apart, with a ditto door. The rest is metal 
sheet and hence its name the "tank. II The cell is crawl ing 
with cockroaches, the corners of the four mattresses 
stained with unnamable deposits, and the place reeks with 
a combination of carbolic and urine. Worst deprevation 
of all is the total absence of dayl ight, for the cell is 
lit with a bulb in the corridor outside. which throws in 
oblique shadows of the bars across thi s page as I write. 
It burns all night and all day_ 
Led by Bradford Lyttle, the jailed walkers staged a hunger strike demanding 
their release from prison and permi ss ion to march through the previously re-
stricted downtown area of Albany.19 
) 
Although the national and international publicity received by the 
Albany Action might have allowed outside help to free the walkers, Lyttl e 
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affirmed his bel ief in non-violent resi s tance as the only way to bring about 
rea l social change. 
I prefer thi s kind of moral and reasonable appear rather 
th~recourse to the courts because I believe that Supreme 
Court and federal intervention in Albanyts affairs,based 
as it would be upon the ultimate coercion of armed power, 
would generate resentment and bitterness . 
Eventually, through the mediation of AFSC, the walkers were permitted to stage 
a limited and highly supervised march through downtown Albany, pamphleteering 
freely. Their exhaustion, disillusionment and inability to obtain vi sas into 
Cuba was a disappointing end to the action, which left CNVA greatly weakened, 
financially as well as emotionally. These feelings are demonstrated by a 
report on the action, written more than a year later. "I tried very hard 
not to make it negative, " wrote ~1ay Suzuki to A. J. Muste, "but it seems to 
be, nevertheless.,,20 
Other sectors of the peace movement also became involved in civil rights 
activism in this period when peace issues were monopolized by the administration. 
Many students participated in field work in the South, which, despite Charl es 
Bolton's characterization as "glamorous and exciting," must have been an 
extremely radica~izing experience. Lawrence Scott's Peace Action Center headed 
south as well, devoting its energies to the rebuilding of burned black churches. 2l 
The extremity of action and the new concentration on civil rights by 
CNVA and others was criticized by pacifists and nonpacifists alike. Especially 
striking was a poem, "To a t1ilitant Pacifist," published in FOR ' s Fellowship 
magazine immediately following the Albany action: 
Put down your fi sts and let1 s be friends: 
Take peaceful means to peaceful ends; 
I'm inclined to believe in what you say; 
Stop beating my head with that olive spray. 
A stab came from SANE in the form of a cartoon publ ished in SANE I~ORLD 
which pictured a couple of 'beatniks' sitting on an empty beach next to a 
large "ban the bomb" placard. "$ure t we would have reached more people at 
Coney Island," read the caption, "but the ones here at Hyannis are more 
influential." A1though the reference to CNVA' s limited audience was apt , 
SANE was really the group which was lobbying at Hyanni s at the expense of 
declining local activity.22 
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A trend that was occurring within CNVA wa s its shift from a middle~aged 
Quaker membership, to a young, non-pacifist membership . As early as Omaha 
Action in 1959, college students were active in the civil disobedience 
sponsored by CNVA . By 1963, CNVA actions had changed in tone considerably, 
as described by historian Neil Katz: "The open smoking of marijuana, petting 
and drinking on the Quebec-Hashing-Guantanamo walk agitated traditional 
pacifi.sts who believed in the necessity of purity and depth in their non-
violent witness." It must have seemed to the more traditional members that 
the desperate tacti cs advocated by Bradford Lyttle in 1960 had finally reached 
their logical conclusion with the attenuation of the CNVA witness. 23 
IV 
The denouement following the test ban treaty wa s marked by many endings, 
but also a beginning. The organizations with which we are now so familiar, 
SANE, CNVA, SPU, TTP, and others would undergo leadership and policy changes 
that marked the end of an era,and in the four cases above, ceasing to exist 
as organizations all together. On the other hand, even before the test ban 
treaty, rumblings of activity concerning the growing violence in Southeast 
Asia are evident. 
Alfred Hassler remembered FOR first becoming concerned with US policy 
in Vietnam in 1961. His paper delivered in 1963 to the International FOR 
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in Holland was the first major sta tement on the Vietnam issue in that organi -
za tion. A SANE memo from July 1962 opposed the arms flow between North and 
South Vietnam and by 1964, much of their literature was concerned with Vietnam. 
CNVA was alerted at the same time, evidenced by an article written in the 
CNVA Bulletin in March 1963 entitled, IIEnd the l~ar in Vietnam, No\Ol." Turn 
Toward Peace too, held meetings about Vietnam, but in 1964. CPC demonstrated 
activity in this new issue in the same year, di scussing both "anti-conscription 
and Vietnam." l~RL \O/as also concerned with the growing conflict in the east as 
early as September 1963, cosponsoring a demonstration with SPU. This student 
group continued to evidence its turn in the direction of radical thought 
and action in thei'r October 1963 demonstration against the US vi sit of Mme Nhu , 
the si ster-in-law of the dictator of South Vietnam. By 1965, almost all of 
SPU· s literature dealt with the Vietnam issue . Coalition activity would take 
en a new importance in the Vietnam era. /\n early example of joint activity 
was a fall demonstration co-sponsored by Catholic Worker, CNVA, General Strike 
for Peace Liberation, SPU, YPSL, and WRL. 26 
The discovery of the new issue that would carry a different peace move-
ment in later years was not enough to prevent the .decline and fall of almost 
the entire cast of characters in the liberal/pacifist peace coalition. Follow-
ing the achievement of the three environment test bans, a change in leadership 
indicated a new direction and emphasis by SANE. Norman Cousins and Clarence 
Pickett stepped down as co-chairpersons, replaced by Benjamin Spock of child 
care fame, and H. Stuart Hughes, the unsuccessfu l peace candidate of 1962 . 
Cousins stayed on as a member of the National Board while Pickett maintained 
Honorary Sponsorship. Both Spock and Hughes were more unilateralist than 
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the previous two men, prompting one SANE board member to speak of "SANE' s 
wayward drift to the left."- Despite this change. however. SANE continued 
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to live in the past, struggling to maintain a sense of legitimacy. For 
example, the National Committee indicated that "everyone" could participate 
i n the 1963 Spri ng Peace Wei 1 ks, "provi ded, of course, tha t they 1 ea ve the 
beards and banjoes at home. ,,25 
A second sign of the decline of SANE as an independent legitimate, 
coa 1 iti on-formi ng organi za ti on was their merger wi th the United Worl d 
Federalists in 1964. The issue of such a merger first arose at the sixth 
National Conference in New York. A decision was made to poll the member-
ship to solicite their response. The reaction was generally favorabl e and 
in January 1964, the National Board approved with "minor reservations,"the 
Statement of Intent to consolidate with UWF. In March the Executive Council 
of UWF agreed to the plan "with reservations." A point-by-point comparison 
of the policies of the two organizations compiled in 1964 demonstrated the 
close similarity of their programs,' yet some, like Donald Keys, questioned 
the merger. 
If SANE and UWF were at any time to merge, the move should 
not bring together two piles of sticks and stones to make 
a bigger one. Both organizations need to consider seriously 
the reasons for the loss of the sense of excitement and 
meaning and the reasons why they no longer stimulate growing 
and dedicated commitment. 
A lthougH' the" move to consoli da te the often over1 appi ng work of SANE and Ul·JF 
was taken as a step to pare down the coalition in order to increase its 
effectiveness," the combi ned organization which arose ~as pl agued by the same 
problems of low membership and limited influence that faced both individually_ 
SANE still existstoday as "ACitizens Organization for a Sane World," now 
centered in Washington, D.C. and functioning primarily as a lobbying and 
d t · 26 e uca 10n group. 
) 
CNVA, too, found itself discussing a merger in 1964 . Talks began to 
join with WRL because of chronic financial difficulties within CNVA. As 
the Vietnam protests escalated with the war, more groups were becoming 
involved in both civil disobedience on the one hand and violent demonstra -
tions on the othe.r. SANE met troubl es when attempting to join multi-
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organi zationa 1 marches employing these tactics. Similarly, CNVA was shaken 
to the core when Bradford Lyttle advocated that the organization join a 1967 
march on the Pentagon, the printed call for which clearly advocated the use 
of violence if deemed necessary. IlCoa1itions must be built around the left,1I 
explained Lyttle, "not the liberal s. " Because of the loss of CNVA's role as 
the pacifist witness at these demonstrations and the existence of other 
groups participating in Gandhian satyagraha, serious talks of a CNVA/L·JRL 
merger were resumed in June of 1967. The plans finalized in January 1968, 
with WRL taking on the $8000 CNVA deficit . 27 
A third leading member of the peace coalition which experienced its 
demise after the test ban treaty was the Student Peace Union. Financial 
and organizational difficulties led to a vote to dissolve the group and forced 
the closing of their Chicago Office in 1964, but a new office was soon opened 
in New York. Because of the increasingly radical analysis of the Vietnam 
situation by s tudents, SPU moved in the direction of radicalism to maintain 
its viability. For example, the 1963-64 policy statement called for dis-
armament, "unilaterally if necessary," by the US. Despite these attempts 
to move to the left, the embracing of an original and radical politics by 
SOS rapidly drew membership away from SPU until, in early 1967, a referendum 
on dissolution was distributed to the membership. In a letter to the member-
ship, Joe Kearns, National Secretary of SPU, recommended di.sso1 ution, com-
menting "we have been passed by and it i s our duty to reali ze this. " Kearns 
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further wished that members reorient their efforts to SDS, which he character-
ized as "a leftish multi-issue organization which i s the real campus activist." 
Yet it was not only the evolution of SDS that sapped the strength of SPU. 
As one historian of the period has put it, "the signing of the test-ban treaty 
effectively ki 11 ed both SPU and the student peace movement." The peace pro-
gram of the Kennedy administration was the kiss of death to all non-radical 
peace groups, including those students not in keeping with the rapidly changing 
political climate. In February, 1967, rather than completely dissolve, SPU 
merged with the Campus Americans for Democrati c Action to become the 
Independent Student Union,,28 
Turn Toward Peace, that stalled coordinating effort, rambled on vlith 
difficulty until 1967 when it too, was reorgani zed. The Horld ~Jithout ~Jar 
Council of the United States , Inc.(liJWWCUS), as it was called, was a restatement 
of Robert Pickus' desire to put emphasis on local activism. While maintaining 
a National and Executive Board, "metropolitan WWWC's" were given much autonomy, 
with the only condition being "regular communication vlith the I~WHCUS and other 
recogni zed WWlrlC' s. II Whi 1 e offeri ng endorsement, oersonnel, resource and 
material exchange and "other he1pH to fellow peace organizations, the umbrella 
effect that was the great hope of TTP was abandoned. 28 
The fall of these individual peace organizations was ultimately due to 
their failure to cooperate effectively. Interorganizationa1 rivalries and 
ideological differences effectively prevented the coalescence of the various 
groups into a true movement. SANE was too ins i s tent on ma i nta i ning its 
liberal legitimacy. CNVA had become so radical and intent on the use of 
civil disobedience whenever possible that they undermined their sources of 
support. SPU was unable to radicalize rapidly enough to avoid major member-
ship losses to SOS. Finally, TTP avoided the lowest common denominator 
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approach only to become an organization with no policy, employing the 
efforts of an unrealistically wide spectrum of groups. The liberal peace 
coalition, without a sense of unity or even an issue. had failed to sustain 





The history of the liberal ly-based coalition peace movement in the 
years 1954-1965 is clearly one of many failures. When dealing with a negative 
assessment it is helpful to analyze what might have been a successful out-
come of this movement and how such an outcome might have been achieved. The 
goal of a peace movement should be the eventual end of war, but to aim for 
such an ethereal target is unrealistic and self-defeating. CNVA under 
Bradford Lyttle experienced this downfall with their emphasis on protesting 
the dete·rrence strategy 9f the US. The other extreme of activism is to 
agitate for a short-term immediately achievable goal. This strategy also has 
major shortcomings, since once the goal is accomplished, the framewor k which 
produced the results has exhausted its usefulness. 
A more realistic and efficient goal for the peace movement would have 
been a combination of the short-term and long-term objectives. Clearly. 
the single-issue approach i s very useful in attaining support and momentum 
toward the broader issues . What was missing from the SANE campa.ign was a.' 
back-up issue to the nuclear weapons test-ban which could have served to 
perpetuate the small success of achieving that treaty. A larger framework 
was needed, one which included a progression of single, related issues 
which could insure some longevity to an organization which took many years 
to build. Flexibility in the coalition ' s goals would have been indispens~bl e 
since personnel underwent changes and the societal atmosphere for peace work 
often changed. Besides lacking a broad framework, SANE-style activism was 
rapidly losing relevancy in post-test ban America . The rise of SOS and the 
new left, especially in the civil rights movement, was an indication that 
radical activism had a place in the United States . The liberal stance of 
) 
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of the Democratic administration drained SANE of all its influence. indicating 
that the radical route was the direction of the future. SANE's failure to 
recognize this shift. instead meeting the challenge from the right, hastened 
its demise. Perhaps the liberal IS insistence on maintaining legitimate 
methods was in part due to the apparent unfavorable societal atmosphere for 
radical ideas and action. 
The assassination of President Kennedy gave the nation a feeling of unity 
in their shared mourning. Alistair Cooke. for example, spoke of the sudden 
discovery that "he was more famil iar than we knew" and all persons can remember 
where they were upon hearing the sad news. In this atmosphere of national 
unity and purpose, furthered by Lyndon Johnson's continuation of the Kennedy 
program and his announcement of the Great Society, those who spoke against · 
the US consensus 'did not receive a serious hearing. Combined with the loss of 
the test ban issue, these setbacks caused the coalition to lose much of its 
immediacy, relevance and legitimacy. Sensing these trends. members of the 
peace movement urged all those involved to continue their work with continued 
vigilance. A meeting of the Consultative Peace Council, for example, warned 
of "relaxation on the part of those interested in working for peace and dis-
armament" and "some organizations possible suffering financially." The Chinese 
government reacted to the test ban treaty with the statement that the agreement 
"would give the people a false sense of security and relax their vigilance. 1I 
Similarly, General t·1axwell Taylor warned of a "euphoria in the west which will 
eventually reduce our vigilance."l 
In addition to feelings of unity, a general acceptance of the fact of US 
affluence helped to lessen the validity of criticism of American society and 
government policy. The CPC questioned the continued relevance of a third 
camp approach to peace work: "The ~~arxist-Capitalist debate may become 
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obsolete, s i nce both of these economies are based on scarcity, and now both 
the US and the Soviet Union are moving into periods of affluence. II Consider-
ing the facts that the composition of SANE, for example, was at least eighty 
per cent white collar or professional and the continuing failure of the peace 
movement to enlist the support of organized labor, thi s critique of US society 
ItJas ul tfmate1y harmful . By focusing its attentions on the broadening middle 
cl ass which they expected to soon make up a 11 of Ameri ca, the peace movement 
was undermining a possible grass roots base. 2 
The atmosphere for peace work was also affected by that continuing theme, 
the adoption of peace rhetoric by established power. Although certain 
programs seemingly favorable for peaceful causes were enacted as a result of 
this phenomenon, the ultimate result was the attenuation of the peace movement ' s 
message beyond recognition. The Consultative Peace Council realized this in 
late 1963, pointing out that "100king back at various movements, they always 
had something they were distinctly either for or against. The peace movement 
does not have this in sharp contrast to other groups . Almost everyone is for 
peace. II A column in the Miami Herald in early 1964 gave an indication of just 
how acceptable peace rhetoric had become in the United States. 3 
"Peace mongers are getting respectable again, " wrote Robert S. Boyd, 
enumerating several clues. 
Spokesmen for the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy 
(SANE), one of the leading peace outfits , say for the first 
time they are getting a polite hearing at Kiwanis ' luncheons 
and Young Republican Club meetings . 
President Johnson on New Year' s Day called for an "unre1enting 
peace offens i ve II in 1964. 
Defense Secretary McNamara has told the New York Economi c Club 
that more atomic bombs won ' t make us safer. 
At first glance these seem signs of hope. But, a corresponding l ack of 
activity by the liberal peace movement negated whatever small gains might 
have been achieved. liThe most SANE looks for this year," continued Boyd, 
"i s a couple of minor agreements on side issues with the Russians."4 
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The co-opting of SANE into the government's camp reveals that the liberal 
coalition-forming organizations ' primary goal was not the first steps toward 
a lasting peace, but an end to the health hazards presented by nuclear weapons 
tests. Most of their literature dealt with the health issue, a~d support 
1 ent to their campa i gn by sci enti sts, doctors, and even the Dentists for SANE 
gave the appeal added impact. The Kennedy administration real ized that the 
radiation menace was;atthe heart of the.peace movement' s s trength and took 
steps to end that issue. Kennedy desired a test-ban treaty since the atmos-
pheric tests were yielding less information and had a negative effect on public 
opinion. What resulted was the incredibly weak limited test-ban treaty which 
gave the administration total freedom to move forward in missile development, 
underground testing, and new weapons development . 
. The coalition's single-minded concentration on the test ban issue i s 
an example of a final factor which appeared to cast the societal balance aga i nst 
radical peace activism--the pattern of nuclear age denial. Psychiatrist 
Robert Jay Lifton deals with this phenomenon of denial, which he calls "psychic 
numbing," in many of his works . In The Broken Connection, Lifton discusses 
the nuclear generation: "Now one is, so to speak, born into a double life; 
the nuclear world demands it. There is a psychological cost, most of it 
probably in the form of extensive psychic numbing." Three stages in each 
member of thi s new genera ti on • s 1 i fe are enumera ted: the fi rs tis one of terror 
and acceptance of the bomb, especially i n those chil dren who experienced 
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regular air-raid drill s in school . The second stage is the numbing Qf 
early adolescence, although bomb imagery remains in dreams . The final s tage~ 
reached in early adulthood, is a mixture of numbing and acceptance. The 
leaders of the liberal coalition were not immune from the syndrome of 
psychic numbing, as their health-oriented program demonstrated. 5 
Despite these indications that the atmosphere for peace was unfavorabl e 
in the 19605 , other facts evidence the real openness of US society in these 
years to peace organizations and even radical programs. Looking back to 
1957, with the appearance of the first SANE newspaper advertisement, "We 
are Facing a Danger Unl ike Any Danger that Has Existed Before, II such a 
tremendous and unexpected response was evoked that we must conclude, as did 
Sanford Gottlieb, that SANE filled a vacuum in midcentury American society. 
The publ ic seems to have needed a 1 egitimate and i'mmediate issue upon which 
to act. The prospect of total nuclear annihilation, which the CNVA under 
Brad Lyttl e tri ed to address, was jus t too easy to deny by the average c iti zen. 
Some of the organizations were painfully aware of the dilemma of choosing 
broad issues over smaller, more immediately addressabl e ones . CPC held a 
prolonged discussion over an essay by Lester Grinspoon entitled liThe Unaccepti -
bility of Disquieting Facts." The conclusion was reached that the average 
citizen would just rather not hear about the dangers of thermonuclear 
annihilation. Better to protest against leukemia in children, genetic damage 
to adults and the resulting defects to the yet unborn. Yet Lifton1s theory 
implies that in the period of mixed numbing and acceptance of the realities 
of the nuclear age, a new emphasis on the substantial issues of annihilation 
was possible .6 
Indeed, some quantitative studi es indicate the growing acceptance of 
the reality of thermonuclear dangers and a desire for some kind of peace 
movement. The results of a 1963 Gallup poll demonstrated tha·t many 
Americans realized the immediacy of the nuclear threat. Sixty per cent of 
respondents believed that nuclear weapons would be employed in the event 
of a world war. while fifty two per cent felt that they had only a "poor 
chance" of surviving such an event. Only five per cent bel ieved they had 
a "very good ll chance. However. the overwhelming response of Americans that 
nuclear war was preferable to communi st domination makes clear that anti ~ 
communist beliefs were still a force to be reckoned VJith by the peace 
movement.? 
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An American Social Attitude survey indicated that many more citizens 
believed that Ilour chances of staying out of war ll were getting better in 1964 
than in 1960. Only 17.9 per cent in 1964 felt that the chance of war was 
i ncreas i ng . A majority of Ameri cans as ked to s ta te the "mos t important 
prob1em ll facing the world in 1964 said "keeping out of war. II In 1965. 
a small percentage of thQse questioned named IIpeace ll as the national symbol 
of the United States. Finally, a 1966 survey conducted by the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution in a small Iowa farming community showed that sixty-three 
per cent of respondents would either "definitely join" or IImight join ll an 
"organi za ti on with a defi nite program for wor1 d peace and di sarmament. " If 
interest was this high in a traditionally conservative rural area, the 
probability is high that interes t was even greater in the usually reliabl e 
cities, especially those in the east. 8 
The coalition peace movement, given these even slightly favorable con-
ditions, could have fared better in its attempts to organize for disarmament 
and greater international harmony. The larger part of causation for its 
failure must be placed on internal factors, not on the societal atmosphere 
wi thin which it worked. In order to reach the goal s as outlined above--
a perpetual progression of victori es on single, yet linked issues--several 
reassessments of coalition strategy were necessary. 
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Primarily~ the balance between radical and liberal ideology needed adjust-
ment. Due to the enormous power of the government to adopt the easy peace 
movement issues, thereby co-opti ng the 1 i bera 1 ~Ji ng ~ the focus of a successful 
peace movement had to be a more radical one. Bradford Lyttle realized this 
when he decided that CNVA should cooperate with the potentially violent 1967 
Spring Peace ~10bi1ization . However~ too radical a witness left the peace 
movement isolated, unable to achieve even the simplest goal in the progression . 
Without SANE, the 1957 peace movement would have gone nowhere. Through their 
legitimacy and traditional methods, a large group of US society was mustered 
into anti-testing activism. 
Coalition theory, specifically the size principle and the bargaining 
theory states that the group entering a coal ition wi th the most "weight" wi11 
have more influence on policy deci sions. In the case of the 1957 Committee 
to Stop the H-bomb Tests, despite the organizational initiative of the 
pacifist groups, the liberals emerged with greater weight. In order to shift 
influence toward radicalism, the pacifi st groups could have coalesced their 
own ranks prior to inviting the liberal s into a working coalition. The radica l 
program could have gone beyond the immediate test ban fears to real issues of 
disarmament. A nuclear weapons freeze would have been a logical next step, 
followed by a gradual reduction of stockpiles, and perhaps some proposals on 
limiting the development of new weapons. Two obstacles prevented this strategy: 
first, the issue at hand was seen as quite urgent; and second, the pacifist 
groups often experienced difficulty working out their differences. The issue 
of the immediacy i s difficult, yet the time taken t o organi ze would have been 
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well spent and it i s doubtful that the test.ban negoti ations would have pro-
gressed any more slowly if this time was taken. Uniting the radical ranks might 
have been a- formidable task, but surely would have been more easily achieved 
than the coordination of radical/liberal efforts as in Turn Toward Peace. 
Compromise is surely a necess,ity in any coalition process. Both the 
liberal s and the pacifists compromised in 1957 in order to achieve the advantages 
of one another's company. The pacifists gained from the numerical support 
and influential voice of the liberals, while the liberals suffered from 
inaction before they joined forces with the experienced radical activi sts. 
Often compromise implies reducing one's goal s to a lowest common denominator, 
yet negotiation among these groups could have achieved a deeper program. Surely 
the pacifi s t groups shared enough common ground to enable them to unite in 
order to meet SANE on equal terms in the formation of a peace coalition. \~ith 
a more profound understanding of the ultimate goals and limitations of the 
coalition, the movement could have progressed with many of the same programs. 
The dual-pronged strategy of liberal education and pacifist direct action 
witness seemed a natural strategy, while the division of labor strategy of TTP, 
with each group performing tasks at which it excelled was also wise. A long-
term strategy and increased . communication concerning the basi s of the coalition 
could have made the story of the coalition more successful. 
Organizing against nuclear weapons was not and is not a s impl e task. 
Besides the widespread numbing of the population, a feeling pervades that nuclear 
weapons are somehow out of control, even by the policy-makers. The forces 
which steer the development and strategy of such weapons seem too well-established 
and anonymous to change. Although specific issue agitation i s one method used 




the larger issues i s a very difficult chore . The dilemma facing the peace 
movement today i s virtually the same one which faced the revived forc es of 
the late 1950s. On one hand the movement can limit itself to the immediately 
s triking issues of health and economy, or on the other hand it can endanger 
its relevancy by addressing the broad social issues of the nuclear age. 
In the present, the rumblings of a new coalition are audible. Faced 
by a domestic economic dissatisfaction and ever-present international tension, 
the external conditions seem as ripe as ever for peace movement activity. 
A beginning i s present in the new single issue of a nuclear weapons freeze. 
This i ssue has great potential for several reasons. First, the issue is 
clearly one of armaments, not of health. If a substantial base of support 
is gathered around this issue, it will not be because of immediate concerns 
for self and family, but a more long-range support, one which i s slowly 
awakening from its psychic numbness. Secondly, the nuclear freeze. unlike 
the test-ban. serves as a tangible first step toward a reduction of grossly 
oversized nuclear stockpiles. Finally. the freeze attempts to halt the 
production of a new generation of nuclear weapons which aim to give the .. US 
nuclear superiority in the near future. 
Despite the promise and hope gtven by the new movement rallied behind 
the issue of a nuclear weapons freeze. some key points should be considered. 
If the freeze is brought to the level of a campaign issue, as is planned. 
care must be taken not to allow the issue to become "gover:nment property. II The 
constant co-optation of SANE' s issues by the Kennedy administration is a 
precedent whith would be painful if repeated. Secondly, definite plans should 
be forged concerning the movement after the freeze. Even if the immediate 
goal does not appear to be imminent under the present admini stration. long-range 
J 
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strategy i s es sential for the continued health of a movement which i s difficult 
to build. Finally, in seeking allies for the coalition which will have to be 
built, the freeze campaign ought to create a balance of members that is 
left of center. Real social change will come about only through radical 
agitation. although legitimate spokespersons are helpful allies for achieving 
results . If the coalition becomes too concerned with maintaining legitimacy, 
the radical wing will isolate itself, leaving no coalition. The fragmentation 
of SANE's coalition after its response to the Dodd investigation i s availabl e 
evidence of thi s precedent. 
Although many activists would not cl ass ify themselves as liberal s, the 
reality of the power behind the liberal ideology is overwhelming. A successful 
political coalition must take this potential source of strength into account. 
However, as the history just presented so vividly reveals, only radical action 
is capable of escaping the inevitable liberal pitfall of accepting l ess than 
one wants or needs in order to achieve success. Only when led by a fo rce out-
side the established order can the sys tem move toward peace . 
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Treaty B~innjng Nuclec~ 
'Veapon Te§ts in tIle 
Atmospllerej in O'tIter 
Space and Under ''Vater 
Text of treaty done at Moscow 
on August 5, 1963, 
U.S. ratification deposited October 10, 1963. 
Entered into force October 10, 1963. 
The Governments of the United St:1tcs of America, the United 
Kingdam of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of 
. SoYLe:: SOc!.1list Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original 
Parties," 
Proclaiming" as their principa.l aim the speediest possible 
achic\'cmcnt of fu'"l agreement on general and complete disarmament 
under strict international control in accordance with the objectives 
of the Uriitcd Nations which woi.lldputan end to the a.rm~mcnts race 
.1nd eliminat~ the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds 
of wc:~pons, including nuclear weapons, 
Seeking to achieve !he discontinuance of all test explosions of 
nuclear .... veapons for all time, determined to contmue negotiations to 
this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's 
environment by mdioactive substances, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to 
prev~nt, ::md not to carry out any nuclcar wcapon test cxplosion, or 
any other nuclear explo:;ic/n, at any place under its jurisdiction or 
cootrcl: " 
" {n} in the atmospherei beyond its limits, including outer space; 
or underwater, including territorial waters ot high seaSj or 
(b) in any other cllvironment if such explosion causes radio-
active debris to be prescnt outside the territorial limits of the 
State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is con- " 
ducted. It is understood in this connection that the proYisions of 
this subp:lmgraph are without prejudice to the conclusion ofa 
treaty resulting in the pcnnancnt banning of all nuclear test 
cxplpsicns, including all such explosions underground, the con-. 
clusian of which, as the Parties have stated"in the PrcOlmblc to 
this Trcaty, they seek to achieve. 
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2. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undcrt~kes furthcnnorc to 
refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, thc 
carrying out 'of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other 
nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the 
environments described, or have the effect referred to, in parlgmph I 
of this Article. ' 
Article II 
1. ! ... ny Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of 
any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary 
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to this Treaty. 
Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, 
the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which 
they shall invite all the Parties, to consi"dersuch amendment. 
2. Any amen<L.-nent to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of 
the votes of all the Parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of 
the Original Parties. The amendment shall , enter into force for all 
Parries upon the deposit of instnlI11ents of ra~ification by a majority 
of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of ull of thc 
Origin~ll Parties. 
Article III 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which docs not sign this Treaty before its entry into force i;:l Joe-
cordancc with paragraph3 of this Article may accede to it at any ti;:i1e. 
2. This Treaty shall ,be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
'Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be 
deposited ""ith the Governments ofthe Original Parties-the United 
States of Americal the United Kingdom of Grcat Britain and Northern 
Irelandl and the Union of Soviet Socidist Republics-which arc 
hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force aftcr its ratification by .al1 the 
Origin'l1 P:1ftics and the deposit of their instruments of ratification: 
4. For States whose instruments · of mtific:ltiol1 or acccsshm arc 
deposited subs~quent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall 
enter into force on the dute of the deposit of thdr instruments of 
mtification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly infonn all signatory 
and accedingStates of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrumen t of ratification of an accession to this Treaty, the date 
of its entry into force l and the date of receipt of any 'requests for 
conferences or other notices-
o. This Tn:aty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursunnt to Article 102 of the Charter of, the United Nations. 
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Article IV 
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the 
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in adv.ance. 
Article V 
This Treaty, of which thc English and Russian texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary 
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmit-
ted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signa-
tory and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, helve 
signed this Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate at the city of Moscow the fifth day of August, 
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three. 
For the Government 
of the United 
States of America 
Dean Rusk 
For the Government 
of the United 




For the Government 
of the Union 




(from Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev and 
the Test Ban, pp. 302-305 
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ESSAY ON SOURCES 
The pre-Vietnam peace movement has been largely overlooked by historians, 
hence much of the documentation for this study was from manuscript sources, 
government documents, and books of a biographical nature. The Swarthmore 
College Peace Collection houses the. collected papers of many of the organizations 
of primary importance in this period, the great majority of,which are available 
without restriction. Documents which pertain to the birth of SANE and NVAANW 
are numerous, as are the memoranda which detail the transformation of CNVA 
under Bradford Lyttle. Both the SANE papers and the CNVA papers are processed 
and \o/ell -ca talogued . The rise and fall of TTP can be traced through the FOR 
papers and the papers of WILPF . Feminist peace activities can be rese~rched 
through both the above group and the Women Strike for Peace, although many of 
these documents are as yet unprocessed. A three-year funded project i s under-
way to process the many shelves of documents at Swarthmore. 
Student activity within the liberal peace coalition can be traced through 
a survey of the Student SANE file of the SANE papers and the papers of SPU. 
Further study of SPU can be conducted through the WRL papers and the corres-
pondence of David ~kReynold . Individuals who deposit or deposited their papers 
at SCPC include A.J. Muste , Homer Jack, Lawrence Scott, David McReynolds, and 
Bradford Lyttl e . 
Government documents were helpful in tracing the progression of the fallout 
debate. See liThe Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man, Hearings 
before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1955), 
"Contro1 and Reducti on of Armaments, II Hearings before a Subcommi ttee of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess, and 85th Cong., 
1st and 2nd Sess. (1955-1958), and "Technical Aspects of Detection and 
Inspection of a Nuclear Weapons Te?t Ban," Hearing before a Special Subcommittee 
on Radi ation and the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Joint 
Committee on Atomi c Energy , 86th Cong., 2nd Sess . (1960). The Department 
of State publication, Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959, is two volumes 
filled with the pertinent documents. Insight into the government argument 
behind closed doors is available in the recently declassified "Meeting the 
Threat of Surprise Attack," Report to the PresidentEi: the Technological 
Capabilities Panel of the SCience AdvisorY Committee, and the article, 
David Alan Rosenberg, "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours, " 
International Security 6 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 3-38. Finally, the Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States contains all of Eisenhower 
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and Kennedy' s public statements and press conferences dealing with the testing 
i ssue. 
Government sources also pertain to the Dodd i nvestigation of SANE, the 
transcript of which is entitled, IICommunist Infiltration in the Test Ban Move-
ment," Hearings before the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on 
the Judiciary. 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1960). The right-wing backlash is 
apparent in "Testimony of Dr. Linus Pauling," Hearing before the Subcommittee 
to Inves tigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Related 
Internal Security Laws, (2 Vols.) 86th Congo 2nd Sess (1960) and in "Communist 
Activities in the Peace Movement (Women Strike for Peace and Certain Other 
Groups)," Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activiti es , 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1962). 
The New York Times contains all the full-page advertisements by SANE and 
the series "SANE comment." In addition, the newspaper was helpful in recon-
structing the chronology of demonstrations and other peace movement actions. 
Time, Newsweek, and US News gave generally government-biased vie\l/s of the 
test-ban controversy, while Nation, New Republic, and Saturday Review presented 
J 
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the liberal outlook . Radical analyses were found in D;ssent ~ Ne\'J University 
Thought and the religious publication~ Fello~ship and Liberation .. Christian 
Century and Commonweal were also valuable for their coverage of pacifist and 
religious peace action. The voice of the scientific community often came 
through in the Bulletin of the Atomic SCientists , a periodical which was 
also helpful in its technical treatments of some of the radiation issues. 
Several books deal t with the peace movement in general, most notably 
Lawrence Wittner, Rebels Against War; The American Peace Movement, 1941.:.1960, 
which links the reborn peace movement of 1957 to the activism of the pre-WWII 
period. Charles DeBenedetti, The Peace Reform in American History is a topical 
treatment of the peace movement from the colonial period. Both Charl es 
Cha tfi e 1 d ~ . For Peace a nd Jus ti ce; . Pac i fi sril .:!l!. Arnett ca a rid Peter B roc k, . Pac i fi sm 
in the United States ftom the Colonial Era to the' First Wor1d~!ar deal exclusively 
with the pacifist ·witness and activism. Brock's text is notable for its detail 
of sectarian movements. Sel ected essays covering topics such as world federal ism, 
student activism, conscientious objection, and the peace research movement are 
available in Charles Chatfield, ed., Peace ~1ovements in America. 
The most complete and readable secondary source on the test ban controversy 
i s Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the VJind:The Nuclear Test Ban Debate~ 1954-1960. 
An insider's view is presented in Glen T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and 
the Test Ban. Diplomatic treatments are Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein, 
Di plomats, Scientists, and Politicians: The United States and the Nuclear Test 
Ban Negotiations and M.V. Subba Rao, "Diplomatic Background of the Test Ban 
Treaty," United Asia [India]. 
The scientific community was involved in more than the technical debate 
concerning the testing. See, for example, Daniel J. Devles, The Physicists. 
) 
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Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure SCience, Stephan J. Dupre and 
Sanford Alkoff~ Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics, and a JCAE 
history, Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom: The 
Integration of Powers. Two case studies in the pol itics of science and tech-
nology are presented i n Steve J. Heims, John Von Neumann and Norbert Weiner; 
From Mathelilatics to the Technologies of Lifeand 'Death. 
~ &iographies of key figures concerning the peace movement and its 
opponents in this period are Jo Ann Robinson, Abraham Went Out; ~ Biography 
~f ~.~. ~1uste, Kenneth S. Davis, The Politics of Honor: !l Biography of Adlai E. 
Stevens6n, Theodore Sorenson,Kennedy, Arthur M. Schlesinger , Jr . , A Thousand 
Days: John E; Kennedy in the White House , and Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn 
Owens: Energy and Conflict: The Life and Times of Edward Teller, all sympathetic 
treatments of their subjects. ~Jorks of an autobiographical nature include 
three scientific memoirs: James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists and 
Eisenhower: ~ Memoir of the ,First Special AssiStant to the President for SCience 
and Technology, George B. Kistiakowsky, ~ Scientist in the White House: The 
Private Diary of President Eisenhower'sSpecial Assistant for SCience and 
Technology, and Lewis L. Strauss, Men and Decisions. For information concerning 
the various international crises of the 1950s and the crucial national election 
of 1956, see Dwight D. Eisenhower, The \~~ite House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. 
The Geneva negotiating process is described by chief us negotiator James J . 
Wadsworth, The Politics of Peace. 
Personal statements,. especially concerning the tests and the potential 
dangers of fallout, abounded in the late 1950s. The pro-testing viewpoint i s 
blatantly laid down in Edward Teller and Albert Latter, Our Nuclear Future 
Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities, while an 9.nti-testirigappeal is made by 
Linus Pauling~ No More War! A more technical anti-testing treatment i s presented 
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in Robert Schubert and Ralph E. Lapp, Radiation: Hhat it ~and Holo" it Effects 
You. ~10re general issues of peace and disarmament are the subject of two 
intensely personal books, Norman Cousins, Present Tense: An American Editor's 
Odyssey, a collection of editorials from the Saturday ·Review and H. Stuart 
An Approach to Peace, the controversial pre-1962 election work which advocates 
a program of unilateral disarmament. The attempts to sail into the Pacific 
testing area which was the great success of early CNVA are descri bed by the 
skippers in Albert Bigelow, The Voyage ·of the Golden Rule: An Experiment With 
Truth and Earle Reynolds, The Forbidden Voyage. 
Radicalism in theory and action is the subject of several books which 
were vital to the treatment of non-violent resistance in thi s study. The 
Gandhian theory is described by Richard Gregg, The Power of Non-Violence. Con-
cerning the use of non-violent methods is Elliot M. lashin, Civil Disobedience 
and Democracy. Collected primary sources on the use ofsatyagraha and related 
methods was compiled by Staughton Lynd, ed., Non-Violence ~ America, !l 
Documentary History . The history of the first active new-left group is pre-
sented by Kirkpatrick Sale.SDS. Finally. the working activist is well-advised 
to read Saul Alinsky, Rules for Radicals: A Practical Primer for Realistic 
Radicals. 
Coa l ition theory i s a vast subject which i s extensively treated in various 
journal s , but several important books provide an overview of the major currents. 
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory ..E!Games and Economic 
BehaVior is where it all started. The updated theory of n-persons and the 
statement of the size principle is in Will iam H. Riker, The Theory of Pol itical 
Coalitions. For an overview of the many theories of the 1960s and 1970s, see 
Abram De Swann. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: 8.. study of formal 
theories of coalition formation applied to nine Eurooean Parliaments after 1918. 
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Finally. many different types of appl ications are presented in Svan Groenning, 
E. W. Kelley and r~ichael Leiserson, The Stud/of Coalition Behavior; Theoreti-
cal Perspectives and Case Studies from Fbur Continents. 
Two unpublished sources are ~ell worth seeking out by the interes ted 
scholar of SANE and CNVA. For a treatment of the liberal groups see Milton 
Steven Katz, "Peace, Politics, and Protest: SANE and the American Peace ~1ove­
ment, 1957-1972." The hi s tory of the radical pacifist group is available in 
Neil H. Katz, "Radical Pacifism and the Contemporary American Peace Movement; 
The Committee for Non-Violent Action. 1957-1967. " 
